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Abstract 
 
Since deeper ‘open-door’ domestic reform in 1992, China has consistently maintained 
its position as the largest foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient among developing 
countries. In recent years China is going global (investment abroad) as well. 
Accompanied with a large amount of outbound FDI, the level of private and public 
debt is also increasing. Thus it is necessary for China to adopt a sustainable economic 
development policy and behave based on rules. China needs to work with the world to 
promote a rules-based investment climate. 
 
At a multilateral level, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 
and promised general and specific obligations on market entry and non-discrimination 
principles. Bilaterally, only after 2001, China has started negotiating preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) with investment chapter. To date, China has signed 130 bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs). The first part of the thesis analyses China’s legal 
obligations in investment agreements in pre- and post-WTO entry phases. Chapter 1 
gives an introduction on China’s investment policy before 2001. Chapter 2 clarifies 
China’s commitments on non-discrimination principles under the WTO agreements, 
especially China’s Protocol of Accession. Chapter 3 sources Chinese BITs and PTAs. 
It begins with a description of the legal rules and economic reasons why countries 
switch from multilateral rules under the WTO agreements to PTAs. Then it scrutinizes 
Chinese PTAs concerning the question of how FTA’s influence on capital flow is 
faring in the context of China. This part lastly compares BITs and PTAs with regard to 
investment principles. 
 
The second part of the thesis concerns interpretation on substantive and procedural 
provisions. Chapter 4 tries to answer the question of whether and how do tribunals 
consider jurisprudential concepts developed in the case law of the trade regime when 
resolving investment cases. The case law shows that they have done so occasionally 
only for a very limited set of substantive issues. Trade law may influence ad hoc 
tribunals’ interpretation of non-discrimination standards. Chapter 5 examines different 
remedies in trade and investment agreements. China has had little-publicised cases 
with investor-state arbitration to date. It is important for China to keep compliance 
with its commitments in international agreements, otherwise, it would face 
countermeasures which are highly costly. Also, China can implement competition 
rules in its domestic market for improving firms’ efficiency. Meanwhile, a balancing 
approach which emphasizes corporate social responsibility is equally important for 
China’s companies going global. 
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1 
1 Introduction 
A brief look at China’s international investment flows reflects the background against 
which the Chinese investment treaties formed. Since 1993, China has consistently 
maintained its position as the largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) recipient 
among developing countries and one of the largest in the world. In 2002, China 
became the largest FDI recipient in the world.
1
 By the end of 2007, China had 
accumulated an FDI stock of over US$768 billion.
2
 China became the largest FDI 
recipient in the world again in 2014.
3
 China has also become the largest overseas 
investor among developing states, with a dramatic surge of outward investment in 
recent years.
4
 
The origin of China’s outward investment boom is sourced in its domestic 
economic development, and is accompanied by trade. China was, for example, a net 
exporter of rice. Meanwhile, to achieve continued strong growth, China also needs a 
reliable supply of energy and resources, especially in the long term. As McKinsey’s 
report estimated, by 2030 China will face a water deficit of 25%.
5
 The lack of clean 
drinking water, and even water for agricultural plants in China, has had a severe 
impact, since China is likely to rely heavily on import products that may be both 
expensive and vulnerable. Significant industrial and domestic wastewater pollution 
will make it hard to adjust the quality gap between water supply and demand. This 
situation will cause deep discontent from civil society and harm the health of the 
domestic investment environment. 
Besides the bright side of the investment boom, the problem caused by rapid 
increasing of Chinese debt cannot be ignored. It is noted that the high level of debt is 
only sustainable as long as China’s economy keeps on growing rapidly and the 
repatriate of profits remains high for its investments outside of China. However, since 
                                                        
1 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003: Overview, p. 8. 
2  See statistics provided by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Statistics/FDIStatistics/default.htm. 
3 UNCTAD, WIP, 2015, p. 4. 
4 UNCTAD statistics show that China was the 18th largest international investor in the world in 2006 with its $16 
billion FDI outflow. See UNCTAD, World Trade Report 2007: Overview, pp. 2-3. 
5 McKinsey 2009, Charting Our Water Future, Economic Framework to Inform Decision-Making.  
2 
China’s economy is slowing down, debt levels will become unsustainable and have a 
high risk of triggering financial difficulty. Also, the difficulty encountered by the 
current socio-economic decision-making system, to try to keep a balance between 
economic growth and environmental protection, may make it harder to solve the 
problem. Thus, a rule-based international investment and technology transfer, 
including into China, is in need. 
This thesis will analyze China’s legal obligations in terms of rules in trade and 
investment treaties, because China needs to support and cooperate with other 
economic entities, which insist that the ‘one belt and one road’ (OBOR)6 plan must 
be rule-of-law based. If China’s investment drive is based on an unsustainable rise in 
public and private debt, and if China behaves in total absence of rules, it will be 
difficult for the Chinese government to realize its goal made in the framework of the 
OBOR. 
Chinese investment may impose a positive impact on the local economy of host 
countries, but a lot of problems still exist. For example, China’s firms are required to 
take certain Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and protect the local environment. 
This thesis focuses on rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreements,
7
 
the network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs). China needs to work with the world to promote a rules-based 
investment climate. The EU’s European External Action Service (EEAS) for example, 
states that China needs to fulfill its declared aim of making its OBOR initiative an 
open platform which adheres to market rules and international norms.
8
 This trend 
requires countries to choose a rule-based path, creating a transparent, level playing 
field for investment in consideration of human rights, environmental standards, etc. 
With regard to these initiatives, China is making efforts to improve its 
investment treaty network. The number of Chinese investment treaties, including BITs 
                                                        
6 China’s “one belt, one road” project, is a ribbon of road, rail, and energy projects to help increase trade. 
7  The World Trade Organization’s founding instrument is the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, done at Marrakesh, 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (1994). It entered into force 1 
January 1995 (WTO Agreement). 
8 http://eeas.europa.eu/china/docs/joint_communication_to_the_european_parliament_and_the_council- 
elements_for a_new_eu_stretegy on China.pdf. 
3 
and regional treaties, has increased to over 130.
9
 Not only has the number of 
investment treaties grown, but the diversity of treaty partners has also increased. This 
trend may bring a new level of diversity to the participants in arbitration, both on the 
claimant and respondent side. China is likely to become involved in more 
international arbitration cases. Thus, it is worth considering the progress of 
treaty-making, and how to respond to the challenges ahead. 
    Other factors in attracting FDI to China include, for example, the country’s large 
and continuously growing market, its export-oriented strategy, the improvement of its 
economic environment, and the spill-over effects of industrial upgrading in 
neighboring economies.
10
 Accompanied by modern technology lowering the costs of 
communication and transport, FDI flow is also growing rapidly as well.
11
 This trend 
remarkably promotes the vertical development of the global value chain (on 
production).
12
 In turn FDI, partly as a result of information technology innovation, 
causes a far-reaching liberalization of FDI policy, especially in developing countries, 
as well as other domestic (policy and legal) reforms that strongly encourage 
movement towards a better investment climate.
13
 FDI related to production chain 
may be either horizontal or vertical in nature.
14
 Vertical FDI involves the 
establishment of companies that specialize in certain parts of the value chain, -- in 
consideration of their location, -- and depending on the comparative advantage of the 
host country. Horizontal FDI entails a company pursuing an expanding market for its 
similar goods. The latter implies that FDI and trade may be substituted for a 
multinational enterprise. Vertical FDI often entails offshoring part of the production 
process to affiliates in other countries with abundant resources or labor-intensive 
                                                        
9 See Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice, Oxford University 
Press, 2009, p. 31. 
10 See OECD Press Release: Reforms Could Boost China’s ability to Attract Foreign Investment, posted at:  
http://www.oecd.org/document/8/0. 2340.en_2649_37467_3240968_1_1_1_37467.00.html. 
11 UNCTAD, “World Investment Reporter” (2011) 4, 9. Asian FDI inflows reached USD 300 billion, and outflows 
reached USD 232 billion in 2010. 
12 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, 
xix-xx, U.N. Sales No.E.13.II.D.5 (2013). 
13 Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, Political Economy of World Trading System: the WTO and 
Beyond, Oxford University Press, 2009, p 13. 
14 Understanding the determinants of observed differences in FDI inflows, and the magnitude of intra-firm trade 
versus arms-length outsourcing and offshoring of tasks has become a major focus of research in international 
economics. See Elhanan Helpman, Understanding Global Trade, Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University 
Press, 2011. 
4 
industries. Multinational companies— can also outsource part of production to 
unaffiliated firms located in other countries, according to vertical FDI. To what extent 
developing countries can benefit from trade and inward FDI (and knowledge 
spillovers) depends on their skill levels and capacity to adapt existing technologies.
15
 
The cost foreign investors may concern is about the ability to implement contracts and 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) in host countries.
16
  
China signed up to the Agreements of the WTO in 2001. The lengthy WTO 
negotiations process, the subsequent amendments to Chinese laws, and regular 
scrutiny by the WTO are familiarizing the Chinese public with these important legal 
principles.
17
 This process has long-term implications for the development of a much 
stronger role-of-law in Chinese society. 
There have been a lot of studies of the legal aspects of investment treaties. Some 
research has an awareness of the economic analysis of law, for example, to assess the 
efficiency of an investment treaty about its liberalization purpose. Some claim that 
BITs benefit host state economies,
18
 while others argue that states receive little 
benefit from signing BITs.
19
 
A few scholars have identified specific circumstances where BITs support 
investment incentives.
20
 Some debate that capital-importing countries seeking to 
attract foreign investment (rather than the capital-exporting countries) drive the 
decisions about signing BITs.
21
 
                                                        
15 Hoekman and Kostecki, supra note 13, p.21. 
16 Id. 
17 Esther Lam, China and the WTO: A Long March Towards the Rule of Law, Wolters Kluwer, 2009, p. 115.  
18 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 67, 111 (2005) (concluding that “BITs work to increase FDI 
into signatory countries substantially”). 
19 Jason Webb Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from 
Alternative Evidence’, 51 VA. J. Int’l L. 397, 434 (2011) (arguing that “BITs are not correlated with political risk 
measures, nor do insurers seem to take BITs into account when deciding insurance terms;” and “limited surveys of 
in-house counsel for large corporations suggest that companies do not view BITs as playing a majority role in 
investment decisions”). And Clint Peinhardt & Todd Allee, ‘Failure to Deliver: The Investment Effects of US 
Preferential Economic Agreements,’ 2012 World Economy 757 (finding that very few countries experience 
increased investment flows after signing preferential economic agreements, including BITs, with the US). 
20 See, e.g., Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, ‘Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations 
on Foreign Direct Investment’, 65 Int’l Org. 401, 402 (2011) (finding that BITs increase FDI only when the host 
state is not later challenged before ICSID); Jennifer L. Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘When BITs have Some 
Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties’, 6 Rev. Int’l Org. 1,2 (2011) 
(reviewing conditions where BITs are linked with increased investment). 
21 See Zachary Elkins et al., ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties,’ 1960-2000, 
2008 U. ILL. L. Rev. 246 (noting that host countries tend to sign BITs in clusters, whereas home country signings 
are more stable over time, and concluding from this pattern that the capital importers decide whether and when to 
5 
    Investment treaties also referred to as ‘international investment agreements’ 
(IIAs), were initially for investors from capital-exporting countries to invest safely 
abroad and thus created a predictable international legal framework to facilitate and 
protect those investments.
22
 Meanwhile, states have also used the investment treaty as 
a means to encourage foreign capital flow and market liberalization with their 
negotiating partners.
23
 These objectives are sometimes reflected in the preamble of 
the treaty, and may also be reflected in the negotiation history. 
As the investment treaty is one of the necessary legal instruments to implement 
economic liberalization policy,
24
 we focus on certain substantive and procedural 
provisions which may facilitate the realization of these purposes. To see a better way 
for China to conclude investment treaties in the future, we will observe the existing 
treaty network, where at present the rules are in-built. Meanwhile, we have to retain 
full awareness of emerging economic problems during the process of forming 
investment agreements. 
The primary purpose of BIT is to protect the interests of foreign investors. By the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, foreign investors in many countries were 
protected by international treaties, rather than by customary law alone.
25
 The origin 
of the law on foreign investment lies in the history of efforts made by the US to 
protect its foreign investments in Latin America.
26
 The US argued that responsibility 
for injuries to the alien arose in the host state when it violated an external standard of 
treatment (international minimum standard). By contrast, the Latin American 
                                                                                                                                                              
sign BITs); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’, 12 U.C. Davis J. 
Int’l L. & POL’Y 157, 177-78 (2005) (suggesting that developing countries turned to BITs largely because, in the 
1980s, developed countries reduced their development aid and lending to multilateral development banks, which 
necessitated seeking private foreign investment); but see Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 17, at 73-74 (suggesting 
that the initial success of BITs was driven largely by negotiation programs promulgated by European states). 
22 This objective is based on the assumption that increased investment will further a country’s economic 
development and prosperity and that foreign sources of capital and technology can contribute to a country’s 
economic advancement. 
23 Investment protection and investment liberalization are distinct concerns. The latter refers to facilitating the 
entry and operation of foreign investments in the host country. The former refers to protecting the investment, once 
it has entered the country, from actions by governments and others that would interfere with investor property 
rights and the functioning of the investment in general. 
24  Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: the Role of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties,’ 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 501 (1998). 
25 See M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Third edition), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
26 Id. 
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countries argued Calvo Doctrine to counter the American formulations of the law. 
They claimed that complaints had to first resort to the national courts. If such recourse 
was impossible, then the responsibility of the respondent state arose on condition that 
there was a ‘denial of justice.’27 In addition, national courts favored expropriation 
and provided for weak compensation. Perhaps because of these conflicts, developed 
countries began to design investment treaties to bring some certainty to the rules on 
foreign investment relations.
28
 BITs originated with Germany (Germany-Pakistan 
BIT in 1959).
29
 Signing a BIT is necessary when the capital importer has a weak 
protection of property rights. Other OECD states then followed. They concluded 
bilateral investment treaties with other developing countries. The number of BITs has 
emerged mainly since then. From a historical perspective, they were asymmetrical 
treaties between a capital exporting country and a capital importing country. 
Developing countries may adopt high standards of treaty obligations in exchange for a 
higher inflow of investments which may lead to its economic development. But it is 
doubtful that these investment treaties have led to increasing investment flows. 
Investment treaties are also enforced through a mechanism of dispute settlement. The 
Investor-State Arbitration (ISA) process that underlies the international investment 
regime grows out of private international law. 
Trade and investment are inextricably linked. In theory, they are complements 
and substitutes. Investment can help circumvent high trade barriers. But trade 
openness might also lead to more investment.
30
 This interactive is reflected not only 
in economic activities but also in treaty law making. In the earliest days, the 
friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaties have incorporated provisions 
addressing investment-related commitments, e.g., rules on the establishment.
31
 
Despite these links, the two areas have largely co-existed in parallel, and in different 
                                                        
27 See Donald R. Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy 
17-20 (1955). 
28 Id. 
29 Treaty between Pakistan and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
25 November 1959, (1963) 457 UNTS 23 (1963). 
30 see Bhagwati, J, RA Brecher, E Dinopoulos and TN Srinivasan (1987), ‘Quid Pro Quo, Foreign Investment, and 
Welfare: A Political Economy Theoretic Approach,’ Journal of Development Economics, 27, 127-138. 
31 See, e.g., W. Alschner, “Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence of Friendship, Commerce and 
navigation (FCN) Treaties on Modern Investment Treaty Law,” Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2013. 
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ways. Trade is regulated by multilateral rules (under the WTO), whereas investment is 
governed through numerous bilateral treaties. However, in recent years, commentators 
have been concerned with the growing convergence of trade and investment law 
(‘cross-fertilization’).32 In particular, since the late 2000s, trade negotiations have 
moved away from the multilateral Doha Round and towards free/preferential trade 
agreements (FTAs/PTAs) built on a bilateral basis.
33
 Many PTAs included a chapter 
on investment. Therefore, the question is, to what extent does international trade 
influence the forming of investment agreements and through what channels does this 
occur? 
What caused the expansion of FTAs, and those revised obligations China 
promised in its trade and investment agreements after joining the WTO in 2001? This 
research will try to find out how trade has a significant influence on forming new 
Chinese investment treaties. 
    We divide provisions in IIAs into two categories: substantive provisions and 
procedural ones. The former includes market access, performance requirements, and 
non-discrimination treatment (national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment) 
provisions.
34
 The latter includes dispute settlement procedures, namely State-State 
dispute settlement (SSDS) and Investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS). BITs 
primarily are referred as investment protection agreements, seeing as a BIT provision 
may occasionally liberalize or promote investment.
35
 Criticisms of BITs have rested 
on either the claim that the protection standards are too rigorous, or that the necessary 
regulatory safeguards are lacking. The extent to which BITs play effective roles on 
free movement of capital has also been questioned.
36
 However, liberalization 
                                                        
32 See Mark Wu, The Scope and Limits of Trade’s Influence in Shaping the Evolving International Investment 
Regime, in Zachary Douglas ed., The Foundations of International Investment Law, Oxford University Press, 2014, 
at 169—209. 
33 For the trend of PTAs, see Petros Mavroidis, ‘WTO and PTAs: A Preference for Multilateralism?’ Journal of 
World Trade 44, no.5 (2010): 1145-1154. Petros B. Mavroidis, Always look at the bright side of non-delivery: 
WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements, yesterday and today, World Trade Review (2011), 10: 3, 375-387. Horn, 
Mavroidis, Sapir, Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements, The World 
Economy, 2010, p.1467. 
34 Distinguish between pre- and post-establishment protection. According to UNCTAD 10% of all BITs grant 
pre-establishment phase national treatment obligation. 
35 Jeswald W. Salacause and Nicholas P. Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’, 46 Harv. Int’l L. J. 67, 2005. 
36 Research on the Effectiveness of BITs, see Mary Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do Bilateral Investment treaties Attract 
FDI? Only a Bit and They Could Bite’, World Bank, Development Research Group, Investment Climate, Policy 
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provisions are more and more involved in BITs, particularly in investment chapters in 
PTAs over time. 
    The content of most Chinese BITs often follows a typical pattern provided by 
developed capital-exporting countries. Similar provisions often appear in more or less 
the same order in nearly every BIT. BITs mainly consist of investment protection 
provisions, which may be categorized as either absolute or relative. Relative clauses 
define the granted treatment by reference to the treatment provided to any other 
investment or investor. By contrast, the absolute clauses define the granted treatment 
without reference to the treatment provided to those comparators.
37
 Relative 
provisions require that covered investment receives treatment no less favorable than 
the treatment accorded to an investment of investors of any third country, a standard 
known as most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. Another relative provision requires 
that covered investment receives treatment no less favorable than the treatment 
accorded to investment of investors of the host country, a standard known as national 
treatment. These two provisions are always followed by a clause making exceptions 
to the general obligation, mainly for measures relating to taxation or obligations 
assumed under an economic integration area.
38
 This thesis focuses on those relative 
provisions, which were influenced significantly by trade law. 
    China’s foreign investment policy has changed towards increased liberalization 
since 2001 (post-WTO entry). Statistics show that FDI in China nearly doubled within 
the first five years of WTO admission.
39
 It reflected that trade could be 
complementary to investment as it eliminated certain restrictive investment measures, 
for example, a prohibition on investment measures related to trade (TRIMs), 
guaranteed non-discrimination, transparency, the rule of law, etc. China’s economy 
                                                                                                                                                              
Research Working Paper No.3121, June 2003; Jennifer L. Tobin and Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘When BITs Have 
Some Bite: the Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties,’ Rev. Int. Organ. (2011)6:1-32; 
Axel Berger, Matthias Busse, Peter Nunnenkamp, Martin Roy, ‘More Stringent BITs, Less Ambiguous Effect on 
FDI? Not a Bit!’, Economic Letters 112 (2011) 270-272; Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, ‘Do Bilateral 
Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?’ World Development, Vol.33, 
No.10, 1567-1585, 2005. 
37 The absolute treatment provisions means they establish an absolute level of protection that must be accorded by 
the host state in every circumstance, such as fair and equitable treatment. 
38 See China-Canada BIT, China-Japan-Korea TIA. 
39 See W. Shan, The Legal Framework of EU-China Investment Relations: a Critical Approach, Hart Publishing, 
2005, P.2. Also see Norah Gallagher and Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p.7.  
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has developed fast since joining the WTO. To test how trade law has had an impact on 
the form of China’s new investment agreements, the first subsections will describe the 
facts concerning China’s signed investment treaties before 2001. It will then analyse 
China’s investment policy in the early years (1980s-1990s) and examine the changed 
trend of two-way capital flow which reflected new features of investment treaties 
since the late-1990s. The last subsection will look at procedures of investment dispute 
settlements in which China has been involved. 
1.1 China’s Investment Policy Before 2001 (Accession to WTO) 
Why did China revise its investment treaties, and involve more economic 
liberalization clauses? As the experiences of other states has shown, investment 
treaties may be one of the relevant legal instruments to implement economic 
liberalization policy.
40
 Since the late 1970s China’s economy has changed: from a 
centrally planned system that was largely closed to international trade, to a more 
market-oriented economy that has rapidly growing private sectors and is a major 
player in the global economy.
41
 Domestic reforms started in 1978 with a phased 
gradual liberalization of prices, the foundation of a diversified banking system, the 
rapid growth of non-state sectors, and the opening to foreign trade and investment.
42
 
In the following sessions we trace a brief history of China’s trade and investment 
policy, then have a look at Chinese BIT program in its early years (before entry to the 
WTO). 
1.1.1 Ancient Times 
During the time of the ancient empire, during the Han dynasty (156-87 BC), China 
was famous for trading its merchandise, such as silk, tea, and porcelain, with the 
                                                        
40 See Zachary Elkins et al., ‘Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties,’ 1960-2000, 
2008 U. ILL. L.Rev. 265, 281-82 (suggesting that “BITs spur foreign direct investment, which in turn spur the 
creation of more BITs”). 
41 But “China is still a developing country with a GDP per capital of around US $6,000 regarding purchasing 
power parity, compared to the US $48,000 in the case of the US and the US $34,000 in the case of the EU”. See 
Rafael Leal-Arcas, International Trade and Investment Law: Multilateral, Regional and Bilateral Governance, 
Edward Elgar Press, 2010. pp.105-107.  
42 Id. 
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world. The “Silk Road,” was a commercial path from China’s capital city Xi’an, 
across Central- and Western Asia, to the Mediterranean countries, and finally the city 
of Rome. Later, during Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China was a strong naval power, 
and frequently involved in long-distance trade. Captain Zheng He, who led his team 
with two hundred ships, went across the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean to trade 
with East Asia countries. This prosperity was centuries before the Europeans’ sailed 
across oceans. But China turned away from the sea in the late fourteenth century 
when the Ming emperor decided that increased long-distance trade, and the creative 
destruction that it might bring, would likely threaten their power to control.
43
 China 
was never formally colonized by a European power, but after the Opium Wars (1839 
–1842), China had to sign a series of “unequal treaties” and allow the entry of 
European exports.
44
 As China did not take advantage of commercial and industrial 
opportunities at that time, it lagged behind Western Europe for hundreds of years. 
1.1.2 The New Government of P.R. China 
From the establishment of China’s new government in 1949, until 1978, there was 
rarely FDI inflow. China’s negative experience with the “unequal treaties” of the 
Western States, had brought large segments of Chinese society to regard trade and 
investment agreements as “imperialistic impositions”, not negotiated but, rather, 
“imposed”.45 Consequently, in 1950, China negotiated its first treaty with its then 
closest ally, the Soviet Union, namely the “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual 
Assistance.”46 Eight years later, China and USSR concluded a “Treaty of Trade and 
Navigation” granting to each other MFN treatment “in all trade, navigation” and 
                                                        
43 Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, Crown 
Business, 2012, p. 117. 
44 Treaty of Nanking, signed 29 August 1842. Other treaties, including the 1844 Treaty of Wanghia between Qing 
China and the USA, and the 1844 Treaty of Huangpu with France may be similarly described. See JK. Fairbank, 
‘Chinese Diplomacy and the Treaty of Nanking, 1842’ (1940) 12(1) Journal of Modern History 1; Immanuel CY 
Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 168. 
45 V. Bath, Foreign Investment: The National Interest and National Security: Foreign Direct Investment in 
Australia and China, in 34 Sydney Law Review, 2012, p.5.  
46 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the 
People’s Republic of China, 226 UNTS 3103, Article 5. 
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“other economic relations.”47 At that time, the “great leap forward” policy had 
brought the country’s economy to the edge of collapse. 
1.1.3 After Deng Xiaoping’s Reform 
In 1978 Deng Xiaoping, the new leader of the country, inaugurated the “open door” 
policy. He believed that it was time to implement a socialist system with Chinese 
characteristics, through some changes in the legal framework, at domestic as well as 
international level. In 1979, the National People’s Congress passed the law of 
China-foreign equity joint ventures. In 1982, the Constitution was amended to include 
a reference to foreign investments, confirming their protection under Chinese law.
48
 
As a result of the ‘open-door’ policy, China entered into 30 BITs covering most 
of its principle investment partners
49
 in the 1980s. It is evident during this period 
BITs were concluded with the overwhelming majority of developed European 
countries (as shown in the table below). For example, in 1982, the Chinese BIT 
program starts with the signature of the first investment treaty with Sweden.
50
 All 
BITs China entered into during the three subsequent years were with major capital 
exporters, such as Germany (1983), France (1984) and Italy (1985). 
 
 
                                                        
47 Treaty of Trade and Navigation between the Union of Soviet Socialist States and the People’s Republic of 
China, UNTS 4534, Art 2 (entered into force 25 July 1958). 
48 See Article 18 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. 
49 For example, the list includes Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Norway, Italy, Denmark, the 
UK, the Netherlands, Austria, Singapore, Switzerland, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, but notably not the U.S.  
50 The Agreement did not provide any investor-state dispute resolution mechanism, only state-to-state dispute 
settlement. See Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement between Sweden and the People’s Republic of 
China on the Establishment of Consular Relations, signed 26 June 1955, 228 UNTS 3148. 
No. Party Signature Renegotiation 
1 Sweden 29/3/1982  
2 Romania 10/2/1983 16/4/2007 
3 Germany 7/10/1983 1/12/2003 
4 France 30/5/1984 26/11/2007 
5 Belgium-Lux 4/6/1984 6/6/2005 
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    Subsequently, while continuing to pursue investment agreements with major 
capital exporters, China also started to enter into BITs with other developing states. In 
those BITs with developed states, China sometimes departed from its previous 
practice of closed-door policy, for example, both the 1986 BIT with the U.K., and the 
1987 BIT with the Netherlands allowed for international arbitration as an option. BITs 
with developed states primarily served the purpose to build its economic 
infrastructure through inbound investment; conversely, BITs with developing 
states—whose texts were usually similar to the Chinese model—were primarily aimed 
at strengthening diplomatic alliances. China’s BITs with developing countries were 
more focused on investment promotion and encouragement, whilst allowing for 
6 Finland 4/9/1984 15/11/2004 
7 Italy 28/1/1985  
8 Thailand 12/3/1985 15/8/2009 (Investment Chapter in ASEAN-China FTA) 
9 Denmark 29/4/1985  
10 Netherlands 17/6/1985 26/11/2001 
11 Austria 12/9/1985  
12 Singapore 21/11/1985 15/8/2009 (Investment Chapter in ASEAN-China FTA) 
13 Kuwait 23/11/1985  
14 Sri Lanka 13/3/1986  
15 UK 15/5/1986  
16 Switzerland 12/11/1986 27/1/2009 
17 Poland 7/6/1988  
18 Australia 11/6/1988 June 2015 (Investment Chapter in FTA) 
19 Japan 27/8/1988 12/3/2013 (Triangle Investment Agreement among Japan, Korea 
and China) 
20 New Zealand 22/11/1988 Apr. 7
th, 2008 (Investment Chapter in FTA) 
21 Canada 9/9/2012  
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flexibility regarding transfers. They featured more specific provisions, such as a 
definition of investment and the conditions for its admittance, a thorough consultation 
process, or the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts in questions over the legality 
of expropriation procedures.
51
 In any case, most Chinese BITs signed until the 
mid-1990s provided for Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) and MFN treatment, but 
not national treatment. 
    China is making an effort to improve its regulatory framework for FDI, including 
its extensive investment treaty network. In addition, China has substantially revised 
old versions of treaties and correspondingly updated its domestic laws. 
During the period of WTO entry negotiations in the 1990s, China modified old 
versions of regulations, especially those which promised national treatment, to level 
the playing field for the investment of both foreign and domestic investors. China was 
active in entering into BITs, with more than 60 BITs signed during this period 
(1992-2001), more than twice the number reached in the previous decade. China 
mainly signed BITs with developing countries at this time. 
Previously, Chinese BITs were concluded with industrialized states. From 1985, 
however, China started to sign BITs with developing countries, while continuing to 
enter into BITs with other developed states. Whilst the general contents were similar, 
Chinese BITs concluded with developing countries displayed certain unique features, 
compared with BITs signed with developed states. First, they were trying to 
encourage and promote investment, which was reflected not only in the preamble, but 
also in the specific provisions (e.g., “definition of investment”). Second, national 
jurisdiction was emphasized. For example, the China-Singapore BIT requires that 
investments must be approved by the host state before they can recourse to BIT 
protection.
52
 It seems China has adopted a liberal route following its fast-growing 
outward investment, in particular in the areas of natural resources and infrastructure in 
Africa. 
                                                        
51 See, e.g., Chinese BITs with Thailand, Sri Lanka, Singapore. 
52 Article 1(1) of China-Singapore BIT (1985). 
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    The ICSID took effect for China in 1993.
53
 In accordance with Article 25(4) 
ICSID Convention, China notified the Centre that it would only consider submitting 
to ICSID jurisdiction for disputes over compensation for expropriation.
54
 Despite this 
reservation, the accession of China to the ICSID Convention made it possible for 
investors to make direct reference to ICSID jurisdiction. China later made full 
reference to ICSID in BITs. For example, the China-Lithuania BIT, signed in 
November 1993, included such a reference
55 . It stipulates that an ‘amount of 
compensation’ dispute may be submitted to the Centre for arbitration, if it cannot be 
settled by negotiation between the parties within six months.
56
 The same article also 
makes it possible for other disputes, as agreed by the parties, to be submitted to the 
Centre for arbitration. However, not all BITs signed by China since 1993 have 
followed this model. For example, the China-Uruguay BIT did not make any 
reference to ICSID jurisdiction, although both parties had signed up to the ICSID 
Convention at the time of signing the BIT. 
1.2 The Features of Early Chinese BITs Due to ‘Open-door’ Policy in 
the 1980s 
As already explained, BITs have their origin in Europe, and the first one was signed 
between Germany and Pakistan in 1959. China has a different history to that of the 
West. In certain aspects, however, investment treaties also reflect Chinese attitudes 
towards international law and international dispute settlement mechanisms.
57
 Unlike 
the developed West, China did not become involved in treaties of Friendship, 
Commerce, and Navigation (FCN). 
    After a long period of absence from investment agreements, the first BIT 
                                                        
53 See designations and notifications for members on ICSID site, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet. 
54 “Pursuant to Art 25(4) of the Convention, the Chinese Government would only consider submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes over compensation resulting from 
expropriation and nationalization.” This reservation can be found at the Centre website: 
http://icsid.worlbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet, (visited on 16 July, 2014.) 
55 See China-Lithuania BIT, Art 8(2). 
56 Id. 
57 Leon E. Trackman, ‘China and Foreign Direct Investment: Does Distance Lend Enchantment to the View?’ 
Volume 2 No. 1, March 2014, The Chinese Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 1-20. 
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concluded by China with a Western country, was with Sweden in 1982, four years 
after the introduction of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘open-door’ policy. China finalized a further 
BIT with the U.K. in 1986, and with the Netherlands in 1987. Since then, China has 
become active in negotiating treaties for industrial cooperation with other states. Over 
130 investment treaties
58
 have been concluded by China. 
    As shown below, the legal structure and the major provisions of existing Chinese 
BITs signed with developing countries do not differ significantly from BITs 
concluded with Western, developed states. The uniformity of the Chinese BIT 
network has been preserved in each of these circumstances.
59
 The similarity of the 
BITs is revealed in certain aspects. Nearly all of the provisions of a typical BIT 
protect investment, while few BITs include provisions that liberalize investment.
60
 
BITs rarely contain stringent commitments to induce outbound investment. Rather, the 
facilitation of investment flow occurs through the guarantee of a secure and stable 
investment climate. BITs virtually never regulate investment by locking in foreign 
investors’ obligations.61 
    The following part will examine China’s purpose in negotiating BITs in the early 
years, to compete with other developing countries in attracting FDI. Typically, the 
European countries prepared a model negotiation text that they presented to potential 
treaty partners as a basis for negotiation.
62
 China began concluding BITs with 
European countries in the early 1980s. More than half of the Chinese BITs entered 
into in the 1990s followed those European models. In the 1990s, China also signed 
BITs with other developing countries, although these countries may have been 
competing with the purpose of attracting private foreign capital, and technology skills 
                                                        
58 For Chinese BITs data selection, see Norah Gallagher, Wenhua Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies 
and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
59 The description on using this comparison methodology, see Petros C Mavroidis, ‘All Clear on the Investment 
Front: a Plea for a Restatement,’ in Jose E. Alvarez, etc., ed., The Evolving International Investment Regime: 
Expectations, Realities, Options, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
60 See C. Fred Bergsten, Gary C. Hufbauer & Sean Miner, ‘Bridging the Pacific: Toward Free Trade and 
Investment between China and the United States,’ Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2014. 
61 See Peter T. Muchlinsk, “Regulating Multinationals: Foreign Investment, Development, and the Balance of 
Corporate and Home Country Rights and Responsibilities in a Globalizing World”, in The Evolving International 
Investment Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options, Jose E. Alvarez and Karl P. Sauvant, etc. ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2011. 
62 Leon E. Trakman and Nicola W. Ranieri, ‘Foreign Direct Investment: A Historical Perspective’, in Leon E. 
Trakman and Nicola W. Ranieri, ed., Regionalism in International Investment Law, Oxford University Press, 
2013. 
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from developed countries.
63
 From 1992 to 1993, China concluded BITs with all five 
of the Central Asian states.
64
 China’s BITs with developing countries were often 
based on existing BITs, already concluded with developed countries. However, these 
BITs concluded between capital-importing countries could be viewed as part of 
regional efforts to facilitate capital flow between themselves.
65
 
    Since private foreign investment has increasingly come to play a significant role 
in capital-importing countries’ development processes, BITs have served to establish 
the rules according to which such investments could be secured. Earlier BITs, like the 
China-U.K. BIT (1986) and the China-Netherlands BIT (1987), allowed investors to 
resort to ad hoc international arbitration for dispute remedy. This allowance was an 
exception to China’s standard practice at that point, which involved the provision of 
settlement for host and home states to resolve investment disputes.
66
 However, an 
updated China-Netherlands BIT (2001) provided for disputes to be submitted to 
ICSID.
67
 As China only became a signatory to the ICSID Convention in 1993, it was 
unlikely that ICSID would have been an option before that year. A possible alternative 
would have been to include a conditional consent to investor-state arbitration, as was 
adopted in the China-Australia BIT (1988), since the condition would have been 
satisfied when China adopted the ICSID Convention.
68
 
    Do legal provisions which protect foreign investment influence the foreign 
investors in their decisions making? In the absence of actual capital flow, legal rules 
of investment treaties have little meaning to promote host state’s economic growth by 
attracting foreign investment. The legal framework and its positive (or negative) 
effect on facilitating a particular foreign investment will play a key role in any 
potential investor’s decision-making. 
    Under this scenario, the existence of a BIT is an essential element in what makes 
                                                        
63 Andrew T. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties,’ 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639 (1998). 
64 See, e.g., Chinese 1992 BITs with Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, and with Tadjikistan 
1993; Chinese BITs with Lao 1993, and Korea and Viet Nam 1992. 
65 Thomas Hale, ‘The de Facto Preferential Trade Agreement in East Asia’, Review of International Political 
Economy, 18:3, 299-327, 19 Oct. 2010. 
66 China-U.K BIT (1986), Art 7(2). 
67 China- Netherlands BIT (2001), Art 10(3). 
68 China-Australia BIT (1988), Art 12(4). 
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up a particular country’s investment climate. Indeed, the negotiation and conclusion 
of a BIT involving a developing (capital-importing) country may be intended to send 
a welcome signal to the international commercial firms, to indicate that the host 
country will protect foreign investors and their investments.
69
 
1.3 A Changed Trend since the Late 1990s: Two-way Capital Flow 
and New Features of Investment Treaty 
In the early1980s, China was predominantly an inward investment destination and not 
yet a major exporter of capital. It hesitated to embrace a liberalized investment regime 
at a time when domestic economic reform was ongoing. After 2001, accompanied by 
a “going abroad” strategy, China’s BIT program, has especially focused on outbound 
investment. Meanwhile, China is currently active as an inward and outward 
participant at this stage of the global development of BITs.
70
 
    The challenge of the new treaties’ negotiation is that China has still resisted 
including market access commitments in both the new BIT signed with Canada, and 
the trilateral investment agreement signed with Japan and South Korea.
71
 By not 
extending the coverage of the national treatment obligations to the pre-establishment 
phase of investments, China is still preserving its right to regulate the entry of foreign 
investments. As some scholars argue, China’s changed foreign investment policy is 
not necessarily linked to its evolving status as an outward investing country.
72
 
    Even though not entirely derived from the U.S. model BIT standards (2010), the 
provisions of the CJK Triangle Investment Agreement drew comparisons with the 
                                                        
69 As Peter Egger and Michael Pfaffermayr’s analysis of outward FDI stock from OECD countries suggested, 
merely signing a BIT (between the current OECD economies involve one old and one new OECD member), 
before implementation actually occurs, has a positive signaling effect. See Peter Egger and Michael Pfaffermayr, 
‘The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment,’ 32 Journal of Comparative 
Economics, (2004). 
70 There is some evidence of China’s vital capacity to conclude more sophisticated BITs with countries across the 
world, for example with Mexico, Canada, Korea and Japan in the new millennium. 
71 China, Japan, and Korea signed a trilateral investment agreement in May 2012.  
72 James Zhan, Jorg Weber, and Joachim Karl, ‘International Investment Rulemaking at the beginning of the 
Twenty-First Century: Stocktaking and Options for the Way Forward,’ in The Evolving International Investment 
Regime: Expectations, Realities, Options, Jose E. Alvarez and Karl P. Sauvant, etc. ed., Oxford University Press, 
2011, p. 203. 
18 
highest standards of existing Chinese BITs.
73
 However, China is willing to grant 
most-favoured-nation treatment to assist market entry, ensuring that its partner 
countries’ investors benefit from a preferable treatment that China might give third 
countries in the future.
74
 
    China’s growing participation in foreign investment treaties indicates that to a 
large extent it is likely to liberalize its investment regime. Since China is making a 
significant amount of investment abroad, there will be more and more claims 
provoked by investors against China in the future. However, the benefits may well 
outweigh the costs. China is going global, and there are at least two trade-offs to be 
considered: firstly, it could make investment concessions in exchange for the 
concessions in other areas—i.e., trade; and secondly, the more mutual-commitments 
implemented, and afforded by, an internal state may be offset by its growing 
investment interest abroad.  
  The earliest BITs signed with European countries contained fewer provisions 
than BITs later updated, for example, the extensively negotiated China-Canada BIT 
(signed in 2012).
75
 Some more complex and detailed provisions were gradually 
added over time.
76
 
Also, notably in the negotiating text of a China-US BIT, more liberalization 
commitments have appeared than in the past. These guarantee national treatment on 
the right to establish investment and prohibit the imposition of certain performance 
requirements as a condition of the establishment of investment. Besides, the provision 
on the free transfer is much less often subordinated to local law in later BITs than in 
earlier BITs. 
    BITs are not reciprocal concessions, but a mutual commitment to certain legal 
principles. The purpose of trade agreements is to facilitate an escape from a 
                                                        
73 Jeffrey J. Schott and Cathleen Cimino, “The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement: Implications 
for US Policy and the US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty,” in Essays Toward a US-China Investment Treaty, 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015. 
74 Id. 
75 J.J. Saulino, ‘The Canada-China Investment Treaty—Lessons from a U.S.-China BIT?’ TDM, Provisional, 
November 2012. 
76 One clear example is that more particular exception clause added in new BITs, i.e. financial services rules. 
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terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemma.77 According to the terms-of-trade theory of 
trade agreements, developing countries stand to gain from reciprocal trade 
liberalization in cases then they are big enough for foreign exporters to “feel the pain” 
of their tariffs (i.e. care about access to their markets).
78
 While different from the 
mutual concession in the trade agreements, BITs impose few, if any, commitments on 
the capital exporting country. 
    The investment treaty’s “asymmetric” characteristic seems “inaccurate” because 
both parties are equally obliged by a BIT in theory. But the imbalance has became 
more accurate in practice, to the extent that investment dominantly flows in one-way 
only between the two parties. In the early years of the BIT programs, the great 
majority of BITs were between a developed and a developing country, and investment 
nearly always flowed in only one direction between the two parties, if it flowed at 
all.
79
 Since the 1990s, however, BITs between developing countries have become 
more familiar, as developing countries seek to increase the stabilizing and signalling 
effect of their BIT programs or to protect their own outward investment. Traditionally 
a sense of asymmetry has been argued, due to the disparity in bargaining power 
between developed and developing countries, though this has gradually diminished 
over time.
80
 In this sense, treaty commitments may be regarded as credits of policies 
that the capital-importing party should be adopted entirely apart from their effect on 
particular investments.
81
  
China has increasingly become a significant exporter of capital to both 
developed and developing countries. Thus, the sense of granting strict high standards 
to inward investment may be offset by giving protection for outside investment.
82
 So, 
                                                        
77 See Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, ed., Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, The American 
Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on WTO Law, Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
78 Kyle Bagwell, Robert W. Staiger, ‘Can the Doha Round be a Development Round? Setting a Place at The Table’, 
in Robert C. Feenstra and Alan M. Taylor, ed., Globalization in an age of crisis: multilateral economic cooperation 
in the twenty-first century, the University of Chicago Press, 2014, pp.103-104. 
79 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, ‘Investment Liberalization and Economic Development: the Role of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties,’ 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 501 (1998); and ‘Sustainable Liberalism and the 
International Investment Regime’, 19 Michigan Journal of Investment Law 373 (1998). 
80 Axel Berger, Matthias Busse, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Martin Roy, ‘Attracting FDI through BITs and RTAs: 
Does treaty content matter?’ Columbia FDI Perspectives, No.75. July 30, 2012. 
81 See Stephan W. Schill, ‘Whither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment 
Law’, the European Journal of International Law, Vol. 22 No.3, 2011; Jason Yankee, ‘Controlling the International 
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what drives China’s motivation to pursue investment treaties with different partners? 
China has concluded their investment agreements, and these treaties often differ in 
only slight ways from the model offered by developed countries. One important 
objective for China is to improve its domestic investment climate. Even since the 
early 1990s, as a major capital-importing country, China has become more likely to 
incorporate international standards, reflected in treaties, into domestic laws. China 
exports capital to many other nations in the world. Thus, it must have apply standards 
to both import and export BITs, which will also help China solidify reforms at home 
and promote competition its market. 
1.4 Investment Claims and China 
China has succeeded in attracting massive amounts of FDI over several decades and is 
expected to further extend its global influence over FDI markets, though there are 
many criticisms of China’s image in relation to foreign investment.83 There have not 
been many cases involving China, or Chinese investors registered at ICSID. To date, 
there appear to be five cases filed by Chinese investors under an investment treaty. 
There is only one case provoked by a foreign investor against China. Despite China’s 
commitments to consent for ad hoc international arbitration, it has had 
little-publicized experience with investor-state arbitration to date. The following 
subsections choose six publicized open cases to observe: (1) the risks foreign 
investors may face in China, and (2) that in other countries’ territory Chinese 
investors pursue investor-state arbitration for their interests. 
 
a) China as a Defendant 
The first claim against China is related to construction, timber logging and property 
development of over 900 hectares in the Hainan province. The rights to leasehold land 
held by the Malaysian investor were revoked by the local authority, as it claimed that 
                                                        
83 Vivienne Bath, ‘The Quandary for Chinese Regulations: Controlling the Flow of Investors into and out of 
China,’ in Vivienne Bath and Luke Nottage (eds), Foreign Foreign Investment and Dispute Resolution Law and 
Practice in Asia (Routledge 2011) 25.  
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the investor had failed to develop the land following local legislation. Ekran
84
 filed 
its claim at ICSID in May 2011. The parties suspended the proceeding in July 2011 
and the case was settled in May 2013.
85
 No tribunal was ever appointed. 
 
b) China (investor) as Complainant 
The first case lodged by a Chinese investor was in Tza Yap Shum v. Peru.
86
 One of 
the central issues at the jurisdiction stage was whether the investor could avail of the 
protections of the China-Peru BIT (1994). The tribunal confirmed that an investor 
from the SAR Co. of Hong Kong was a covered investor under the BIT, and thus 
entitled to protection for their investment. Nationality is a question of domestic law, 
as nationality was conferred by a state to a person under its laws. There was no 
express exclusion in the BIT itself of Chinese nationals resident in Hong Kong nor did 
Article 25 ICSID require anything more than nationality. Peru’s objections on this 
point were rejected as well as the submission that the transaction was not a covered 
investment because it was made indirectly through an SPV corporation. 
    There are some other pending claims by Chinese investors. Two are UNCITRAL 
arbitrations in accordance with the terms of the relevant BITs: China Heilongjiang 
International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp., et al. v. Mongolia,
87
 which 
has been withdrawn by the claimant, and in Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Australia.
88
 
    The Philip Morris claim was lodged in 2011, under the Hong Kong-Australian 
BIT (1993). Article 10 of the treaty provides for arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
Rules. The basis of the claim relates to the issue of plain-packaging legislation for 
cigarettes, which Australia argues is part of a “comprehensive government strategy to 
                                                        
84 Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15). 
85 The outcome of the proceeding as shown in the ICSID centre: The Secretary-General issues a procedural order 
taking note of the discontinuance of the proceeding according to ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(1) on May 16, 2013. 
86 Tza Yap Shum (Investor of Chinese Nationality) v. the Republic of Peru, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
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88 Philip Morris Asia’s claim against Australia concerns Australia’s plain packaging laws. The tribunal ruled (in 
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reduce smoking rates in Australia.”89 The Hong Kong-Australian BIT is different in 
format to the Chinese BITs relied on the previous cases, as it is a broad dispute 
resolution provision, not requiring the exhaustion of domestic administrative 
proceedings. Australia also asserted, as a separate argument, that the Hong 
Kong-Australia BIT only accorded protection to investments that had been ‘admitted’ 
by the host state ‘subject to its law and investment policies applicable from time to 
time’.90 
    Another case is an ICSID claim arising out of the financial crisis. The award on 
jurisdiction has already been released. Ping An, China’s second-largest insurance 
company, filed a complaint against Belgium in September 2012 seeking over $3 
billion in damages relating to its ill-fated investment in Fortis which was nationalized 
by the Belgian Government in 2008. Ping An had bought a stake in Fortis less than a 
year before. A tribunal was appointed and held its first meeting on procedural aspects 
in April 2013. It was both the first time a mainland Chinese investor filed a claim 
against an OECD country at ICSID, and that one of China’s new third generation 
BITs will be considered. The tribunal dismissed Ping An’s claim for lack of 
jurisdiction.
91
  
The latest case is Beijing Construction Company v. Yemen.
92
 Claimants alleged 
that the Yemeni government deprived their assets and contract rights concerning a 
project for the construction of an airport terminal in Sana’a. The case was registered at 
the ICSID in 2014. At the time of writing this case is still pending. 
Many early Chinese BITs provided a clause to submit the claims to a judicial or 
                                                        
89 Australia contended that at the time that the dispute between the parties arose, Philip Morris Asia did not own 
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administrative body of the host state.
93
 In the absence of an investor-state arbitration 
clause in BITs, the investor will have no effective means of enforcing their 
substantive rights under the BIT. For some BITs, arbitration clauses are limited to a 
quantification of compensation in cases of expropriation (depending on the precise 
wording of such clauses). Recently, Chinese investors have begun using the BIT to 
make claims against the host state if governmental measures have negatively affected 
their overseas investments. 
    In practice, there are still many questions. China’s particular method of 
liberalizing its BITs is explicable in light of its economic and political development 
and historical differences from the West.
94
 Given China’s late participation in BITs, 
its ideological dissimilarities to the West, and its developing economy, it is unrealistic 
to expect it to embrace the liberalization of investment that most Western countries 
themselves did not initially embrace either.
95
 As a capital importer, China has had 
significant historical reasons for regulating inbound capital, including through BITs, 
domestic laws, administrative regulation, its court system, and commercial arbitration. 
As a growing capital exporter, China may need to use BITs to protect its outbound 
investors in BIT partner states. This raises further questions of what commitments 
China has already promised in its current trade and investment agreements, and if 
China should take responsibility when involved in world economy activities. 
Furthermore, it asks what is trade law’s influence on the form of new investment 
agreements? 
The structure of this thesis will be as follows: The first part of the thesis will 
analyse China’s legal obligations in investment agreements in the pre- and post-WTO 
entry phases respectively. After Chapter 1 states China’s investment policy before its 
accession to the WTO in 2001, Chapter 2 clarifies China’s commitments in the WTO 
agreements, especially China’s promises under the Protocol of Accession. Recently 
countries are inclined to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) which involved 
investment agreement as a package deal. Challenge of this trend arises as a large 
                                                        
93 See, for example, Article 8 of the China-Kuwait BIT (1985), and Article 13 of the China-Singapore BIT (1985). 
94 Id. 
95 See Sharon W Mukand, ‘Globalization and the “Confidence Game”’ (2006) 70(2) J Int’l Econ, p. 406. 
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number of bilateral treaties make the system much more complicated. Chapter 3 
describes China’s practice in concluding bilateral investment agreements and analyses 
FTAs and BITs respectively during the post-WTO period. It begins with a description 
of the legal rules and economic reasons why countries may choose to switch from 
multilateral rules under the WTO agreements to make promises under PTAs. It will 
then scrutinize Chinese PTAs, questioning how FTA’s influence on capital flow is 
faring in the context of China. This part lastly makes a comparison between 
investment provisions in BITs and PTAs. 
The second part of the thesis concerns interpretations of substantive and 
procedural provisions, as trade may influence the formation of investment treaties 
through the interpretation of substantive commitments by tribunals. 
Most-Favoured-National (MFN) treatment and national treatment are among core 
principles in foreign investment law, which can trace their sources from international 
trade law. Chapter 4 tries to answer the question, whether and how do tribunals 
consider jurisprudential concepts, developed in the case law of the trade regime when 
resolving investment cases. The case law shows that they have done so occasionally 
only for a very limited set of substantive issues. Trade law may influence ad hoc 
tribunal’s interpretation of non-discrimination standards. Chapter 5 examines different 
remedies in trade and investment agreements. China has had few publicized cases of 
investor-state arbitration to date. It is important for China to maintain compliance 
with its commitments in international agreements, otherwise, it will face high-cost 
countermeasures. Finally, Chapter 6 provides an overall conclusion regarding China’s 
openness to foreign investment during the phases of pre- and post-accession of WTO. 
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2 Investment, Trade and Multilateral Agreements 
In the WTO, countries negotiate binding agreements to reduce trade barriers, agree on 
disciplines for policies affecting international trade, and provide a remedy for dispute 
settlement mechanisms.
96
 The interface defined between trade policy and economic 
regulations has become more blurred.
97
 One difference is that negotiations on 
regulatory issues may be ‘zero-sum games’ (i.e., some countries may lose). By 
contrast, tariff reductions are ‘positive-sum’ (i.e., all countries gain, even though 
certain groups in each country will lose unless they are compensated). Another 
difference, again in contrast to tariffs, is that it can be difficult to agree on what 
constitutes a non-tariff measure (NTM) — that is to say, what types of policies are 
trade distorting. Sometimes, it may be indeasible to reduce their negative impact. For 
many NTMs, all that may be possible is to agree to apply the core principles of 
transparency, National Treatment (NT), and Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN), and to 
seek to adopt procedural mechanisms.
98
 
Non-discrimination treatment, which is a core principle in investment law, may 
trace its roots from trade law but has a few differences. Firstly, unlike in international 
trade law, in international investment law MFN and NT provisions serve the same 
purpose.
99
 They provide foreign investors, and their investments, with an equality of 
economic opportunity, regarding both the establishment and of treatment. In contrast, 
in the GATT world,
100
 disciplines on regulations were mainly intended to ensure that 
tariff reductions would not be circumvented through the substitution of domestic 
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measures.
101
 Non-tariff barriers are addressed by the non-discrimination principle 
under the GATT. Then, the WTO agreements allow for the TBT and SPS 
Agreement
102
 to integrate markets beyond non-discrimination.
103
 
Secondly, by contrast to remedy confronting in trade law, the complainants 
(private investors) enjoy a direct right to demand compensation for violations. The 
tribunals in investment arbitration are also different from those in trade law: they are 
ad hoc tribunals. The ICSID Convention is procedural. Most investment treaties are 
bilateral, representing different internal compromises reached between specific 
countries. However, some opinions advocate that Most-Favoured-Nation provisions 
should be interpreted as broadly as possible.
104
 
    Despite these differences, the non-discrimination commitments of investment 
treaties that are influenced by trade law, reflect changes in the states’ economic 
activities. Trade and investment can be ‘complements’ and ‘substitutes’. ‘Substitutes’ 
refers to the establishment of a foreign subsidiary as a means for delivering goods or 
services to a foreign market, particularly when high tariffs or high transportation costs 
have made exports to that market unattractive. However, in a global picture, 
investment was increasingly seen not as a means of replacing trade, but of promoting 
it. Foreign subsidiaries, once established, were often links in a large chain of 
production. Thus, deeper economic integration required lowering barriers both to 
trade and to investment. As a result, states may negotiate bilateral and regional trade 
agreements as a package deal, which includes investment-related provisions. The 
inclusion of investment in a large group of contracts, therefore, may allow parties to 
offer concessions on investment in exchange for concessions in other areas. This 
process of deeper economic integration has begun to occur. For example, the founding 
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of the European Union (EU) and the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)
105
 represent this process. Free trade agreements with investment-related 
provisions between developed and developing countries have also proliferated in 
recent years. 
    This chapter will first give a review of the nexus between trade and investment 
agreements, then analyse investment-related rules in multilateral trade agreements. 
Finally, it will move to clarify a few of China’s specific commitments in WTO 
Agreements, and its promises under Protocol of Accession. 
2.1 The Nexus between Trade and Investment Agreements  
Investment treaties trace their history to Friendly, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) 
treaties in the eighteenth century, when Western developed countries aimed to 
improve trade between themselves.
106
 As part of these treaties, the right of access was 
primarily for the purpose of trade, and persons entering the territory with their 
property.
107
 FCN treaties were primarily trade-oriented agreements, and investment 
protection did not play an important role in their provisions.
108
 However, FCNs did 
include some obligations to protect foreigners’ property, for example, by giving 
‘special protection’ or ‘full protection’ to the covered property.109 In addition to the 
broad terms of property protection clauses, these early treaties developed specific 
provisions solely covering foreign investors and commercial ownership.
110
 Thus, the 
principle objective of the treaties was to secure minimum international standards of 
treatment for both investors and investment abroad. According to these early FCNs, 
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foreign nationals also enjoyed the right of equal access to domestic courts. Later FCN 
treaties were extended to prohibit restrictions on the repatriation of profits. 
    After the Second World War, states endeavoured to set up an international order 
by negotiating a multilateral trade agreement.
111
 The Havana Charter of 1948 would 
have created the International Trade Organization (ITO).
112
 Notwithstanding its focus 
on international trade, an important objective of the Charter was to encourage 
economic development, and to foster the global flow of capital for productive 
investment.
113
 The Havana Charter contained some provisions concerning foreign 
investment, and the relationship between host states and foreign investors.
114
 Had the 
Havana Charter come into force, this would have paved the way for the co-existence 
of a treaty-based system of bilateral and multilateral treaties on foreign investment, 
alongside its members’ trade obligations.115 
    Following the failure of the Havana Charter to enter into force, the international 
community was left with the GATT 1947 and its annexed tariff schedules. The GATT 
1947 did not contain any provisions on investment.
116
 GATT is about tariff reduction, 
with domestic instruments ensuring that tariff concessions will not be undone through 
subsequent unilateral action.
117
 Should WTO members be obliged to treat domestic 
and foreign investors alike in all respects, because the term “affecting” appearing in 
Article III.4 GATT and the non-discrimination obligation may extend to any measure 
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affecting trade?
118
 The panel on Canada—FIRA (Foreign Investment Review Act) 
explained the limits of the coverage of investment protection under the GATT 1947: 
“…the purpose of Art. III.4 is not to protect the interests of the foreign investor but 
to ensure that goods originating in any other contracting party benefit from 
treatment no less favourable than domestic goods…” “…the national treatment 
obligations of Art. III of the General Agreement do not apply to foreign persons or 
firms but to imported products.”
119
 
 
Thus according to the award, the non-discrimination obligation does not extend to 
protection of private investors.  
Following the demise of the Havana Charter there have been a number of 
developments in which investment and trade initially went their separate ways.  
    Despite restrictions after WWII, some international investment flows did resume, 
nearly all of which originated in a few Western developed countries.
120
 By 1971, the 
Bretton Woods system was no longer sustainable.
121
 The collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system changed state practice on capital mobility, while the ‘impossible 
Trinity’ (‘trilemma of international finance’) illustrated further capital mobility 
issues.
122
 
    Different from US’ practice on FCNs, the European BITs were concerned solely 
with investment protection.
123
 However, capital-exporting developed countries shared 
the same approach to protect investment under either FCNs or BITs. Their joint 
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123 In the early 1960s, individual European countries began to negotiate bilateral treaties that were unlike previous 
bilateral commercial agreements. These new treaties dealt exclusively with foreign investment and sought to create 
an international legal framework governing investments by the nationals of one country in the territory of another. 
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economic consideration was to protect investment against a variety of threats from the 
host state, including discriminatory treatment, exchange controls, and 
expropriation.
124
 The late 1980s witnessed a new phase in the history of the BIT 
movement. The emerging economies of Eastern and Central Europe, alongside Latin 
American, African, and Asian countries, sought foreign capital to promote their own 
country’s economic development. Since this time, the number of BITs involving two 
developing countries, in what one may call ‘South-South’ BITs, has increased 
steadily. 
    After NAFTA was concluded in 1994, it became an important driving force for 
its member countries to re-examine the BIT negotiating model. One reason was that 
NAFTA gave rise to claims against the US by foreign investors. The second reason 
was that BITs were launched in a setting in which investment was increasingly 
viewed in its relationship to trade. 
    This subsection will first observe how bilateral investment treaties were 
successfully emerging in developing countries. It will then analyse the reasons why an 
endeavour sponsored by many OECD countries for a multilateral investment 
agreement failed, and assess where it would be possible to build a multilateral 
investment treaty, in a global scenario. 
2.1.1 Developing Countries’ Unique Way to Liberalize Investment by Signing 
BITs 
In the 1970s, developing countries suffering debt crises were forced to turn to private 
foreign investment as a source of capital.
125
 The economic integration trend was also 
reflected in a series of success stories. For example, ‘Asian Tigers’ and ‘Dragon 
Economies’ succeeded because of high rates of private investment and an emphasis on 
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production for export. Then in 1989, after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the former 
Soviet countries turned to the free markets, while abandoning central planning. 
    In addition, the international law on foreign investment was redesigned at this 
time to adopt rules derived from the neoliberal philosophy.
126
 Neo-liberalism 
advocates the reduction of state control over the economy and the facilitation of 
individual enterprise. It requires the protection of property rights, including 
intellectual property rights, the enforcement of contracts, and the effective use of 
dispute settlement mechanisms.
127
 
The combined effect was the emergence of a consensus in the developing world 
about the desirability of attracting foreign investment through free market policies. 
Changes in attitude toward foreign investment were accompanied in the 1990s by a 
revolution in information technology. Starting in the late 1980s, the number of BITs 
soared. The emergence of these BITs may have been due to the assumption that an 
increase in FDI would provide interests to investors, while the developing host state 
would benefit from the capital, human resources and transfer of technology brought 
by FDI.
128
 On the other hand, concluding BITs that guaranteed the safety of foreign 
investment may have offered a mechanism for signalling a desire to attract these new 
flows of foreign investment, and to provide a safer climate for investment. 
2.1.2 Failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment among OECD Countries 
At the multilateral level, it was not until the mid-1990s that the relationship between 
trade and investment law was revisited. This happened in two related developments. 
One was the establishment of the WTO in 1995 with new annexed agreements, while 
the other was an effort at the OECD to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI)
129
 regulating FDI between states. 
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Countries made efforts to reconcile trade and investment — in the WTO’s 
TRIMs
130
 and in its Working Group on Trade and Investment.
131
 At the multilateral 
level, the WTO has abandoned the negotiating group on trade and investment. As a 
result, regulations of investment in the WTO are limited to Art.III.5 GATT, TRIMs, 
Mode 3 under GATS
132
 rules and the TRIPs provisions. 
 
a) Negotiations for an MAI 
Why did the MAI sponsored by OECD countries fail in 1998, and is a 
multilateral investment treaty still possible in the future? Or, why negotiate a 
multilateral treaty in the first place, if an investment agreement cannot promote FDI 
flow? The prospect of investment capital from certain developed countries, along with 
other political and economic benefits arising from a bilateral treaty,
 
may make a 
developing country inclined to conclude a BIT rather than enter into a multilateral 
agreement. 
    Developed countries are inclined to think about the competition between their 
domestic competing-industry and foreign investors. This means that when investment 
flow is through a “single way”, the developed country will prefer to conclude a 
bilateral treaty with the developing country partner for investment liberalization, 
because there are few enterprises from the developing country that will invest in the 
developed country. 
    There was also skepticism that investment rules actually had any real impact on 
the pattern of international investment flows. It was asked whether a multilateral 
agreement would be ‘efficient’ to attract investment. The MAI contained very high 
standards for liberalizing investment protection.
133
 Unlike most BITs, the MAI 
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purported to cover the pre-establishment phase as well. It included provisions on 
privatization, the behaviour of monopolies, and the temporary entry and stay of key 
personnel, such as investors, managers, and experts. The MAI adapted the principle of 
non-discrimination: first, the MAI parties committed to treat foreign investors and 
their investments no less favourably than they would treat their own; and second, the 
MAI parties agreed not to distinguish between investors and investments of other 
MAI parties. The MAI contained provisions on the cross-border transfer of funds; fair 
and equitable treatment; and the standard of compensation in case of expropriation. 
The coverage of the MAI was broad, as FDI, portfolio investment, and rights under 
contract formed part of its subject matter. It also sought to establish effective dispute 
settlement procedures, with both state-to-state procedures as well as investor-state 
arbitration. However, tribunals under inter-state investment dispute settlement, unlike 
WTO panels, would be allowed to grant direct pecuniary compensation or restitution. 
A few reasons may explain why the MAI failed. First, foreign firms can have a 
huge impact on domestic economic sectors. It can lead to an economic crisis if foreign 
investors withdraw their investment (especially portfolio investment).
134
 Second, 
multilateral corporations would have employed workers in low-wage countries, with 
lower labour standards.
135
 Third, the NGOs were extremely hostile to the notion of 
investment negotiations, and they argued that companies would invest in countries 
with low environmental standards.
136
 Also, developing countries were against it since 
they had not been invited to participate. Thus, while developing countries felt 
duty-bound to attend negotiations, they could neither actively participate, nor 
influence the rules-making process. 
b) Back to investment in the WTO? 
    At the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001, delegations discussed adopting a 
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multilateral framework for trade and investment.
137
 However, the WGTI could not 
agree on how to address the concerns of developing country members (who did not 
want to see their right to regulate investment restricted).
138
 The Cancún Ministerial 
Conference concluded without any consensus on taking the work of the WGTI 
forward.
139
 
2.1.3 A Multilateral Investment Treaty Outside the WTO 
Where might a multilateral investment treaty be built? The challenge in answering 
this lies in exploring the reasons for proposals to address this issue in the WTO. An 
investment issue may be treated in the WTO if it is trade-related. Therefore, the 
question is where to draw a fine line: how can an administrative area be negotiated in 
the WTO? This may extend beyond market access. From an economic perspective, 
countries are willing to pursue regulatory cooperation which brings gains. One 
benchmark is to see whether there is a link to the contest of market. If it has a direct 
bearing on the conditions of competition prevailing on markets, it could be dealt with 
in the WTO. 
    The GATT rules apply to trade and trade-related issues, and they do not pertain 
to government measures that restrict or attract FDI. GATT is also not relevant to 
policies that affect the operations of foreign firms. 
    If countries propose to negotiate a multilateral investment treaty, the treaty may 
include rules on the right of establishment and national treatment for foreign investors 
and their investment.
140
 These issues are largely not included in market access 
objectives. In many sectors, firms prefer the mode of supplying a market through FDI 
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rather than exports.
141
 
    However, trade and investment are increasingly complementary.
142
 A larger 
share of global trade is intra-firm, involving exchanges between related enterprises. 
Much of the vertical FDI is export-oriented. Firms will pursue least-cost producers all 
over the world under global production scenario. Firms are sensitive to investment 
regulations because they often have to establish joint ventures or affiliates in various 
locations to ensure profits and quality. 
    Meanwhile, states could compete with one other to attract FDI by offering 
incentives — subsidies, taxation, etc. —to foreign investors. But, ongoing 
competition between developing countries in this way is not efficient from a global 
welfare point of view. This is because once a capital-exporting party (always 
developed countries) decides to make an investment, they only consider the exact 
location, and the total amount of FDI is not affected by tax incentives. The result of 
competition for FDI costs too much, and reflects a suboptimal level of taxation of 
capital relevant to other factors of production. 
Why is a multilateral investment treaty still possible? If two countries compete 
for the same investment, why would they want to harmonize competition between 
them? First, national incentives (i.e., subsidizing foreign firms) may impose negative 
spillovers on other countries, leading to an inefficient outcome for the world as a 
whole.
143
 Second, an international agreement on investment may be an instrument by 
which states make commitments, earn credibility, and reduce risk for investors. Third, 
trade and investment are closely interlinked. Thus, rules may be made for the full set 
of policies that affect actor’s decisions—both trade and investment-related regulations. 
Lastly, because the GATS already covers FDI, investment rules on (non-services) FDI 
may be built outside the WTO framework. 
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a) Externalities 
    If countries are competing for FDI, externalities from this competition may exist. 
Developing countries are supposed to compete with one another to promote inward 
FDI through incentives to pursue spill-overs.
144
 Thus, countries may need to justify 
incentives (i.e., taxation advantages) to attract FDI. States may also need to consider 
whether or not FDI can bring positive externalities, and what forms of domestic 
regulation will maximize the positive impact of FDI on the host country’s economic 
growth. However, it is very expensive for governments to give foreign investors 
excessive payments (using tax incentives). 
International agreement may play a role in disciplining the use of fiscal 
incentives. An empirical question is whether fiscal incentives are effective in 
attracting FDI. If incentives can’t influence the FDI flow, there is no need to make an 
international agreement on efficiency grounds. The evidence on this question has been 
debated. Some studies say that incentives do not play an important role in changing 
the global FDI flow;
145
 instead, what is more important is the domestic investment 
climate, including— market size, labour standards, trade facilitation, intellectual 
property rights, contract enforcement, etc.
146
 In contrast, some others argued that 
incentives do have an effect on location decisions, especially for export-oriented 
FDI.
147
 
                                                        
144  Andrew Guzman argued that whereas developing countries might have been better off negotiating a 
multilateral investment agreement as a group, individual developing country defected in a prisoners’ dilemma 
situation as each tried to attract the largest possible share of foreign investment by concluding bilateral treaties 
with developed countries. See Andrew Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the 
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties,’ 38 Virginia Journal of International Law 639 (1998). 
145 Susan Rose-Ackerman takes a global view, finding that ‘the marginal impact of BITs is greater in countries 
that already have relatively effective legal regimes and favourable economic environments.’ See Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, ‘The Global BITs Regime and the Domestic Environment for Investment.’ In Karl O. Sauvant 
and Lisa E. Sachs eds., The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double 
Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 311. 
146 For example, as Luke Eric Peterson and Kevin R. Gray argued, “host states may wish to regulate the economy, 
including foreign investors embedded therein, in a manner which seeks to promote or protect certain human rights 
interests…. Where bilateral investment treaties are in place, foreign investors will often enjoy the ability to 
challenge these human-rights inspired measures through international arbitration.” See Luke Eric Peterson and 
Kevin R. Gray, “International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration,” International Institute for Sustainable Development (2003), p. 5. 
147 ‘While the stated purpose of DTTs is to address these tax issues, most countries have claimed that, by 
eliminating excessive taxation, tax treaties can help increase trade and investment between the two treaty 
signatories.’ See Allison Christians, ‘Tax treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa,’ 71 Brooklyn 
Law Review, 639 (2005), p. 658. 
37 
Double taxation treaties (DTTs) help to eliminate double taxation and relieve 
jurisdictional conflicts. They detail specific allocation rules for different categories of 
income in both countries. DTTs can also limit transfer pricing, help to combat tax 
evasion (notably through the exchange of information), provide non-discrimination 
rules, and outline ways in which tax disputes can be resolved by prescribing specific 
conflict resolution mechanisms and arbitration procedures.
148
 In addition, DTTs can 
provide remarkable certainty to foreign investors about the tax treatment of their 
cross-border activities in both the host and the home country.
149
 Foreign investors can 
benefit from DTTs, which determine the maximum rates of taxation (particularly 
withholding tax rates) that can be imposed by a host country. 
Beginning in the 1990s, investment issues have been increasingly addressed in 
bilateral and regional Free Trade and Investment Agreements (FTIAs).
150
 Typical 
investment provisions of FTIAs include MFN and NT. FTIAs also increasingly 
address host country responsibilities on labour rights and environmental protection, 
issues not usually addressed in BITs. This approach allows trade-offs across issue 
areas (e.g. market access for increased investor protection). In this manner, FTIAs 
may directly influence FDI flows by opening sectors for investment. They may also 
indirectly influence FDI flows by enlarging the market, setting standards, and 
improving a host country’s overall investment climate. 
In practice, incentives are likely to be most expensive for developing countries 
that try to offset policy-distortions (bad infrastructure, political instability, etc.). 
Therefore, it is better for states to restrict those distortions directly, which means 
focusing on the fundamental disciplines of the WTO—transparency, NT, MFN and 
binding of polices—to the investment policy area may be a better choice. 
 
                                                        
148 Karl P. Sauvant and Jorg Weber, eds., International Investment Agreements: Key Issues (New York and 
Geneva: United Nations, 2004), volume II, p. 203. 
available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit200410v2_en.pdf.  
149 Tsilly Dagan illustrates a game theory rationale that explains why many developing countries have opted for 
relieving source-country taxation in order to attract more FDI. See Tsilly Dagan, ‘The Tax Treaties Myth,’ 32 
Journal of International Law and Politics 939, (2000), at 979. 
150 “As of June 2007, 251 FTIAs had been signed—nearly twice as many as five years earlier.” See UNCTAD 
Research Note, “Recent Development in International Investment Agreements,” UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2007/6, 
available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20076_3n.pdf. 
38 
b) Credibility 
Obligations in the investment agreement have played a major role in protecting 
investment from risks such as expropriation. Many countries that are looking for FDI 
have made use of a variety of existing, non-WTO credibility-enhancing institutions. 
These include accepting the arbitration of disputes under the ICSID, by the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or by the UN Committee on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). Investors can choose tribunals. Most BITs involve 
commitments on dispute settlement mechanisms. Countries can also use existing 
WTO disciplines to schedule market access policies for services (FDI). 
 
c) Completing the WTO Architecture 
The NAFTA adopts regulations that distinguish between trade and investment, 
with trade in goods or services being subject to a set of standard rules, and movement 
of factors of production (investment) being subject to another set of rules. In other 
words, NAFTA includes a separate chapter on investment (in goods and services), 
which is distinct from the rules relating to cross-border trade (in goods and services).  
  FDI in service is covered by the GATS (“mode 3”). “GATS-inspired” FTAs have 
separate chapters on investment and services.
151
 However, investment in services is 
covered by both chapters. Liberalization of the supply of services, (including through 
commercial presence), is governed by the Trade in Services Chapter; whereas the 
protection of investments in services, (including clauses on expropriation, 
compensation for losses, investor-state dispute settlement), is located in the 
Investment Chapter. 
 The payoff for eliminating entry restrictions for services is high from an economic 
perspective, as FDI is the main Mode of supply. In turn, if it is the high trade barriers 
that cause the red tape on inward FDI, governments should give priority to trade 
liberalization. Both can be pursued independently of FDI talks through multilateral 
liberalization of trade in goods and services. The GATS already covers FDI in 
services industries and allows commitments on establishment as a mode of supply. 
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Based on this fact, states may prefer to make a multilateral investment agreement 
outside of the WTO. 
    The following sections will scrutinize investment-related rules in existing world 
trade frameworks, with particular focus on China’s obligations under multilateral 
trade agreements, i.e., the GATS. We will also have a look at the Telecoms Reference 
Paper, which obliges WTO member to impose an agreed set of requirements on their 
private agents. 
2.2 Investment-Related Rules in WTO Agreements 
There are some formal mechanisms by which trade directly influences the formation 
of international investment agreements. First, through provisions within the 
TRIMS,
152
 GATS, and TRIPS Agreements, the WTO contracts place distinct 
obligations on its members concerning their handling of cross-border investment. 
Second, through the inclusion of an investment chapter within a PTA, states may 
choose to subject themselves to further investment-related obligations in exchange for 
preferential market access for their exports. This subsection will clarify 
investment-related rules under WTO Agreements, and China’s obligations in 
multilateral trade agreements.  
2.2.1 TRIMs 
One link between investment and trade is the TRIMs Agreement, which seeks to 
prevent the trade-restrictive and distorting effects that some investment measures may 
have on trade in goods. Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement
153
 bans any TRIM that is 
inconsistent with the national treatment standard of Article III of the GATT 1994
154
 
or the prohibition on quantitative restrictions in Article XI of the GATT 1994.
155
 An 
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Illustrative List annexed to TRIMs provides examples of measures that are 
inconsistent with Art. III or Art. XI GATT. The Illustrative List cites the following 
examples: 
    (a) local content requirements; 
    (b) export performance requirements; 
    (c) trade balancing requirements; 
    (d) foreign exchange balancing restrictions, and 
    (e) restrictions on an enterprise’s export or sale for export of products.
156
 
 
    Two of the measures [(a), (c)] covered are inconsistent with Art. III.4 GATT. The 
Illustrative List also reflects three categories of measures that are inconsistent with Art. 
XI.1 GATT [(b), (d), (e)]. What all these measures share is that they are 
export-related. 
North American countries favour the admission and establishment of FDI on the 
basis of MFN and national treatment, including pre- and post-establishment.
157
 The 
right of admission may be subject to the right of each party to the BIT to adopt certain 
exceptions falling within certain sectors. These are listed in a separate annex.
158
 The 
2012 US Model BIT, for example, also specifically dealt with performance 
requirements, which are: local purchasing and local content requirements, trade 
balancing requirements, foreign exchange restrictions and export performance 
requirements.
159
 
2.2.2 “Mode 3” in GATS 
As tariffs on goods are reduced, industries must lobby for liberalization and 
regulatory cooperation in service markets. If service markets are contestable, it may 
be reflected in the reduced input prices for manufacturing industries. This trend has 
happened since the 1980s. States also began emphasizing policies affecting trade and 
investment in services, due to the rapidly growing global market. 
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    The GATS was created as a major result of the Uruguay Round.
160
 It established 
rules and disciplines on policies affecting access to service markets, and extended the 
coverage of the multilateral contract. The liberalization of trade in services happened 
later, as many services had been non-tradable for a long time. Technological 
innovation made a large number of services tradeable. If trade occurred, the services 
tended to be embodied in goods, information flows, or people.
161
 
     Trade in services differs from trade in goods because services tend to be 
intangible and non-storable. Although some transactions may occur across the border, 
some services still require that provider and consumer are in the same place at the 
same time. However, this limitation can be overcome through the physical movement 
of consumers to the location of the service providers, or via the entry of service 
providers into the territory of a consumer. 
The GATS explicitly applies to the delivery of services, through a ‘commercial 
presence.’162 One of the ‘modes’ to supply services outlined in the GATS is that in 
which a service provider establishes a ‘commercial presence’ in the host country—i.e., 
a firm makes an investment to provide a service to the host country (‘mode 3’ in 
GATS). In fact, the definition of ‘commercial presence’ is ‘any type of business or 
professional establishment’, which might include either ‘the constitution, acquisition 
or maintenance of a juridical person’, including, but not limited to, ‘the creation or 
maintenance of a branch or a representative office’ in the territory of a member for the 
purpose of supplying a service.
163
 
Thus, a GATS commitment to allow trade in a particular service sector, through a 
commercial presence, amounts to a commitment to allow the establishment of foreign 
investment. 
The establishment of a commercial presence in a country—engaging in foreign 
direct investment (FDI)—is another way of liberalizing services markets. Firms can 
sell their services in the foreign country by FDI (long-term physical presence) if they 
                                                        
160 General Agreement on Trade in Services, done at Marrakesh, 15 April, 1994, 1869 UNTS 183, 33 ILM 1167, 
entered into force 1 January 1995 (GATS) is taken up in Annex 1B to the WTO Agreement. 
161 Hoekman and Kostecki, supra note, at 318. 
162 GATS, Art. I:2(c). 
163 GATS, Art. XXVIII(d). 
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find cross-border exchange or the temporary physical movement of a natural person 
does not suffice for an exchange to be feasible.  
From a balance of payments perspective, ‘a commercial presence’ as a means of 
delivering international services is a transaction between residents and is therefore not 
recorded as a trade transaction.
164
 In this sense, it is much harder to collect data on 
trade in services compared to those on goods. Part of the reason is that, once 
established, foreign firms are considered to be residents of the host country, and thus 
data on sales of services by affiliates does not exist. 
2.2.3 TRIPs 
Another investment-related WTO agreement is the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). The TRIPs agreement obligates the parties to 
provide certain protections for intellectual property, as a form of investment. As 
cross-border investments increasingly involve intellectual property, the TRIPs 
Agreement serves as a guarantee of the minimum standards of protection that such 
investments will have in WTO member states.  
Any violation of these three agreements, as mentioned above, is open to 
adjudication under the WTO dispute settlement system. However, the WTO 
agreements governing investment do not include general rules on issues such as 
restrictions on the transfer of funds related to investment, or the calculation of 
compensation for expropriation. 
2.3 GATS and Interpretation of China’s Commitments 
Under traditional trade concepts, questions of access to the distribution system or 
service facilities is a trade issue, while ownership of the distribution system is an 
investment issue.
165
 While it is necessary for trade negotiating purposes to make a 
                                                        
164 The reference to ‘a commercial presence’ as a means of delivering international services is an innovation of the 
GATS, which requires the proximity of the supplier and the consumer. See Mary E. Footer and Carol George, ‘The 
General Agreement on Trade in Service’, in Patrick MacRory, Arthur Appleton and Michael Plummer (ed.), The 
World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, Springer, 2005, p. 825. 
165 ‘The US National Study on Trade in Services, A Submission by the United States Government to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ 37-39 (1982), in John H. Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan O. Sykes, Jr., 
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distinction between trade issues and investment issues, this does not imply that 
investment barriers are irrelevant to trade.
166
 Indeed, in many cases, the ability to 
invest in elements of the distribution system or local enterprises can substantially 
enhance a firm’s ability to export its services. BITs cover many areas of services. The 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is the only multilateral agreement 
that contains legally binding and enforceable rules about measures affecting foreign 
investments.
167
  
2.3.1 Framework of the GATS Commitments 
The subject of the general obligations imposed by the GATS on all WTO members 
includes the MFN obligation (Art. II), transparency (Art. III), obligation to negotiate 
aspects of domestic regulation (Art. VI), and some competition-related commitments 
(Art. VIII and IX). The GATS allowed for exemptions from the MFN obligation, 
provided that these were scheduled at the entry into force of the WTO. Thus, a 
member can indicate the countries that it does not wish to grant MFN status. The 
Annex on Art. II of the GATS states that, in principle, such exceptions should not last 
for more than ten years.  
    When it comes to specific commitments, the structure of commitments made by 
WTO members on services takes the form of a positive listing of sectors. These 
sectors are subject to market access and national treatment obligations. A member has 
three broad choices: it may schedule “none”, meaning that it does not impose any 
limitation on the supply of particular kind of service; “unbound” implies it is 
essentially free to regulate as it deems appropriate (no commitment of any kind has 
been made); or it may introduce specific language to describe its commitment. 
    The first column of a schedule pertains to Art. XVI GATS (market access). This 
column lays out six measures restricting market access.
168
 The second column of 
                                                                                                                                                              
Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text, six edition, WEST Press, 2013, 
pp1042-1044. 
166 Id. 
167 Bart De Meester and Dominic Coppens, ‘Mode 3 of the GATS: A Model for Disciplining Measures Affecting 
Investment Flows?’ at Zdenek Drabek and Petros Mavroidis ed., Regulation of Foreign Investment, World 
Scientific Press, 2013, pp.99-151. 
168 In sectors where market access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a member may not maintain 
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each schedule relates to Art. XVII GATS: national treatment. The third column of 
each schedule relates to Art. XVIII GATS, which allows for “additional 
commitments.”169 
    For a complete picture of sectoral commitments, it is also necessary to consider 
the “horizontal commitments”—generally applicable provisions and restrictions that 
apply to all modes of supply, as well as the list of MFN exemptions that each WTO 
member has deposited to the WTO. 
2.3.2 GATS Scope about Investment Measures 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has a different approach toward 
investment: contrary to the GATT, it does not provide a list of impermissible 
investment measures, but allows for WTO members to contract the parameters of 
investment protection in their market in the field of services. 
    The situations of investment that are covered by the GATS are more limited than 
the cases covered by the OECD benchmark definition. 
    Article 1.2 of the GATS defines “trade in services” through four modes of supply. 
A link is made to foreign investment because Mode 3 of service supply is described as 
“the supply of a service […] by a service supplier of one Member, through 
commercial presence in the territory of another Member.”170 
    The term “commercial presence” is further clarified in Art. XXVIII (d) of the 
GATS, which reads: 
 
“commercial presence” means any type of business or professional establishment, 
                                                                                                                                                              
(unless otherwise specified in its schedule), are defined as: 
a) limitations on the number of services;   
b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets;  
c) limitations on the total number of service operations or the total quantity of service output expressed;  
d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a particular service sector or that a 
service supplier may employ and who are necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific service;  
e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through which a service supplier 
may supply a service; and 
f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding 
or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment. 
169 So far, this possibility has been used comprehensively in the case of telecommunications. The Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications includes a “Reference Paper,” whereby WTO members agreed on conditions of 
competition (and the ensuing investment protection) for foreign operators doing business in their national telecoms 
market.  
170 GATS, Art. 1.2. 
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including through 
(i) the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or 
(ii) the creation or maintenance of a branch or a representative office, within the 
territory of a member for the purpose of supplying a service.”
171
 
 
    Mode 3 service supply thus apparently involves investment in the sense that “any 
type of business or professional establishment” will be set up in the territory of 
another member for the purpose of supplying a service. This test can take the form of 
a juridical person or of an entity that has no juridical personality (e.g., a branch or 
representative office). Art. XXVIII (1) defines “juridical person” as: 
 
“Any legal entity duly constituted or otherwise organized under applicable law, 
whether for profit or otherwise, and whether privately owned or governmentally 
owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, joint venture, sole 
proprietorship or association.”
172
 
 
    The legal person may not only involve the creation of a new juridical person but 
may also be created through the acquisition of an existing corporation in the host 
member. Therefore, Mode 3 service provision also covers the “pre-establishment” 
phase: measures that restrict the possibility to set up a commercial presence (and thus 
to invest) are within the scope of the GATS.
173
 
 
a) Defining “Owned or Controlled.” 
 
Art. 1.2(c) provides that Mode 3 service supply takes place when a service supplier of 
one member provides services through commercial presence in another member. The 
service provider of the first member is a juridical person.
174
 It is important, however, 
that the commercial presence in the host member is “owned or controlled” by the 
natural or juridical person in another member.
175
 If not, the service provider that 
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173 See Council for Trade in Services, Mode 3—Commercial Presence. Background Note by the Secretariat, 
S/C/W/314, April 7, 2010, para. 9.  
174 For most supply, the service supplier is a legal entity, and it must be a company. 
175 The panel addressed this question to define the origin of a service in China-Publications and Audiovisual 
Products, whereby the panel considered whether some Chines measures treated service suppliers from another 
member less favourably than their own service suppliers, thereby violating China’s commitments under Art. XVII 
of the GATS. The panel needed to determine the origin of the foreign-invested entity and stated: “Recalling the 
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provides services through a commercial presence would not be a service supplier from 
another member. In such case, there would not be any cross-border element in the 
supply, and thus the GATS could not apply.
176
 It was therefore necessary to define the 
situations in which the commercial establishment of a host member can, in fact, be 
considered to be a “juridical person of another member.” Art. XXVIII(m)(ii) of the 
GATS clarifies: 
 
“juridical person of another member” means a juridical person which is either: 
 
(i) constituted or otherwise organized under the law of that other member, and is 
engaged in substantive business questions in the territory of that member or any 
other member; or  
(ii) in the case of the supply of a service through commercial presence, owned or 
controlled by: 
     1. natural persons of that member; 
     2. juridical persons of that other member identified under subparagraph (i).”
177 
 
    The Panel in Canada—Autos stated: “In order to define a ‘juridical person of 
another member’, Art. XXVIII(m) of the GATS does not require the identification of 
the last controlling juridical or natural person: it is sufficient to establish ownership or 
control by a juridical person of another member, defined according to the criteria set 
out in subparagraph (i).”178 
 
    The meaning of “owned” and “controlled” is further specified in Art. 
XXVIII(n)(i) and (ii) of the GATS: 
 
(i) ‘owned’ by persons of a member if more than 50% of the equity interest in it is 
                                                                                                                                                              
relevant definitions set out in Art. XXVIII of the GATS, we observe that any ‘foreign-invested entity’ supplying 
the services at issue in China, and that is owned or controlled by persons of another member, is a service supplier 
‘of any other member’ within the terms of Art. XVII.” This point was not appealed before the Appellate Body. See 
Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted January 19, 2010, para. 7,1282. 
176 The definition of the four modes of supply in Article I.2 of the GATS requires each time a cross-border 
element. The GATS does not apply to purely internal situations. Either the service moves from one member to 
another (mode 1), or the consumer moves from one member to another to receive the service (mode 2), or the 
service supplier from one member sets up a commercial establishment in another member where the service is 
provided (mode 3), or the service supplier that is a natural person moves to another member to provide the service 
(mode 4). 
177 GATS, Art. XXIII(m)(ii). 
178 Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, 
adopted June 19, 2000, para. 10,257. 
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beneficially owned by persons of that member; 
(ii) ‘controlled’ by persons of a member if such persons have the power to name a 
majority of its directors or otherwise to legally direct its actions.
179
 
 
In contrast to the OECD benchmark definition of investment, the definition provided 
by the GATS would therefore not necessarily consider situations where only 10% of 
the voting power is at stake as service supply through commercial presence. What 
needs to be shown is that there is either majority ownership or actual “control”, in the 
sense of power to name a majority of the directors or legally direct their actions. This 
requires considering the spread of the shareholding, and the influence by other 
stakeholders in the juridical person. 
    Art. XVI.2 (f) of the GATS specifies as a prohibited market access restriction, 
“limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of a maximum limit on 
foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign 
investment.”180 It thus seems that the GATS covers measures that limit investment. 
 
b) Defining “investment by service suppliers.” 
  
The link with the GATS requires that the investment must be made in order to supply 
a service in the host member. The connecting factor is the supply of a service through 
Mode 3.  
    The question is therefore whether the investor must already be a service supplier 
to be covered by the GATS. For instance, when an investor from one member seeks to 
acquire a service supplier in another member, but this investor is itself not engaged in 
the supply of services, would any measures affecting this investment still be covered 
by the GATS? 
    Some elements need to be considered in this respect. First of all, Art. I.2(c) of the 
GATS uses the words “by a service supplier of one member,” which may be 
interpreted as requiring that the investor is already a service supplier in that member. 
However, it could also be argued that the investor becomes a service supplier at the 
                                                        
179 GATS, Ar. XXIII(n)(i)(ii). 
180 Art. XVI(2)(f). 
48 
moment of investment. Therefore, it is not necessary that the entity which invests in a 
service sector is itself a service supplier at the moment of making an investment (i.e., 
setting up a commercial presence to supply a service.)
181
 
     A second element to be considered in this regard is that Art. XXVIII (m) of the 
GATS requires that the juridical person that owns or controls the commercial presence 
is engaged in substantive business operations in the territory of the member where it is 
constituted or organized, or in any other member. It is noted that no such requirement 
is applied to natural persons.
182
 This requirement prevents that a ‘shell company’ is 
set up in a WTO member, while the substantive business operations take place in a 
country that is not a WTO member. This ‘shall company’ would be relied on to make 
use of the GATS, to establish a commercial presence in another WTO member.  
    There is no further specification of what the ‘substantive business operations’ 
must entail. Therefore, the substantive business operations can be in any sector, and 
do not necessarily need to be in the same sector as the one in which the supply of the 
service will take place. 
    Therefore, it can be summarized that the GATS indeed applies to measures 
affecting investment because of its coverage of Mode 3 –service supply. It involves 
both pre- (i.e., conditions for making an investment) and post-establishment (i.e., the 
treatment of investment once made in a host country) investment measures. However, 
there are some limits to the application of the GATS. First, it is important that the 
investment is made in a service sector. It must indeed be made in order to supply 
services by means of a commercial presence. Second, the investment must lead to 
ownership or control of the commercial presence in the host territory (target country 
of the investment). Third, the investment must originate in a different WTO member 
then the member in which the investment is made. This investor must not necessarily 
be a service supplier before it has made the investment, but needs to be engaged in 
substantive business operations in the WTO member where it was constituted, or in 
any other WTO member.  
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182 See Art. XXVIII(m)(ii)(1) of the GATS. 
49 
    It can already be noted that, even if a measure that affects investment should fall 
within the scope of the GATS, a number of important obligations in the GATS 
(market access, national treatment, certain disciplines on domestic regulation) only 
apply as far as the WTO member in question has made a special commitment to the 
service sector at stake, and has not inscribed limitations to these commitments such 
that certain investment measures would remain unaffected. 
2.3.3 Commitments on Mode 3 Service Supply 
The GATS is a very flexible agreement because it allows members to both specify for 
certain obligations, and the extent to which they want these obligations to apply to the 
service sector at stake. For market access (Art. XVI of the GATS), and national 
treatment (Art. XVII of the GATS), members specify in their “schedules of 
commitments” what sectors and subsectors are covered by the obligations, and what 
modes of supply. The member can limit their commitments by explicitly excluding 
certain measures or reserving themselves the right to adopt new measures (by 
inscribing the word “unbound” in their schedules.) 
 
a) Market Access  
 
Trade liberalization in the GATS focuses in the first place on allowing suppliers from 
one WTO member to have access to the market of another member to provide 
services. To this end, Art. XVI of the GATS prohibits, in sectors where a member has 
made specific commitments, to take specific measures that restrict market access 
contrary to these commitments. Art. XVI.2 specifies six types of measures that must 
not be adopted by the member that has made a commitment. The majority of these 
measures are of a quantitative nature. Art. XVI.2(f) of the GATS is important for 
investment, since it prohibits the member to from adopting limitations on the 
participation of foreign capital regarding maximum percentage limit on foreign 
shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign investment. 
50 
Nonetheless, the GATS does not apply to situations where no ownership or control is 
taken in a local commercial establishment. 
    As soon as a measure makes it completely impossible to access the market 
through a mode of supply for which a commitment is carried out without limitations, 
it is prohibited under Art. XVI of the GATS. Hence, if an investment in a service 
sector is made impossible because of a particular measure, this measure violates Art. 
XVI. 
    Art. XVI.2 of the GATS mentions two types of market access limitations that are 
of particular relevance for the investment related to Mode 3 service supply. 
    The first type of market access limitation is that where a WTO member requires 
the investment to take a particular form. Art. XVI.2 (e) reads: 
 
measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture through 
which a service supplier may supply a service.
183
 
 
    A second type of measure involves quantitative limitations on the participation of 
foreign capital. Art.XVI.2(f) reads: 
 
limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage 
limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or aggregate foreign 
investment.
184
 
 
    The latter provision was interpreted in China—Publications and Audiovisual 
Products. The panel held on to the “quantitative nature” of the market access 
restriction in Art. XVI.2(f).
185
 If no clear quantitative limitation can be identified, no 
such type of market access restriction is at stake. 
 
b) MFN and National Treatment 
 
Two specific provisions set out the obligation of non-discrimination in the GATS. 
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First, Art. II of the GATS prohibits WTO members to treat services and service 
providers from one WTO member less favourably than those from any other country 
(most-favoured-nation treatment). WTO members were permitted to list specific 
exceptions to this obligation in a member-specific Annex on Art. II exemptions. 
Second, Art. XVII of the GATS obliges each WTO member to accord to services and 
service suppliers of any other member, treatment no less favourable than that it 
accords to its own ‘like’ services and service suppliers (national treatment). This 
obligation only applies as far as the WTO member in question has made a specific 
commitment to the service sector and mode of supply at stake, and provided that the 
member has not specified any limitations to this commitment. 
    The national treatment obligation of Article XVII:1 of the GATS does not apply 
to all trade in services. The national treatment obligation applies only to the extent 
that a WTO member has explicitly committed itself to grant ‘national treatment’ in 
respect of a particular services sector. 
    (i) In applying Article XVII:1, panels must therefore first examine the 
responding member’s Services Schedule to establish whether, and to what extent, that 
member has made a national treatment commitment on the services sector at issue in 
the dispute.
186
 
    In China-Publications and Audiovisual Products (2010), the issue arose whether 
China had made a national treatment commitment on the distribution of sound 
recordings through electronic means. China argued that the entry ‘Sound recording 
distribution services’ under the heading ‘Audiovisual Services’ (Sector 2.D) in 
China’s Services Schedule, about which it had made a national treatment commitment, 
does not extend to the distribution of sound recordings through electronic means. 
According to China, the entry in dispute covers only the distribution of sound 
recordings in physical form, for example, music embedded on compact discs (CDs). 
This dispute thus called for an interpretation of China’s Services Schedule, and in 
particular the meaning and scope of the entry ‘Sound recording distribution services’. 
                                                        
186 Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Third 
Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 406, 409, 411-413. 
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After interpreting this entry by Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, the panel concluded that China’s commitment in the entry ‘Sound 
recording distribution services’ covers physical distribution as well as the electronic 
distribution of sound recordings.
187
 The Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding. 
After reviewing the panel’s reasoning, the Appellate Body concluded that the panel 
did not err in its consideration of the dictionary definitions of the terms ‘sound 
recording’ and ‘distribution’.188 Furthermore, the Appellate Body was persuaded that, 
on balance, the analysis of a number of contextual elements (such as China’s Services 
Schedule, provisions of the GATS, and the Services Schedules of other members) 
supported the interpretation of China’s commitment to ‘Sound recording distribution 
services’ as including the electronic distribution of sound recordings.189  
    (ii) To analyse whether the measure at issue is a measure by a member affecting 
trade in services, i.e., a measure to which the GATS applies.  
    A measure affects trade in services when the measure bears ‘upon the conditions 
of competition in the supply of a service’. The panel in China-Publications and 
Audiovisual Products (2010) noted in the context of its assessment of the prohibition 
on wholesale trading of reading materials that the term ‘affecting’ is wider in scope 
than ‘regulating’ or ‘governing’, and thus concluded that the measures at issue ‘affect’ 
the supply of reading materials distribution services for the purpose of Article 
XVII:1.
190
 
    (iii) To ascertain whether the foreign and domestic services or service suppliers 
are ‘like services’ or ‘like service suppliers’. It is only between ‘like service’ or ‘like 
service suppliers’ that the national treatment obligation applies, and that 
discrimination within the meaning provided by Article XVII:1 of the GATS may 
occur. 
    The GATS does not define terms ‘like services’ and ‘like service suppliers’. The 
panel in China-Publications and Audiovisual Products (2010) noted that:  
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[t]he measures at issue distinguish between suppliers that may be permitted to engage in 
the wholesale of imported reading materials and suppliers that are prohibited from 
emerging in this service, based exclusively on the suppliers’ origin. When origin is the 
only factor on which a measure bases a difference of treatment between domestic service 
suppliers and foreign suppliers, the ‘like service suppliers’ requirement is met, provided 
there will, or can, be domestic and foreign suppliers that under the measure are the same 
in all material respects except for origin.
191
 
 
    However, the panel observed that, in cases where a difference of treatment is not 
exclusively linked to the origin of service suppliers, but to other factors, a more 
detailed analysis would probably be required to determine whether service suppliers 
on either side of the dividing line are, or are not, ‘like service suppliers’.192 Referring 
to the considerable body of case law on ‘likeness’ in the context of Article III of the 
GATT 1994, the panel first observed that it did not assume that ‘without further 
analysis, [it] may simply transpose’ to trade in services the criteria or analytical 
framework used to determine ‘likeness’ in the context of Article III of the GATT 
1994.
193
 The panel noted that there are ‘important dissimilarities’ between the two 
areas of trade, such as the intangible nature of services, their supply through four 
different modes, and possible differences in how trade in services is conducted and 
regulated.
194
 
    The panel in China-Electronic Payment Services (2012) observed that the 
dictionary defines ‘like’ as: 
 
[h]aving the same characteristics or qualities as some other person or thing; of 
approximately identical shape, size, etc., with something else; similar.
195
 
 
According to the panel, this range of meanings suggests that: 
 
for services to be considered ‘like’, they need not necessarily be exactly the same, and 
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that in view of the references to ‘approximately’ and ‘similar’, services could qualify as 
‘like’ if they are essentially or generally the same.
196
 
 
The panel further noted that the dictionary definition of ‘like’ made clear that 
something or someone is ‘like’ in some respects, such as – in the terms of the 
definition – the ‘shape, size, etc.’ of a thing or person. To determine in what respect 
services need to be essentially the same for them to be ‘like’, the panel subsequently 
considered the context of the term ‘like services’, and, in particular, Article XVII:3 of 
the GATS. Article XVII:3 clarifies the ‘treatment no less favourable’ requirement of 
Article XVII:1, and states that a member is deemed to provide less favourable 
treatment if it ‘modifies the conditions of competition in favor of services of [that] 
Member compared to like services … of any other Member’. According to the panel, 
this suggests that: 
 
Like services are services that are in a competitive relationship with each other (or would 
be if they were allowed to be supplied in a particular market).
197
 
 
The panel argued that this is so because: 
 
Only if the foreign and domestic services in question are in such a competitive 
relationship can a measure of a Member modify the conditions of competition in favour 
of one or other of these services.
198
 
 
With regard to the ‘likeness’ of service suppliers, the panel in China-Electronic 
Payment Services (2012) agreed that the fact that service suppliers provide ‘like’ 
services might in some cases ‘raise a presumption’ that they are ‘like’ service 
suppliers. However, the panel cautioned that, in the specific circumstances of other 
cases, a separate inquiry into the ‘likeness’ of the suppliers may be called for.199 ‘Like 
service suppliers’ determinations should be made on a case-by-case basis.200  
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(iv) ‘Treatment no less Favourable’ 
The panel in China-Electronic Payment Services (2012) examined the fourth 
element of the national treatment test of Article XVII:1 in two steps. First, it analysed 
whether and how the measures under dispute provided for different treatment between 
domestic services and service suppliers and ‘like’ services and service suppliers of 
other members. Secondly, it examined whether any different treatment amounts to less 
favourable treatment. As the panel noted: 
 
Subject to all other Article XVII conditions being fulfilled, formally identical or different 
treatment of service suppliers of another Member constitutes a breach of Article XVII:1 
if and only if such treatment modifies the conditions of competition to their detriment.
201
 
  
    In China - Publications and Audiovisual Products (2010), the panel found in the 
context of its assessment of the prohibition on wholesale trading of reading materials 
that: 
 
[s]ince the measures at issue have the effect of prohibiting foreign service suppliers from 
wholesaling imported reading materials, while like Chinese suppliers are permitted to do 
so, these measures clearly modify the conditions of competition to the detriment of the 
foreign service supplier and thus constitutes ‘less favourable treatment’ in terms of 
Article XVII.
202
 
2.4 China’s Commitments on the Non-discrimination Principle under 
the Protocol of Accession 
China acceded to the WTO on 11 December 2001. During the accession process, it 
accepted scrutiny by WTO members of all aspects of its domestic system relating to 
trade. The terms of China’s accession to the WTO are set out in the Protocol on the 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China (the Protocol) 203  and the WTO 
agreements. With regard to the terms of China’s accession, its market access 
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commitments are extensive,
204
 and there are a large number of specific rules that 
apply only to trade with China only.
205
 While some of these special terms are 
transitional, with a built-in expiration date, others are of unlimited duration. The 
China Protocol consists of a main text of 17 sections of substantive provisions, 9 
annexes (including China’s goods and services schedules), and 143 paragraphs of 
substantive provisions incorporated by reference from the “Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of China.”206 The following subsections will provide an 
overview of the special terms of China’s accession and its post-accession practice to 
implement those WTO rules. 
2.4.1 China’s Promise in Line with the ‘Non-Discrimination Principle’ 
It is necessary to identify the commitment articles concerning specific WTO 
requirements on the Chinese legal system. 
This section is concerned with the WTO principle of non-discrimination, most 
commonly characterized by the notions of MFN and national treatment. China 
accepted that ‘except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, foreign individuals 
and enterprises and foreign-forwarded enterprises shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to other individuals and enterprises…’207 In particular, 
the Accession Protocol guarantees that this treatment is accorded with the 
procurement of goods and inputs, and the price and availability of goods and services. 
 
a) WTO Requirements and China’s Commitments 
 
The WTO China Working Party registers members’ concern over ‘the application of 
the principle of non-discrimination to foreign individuals and enterprises’, in 
particular, ‘China’s practice of conditioning or imposing restrictions upon 
                                                        
204 Analysis on the scope and depth of China’s market access commitments, see Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating 
China into the Global Economy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp.79-80. 
205 Julia Ya Qin, ‘“WTO-Plus” obligations and their implications for the WTO legal system: An Appraisal of the 
China Accession Protocol’ (2003) 37(3) Journal of World Trade 483. 
206 WPR, WT/MIN(01)/3 (10 November 2001). 
207 Accession Protocol, 3(a)(b). 
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participation in the Chinese economy based on the nationality of the entity 
concerned’.208 Specific to the Chinese legal system, some WTO members expressed 
concern about ‘certain provisions of Chinese laws, regulations, administrative notices 
and other requirements which could, directly or indirectly, result in less favourable 
treatment of imported products, in contravention of Article III of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994)’.209 Most of these requirements relate 
to product registration and certification; internal taxation; price and profit controls; 
hugely varying licensing procedures for imports; and distribution or sale of imported 
goods. Even though some of these requirements apply nominally to Chinese goods as 
well, WTO members ‘reiterated that any de facto or de jure less favourable treatment 
of imported goods had to be eliminated in order to ensure full conformity with the 
principle of national treatment’.210  
In response, China pledged that it would provide ‘non-discriminatory treatment to 
all WTO members’ and ‘the same treatment to Chinese enterprises, including 
foreign-funded enterprises, and foreign enterprises and individuals in China. China 
would eliminate dual pricing practices as well as differences in treatment accorded to 
goods produced for sale in China, in comparison to those produced for export’.211  
Addressing the concern of WTO members over Chinese laws, the government 
confirmed that ‘full respect of all laws, regulations, and administrative requirements 
with the principle of non-discrimination, between domestically produced and 
imported products would be ensured and enforced by the date of China’s accession 
unless otherwise provided in the Working Party Report. Furthermore, China 
undertook, by the time of accession, to ‘repeal and cease to apply all such existing 
laws, regulations and other measures whose effect was inconsistent with WTO rules 
on national treatment.’ 212  This commitment also applies to provisional laws, 
administrative measures, rules, and notices, or any other form of guidelines.  
China confirmed that measures would be taken at both national and regional 
                                                        
208 Working Party Report, II(1), paras 15-16. 
209 Working Party Report, II(1), para. 20. 
210 Working Party Report, II(1), para. 21. 
211 Working Party Report, II(1), paras 18-19. 
212 Working Party Report, II(1), para. 22. 
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levels, including the repeal or the modification of legislation, to provide full GATT 
national treatment in respect of laws, regulations, and other measures applying to the 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of a wide 
range of products. 
The non-discrimination principle, when applied to the right to trade, requires that 
‘within three years after accession, all enterprises in China shall have the right to trade 
in all goods throughout the customs territory of China’, with some exceptions as 
agreed in the Accession Protocol. It further requires that ‘all such goods shall be 
accorded national treatment under Article III of the GATT 1994, especially paragraph 
4 thereof, in respect of their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use, including their direct access to end-users’.213 Also, all foreign 
individuals and enterprises, including those not investing or registered in China, shall 
be granted treatment no less favourable than that accorded to companies in China on 
the right to trade.
214
 
 
b) Case-law 
 
The first case against China in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) further 
publicized the principle of non-discrimination. Central to the complaint was the 
alleged violation of the principle of national treatment by the Chinese government in 
its administration of tariffs on automobiles and car parts. On 15 September 2006, the 
US, the EU, and Canada submitted separate requests for the establishment of a dispute 
panel, which would determine whether China violated global trade rules by imposing 
a tariff surcharge on imported automobile parts.
215
 The plaintiffs argued that China 
violated WTO rules by imposing discriminatory tariffs on imported car parts, which 
favoured China-based manufactures of car parts. China, in response, maintained that 
the measures were necessary to stop importers from circumventing higher tariffs by 
importing automobiles under the guise of car parts. 
                                                        
213 Accession Protocol, Art. 5(1). 
214 Accession Protocol, Art. 5(2). 
215 Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts (WTO case: DS339, 340, 342). 
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The panel, established in late October 2006, was the first WTO dispute panel 
adjudication against China since it joined the WTO.
216
 At issue was China’s May 
2004 Policy on Development of Automotive Industry (Order No. 8 of the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)), and two subsequent implementing 
regulations adopted on 1 April 2005. Under these regulations, tariffs on imported car 
parts were equivalent to the tariff imposed on complete vehicles, if the imported parts 
exceeded a certain percentage of the completed vehicle’s content or its price, or if 
specific combinations of the imported car parts were used in the finished vehicle. The 
tariff surcharge sought to encourage car part manufacturers to establish production 
facilities in China, and to protect the producers already based in China. The 
complainants contended that the surcharge exceeded the maximum tariff in China’s 
WTO schedule of commitments, and amounted to a discriminatory tax that favoured 
domestic over imported goods. They also argued that it, in effect, provided a subsidy 
to those using domestic, rather than imported, car parts. 
    In late 2008, the WTO Appellate Body ruled against China
217
 and upheld the 
panel’s finding that the measures at issue indeed subjected imported auto parts to an 
internal charge.
218
 It also found that these measures were inconsistent with China’s 
obligations under GATT Article III(2).
219
 
On 15 August 2009, China implemented the report’s findings and withdrew those 
regulations which were found to be incompliant with its WTO obligations. 
2.4.2 Obligations to Eliminate Export Tariffs 
While lowering import tariffs is an essential part of the GATT obligations, the WTO 
has not imposed similar disciplines on export tariffs, although the use of quotas or 
quantitative restrictions on exports is generally prohibited.
220
 The Protocol requires 
China to ‘eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports’ except for those 
                                                        
216 A previous WTO case brought against China over value-added taxes applied to semiconductors, brought by the 
United States in 2003, was settled before a dispute panel was established.  
217 The decision of the WTO Appellate Body in China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 
WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R and WT/DS342/AB/R, 15 Dec. 2008. 
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219 Ibid., para. 253(a) & (b). 
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specifically provided in Annex 6 of the Protocol.
221
 Annex 6 contains a list of 
eighty-four types of products, with a maximum export duty rate identified for each. 
China promised not to raise the maximum rates except under exceptional 
circumstances and, if such circumstances occur, to consult with affected members 
prior to raising the rates.
222
 
     There are two cases relevant to China’s commitments on “export limitations”. 
The first case, (China-Raw Materials), targeted the export duties and quotas that 
China continued to maintain on various forms of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, 
manganese, silicon metal, yellow phosphorous and zinc.
223
 The second, (China-Rare 
Earths), challenged the export duties and quotas imposed on rare earth elements, 
tungsten and molybdenum.
224
 In both cases, China’s export duties were found to be in 
breach of Paragraph 11.3 of China’s Accession Protocol, whereas the export quotas at 
issue were declared inconsistent with Article XI:1 GATT. China’s arguments, seeking 
justification under Article XX (b) and (g) GATT, were dismissed. 
    The most important reason for this lies in the scope of the China-specific WTO 
obligations.
225
 It remains to be seen whether China will change its defensive strategy 
for Article XI:1 GATT-inconsistent export quotas (e.g. by invoking other Article XX 
justifications), although recent WTO case-law seems to leave no room for China to 
successfully defend the challenged export duties. 
2.4.3 Implementation of WTO Rules: China’s Practice 
There are key constitutional issues apparent in analysing the implications of China’s 
WTO membership for its legal order. One key concern raised by WTO members was 
how WTO rules would be implemented in China. 
The legal status of international treaties is not clearly defined in China’s 
                                                        
221 Protocol, section 11(3).  
222 Protocol, Note to Annex 6.  
223 See Penal report, China- Raw Materials (2012), para. 7.77(for bausite), para. 7.81(for coke), para. 7.85(for 
fluorspar), para.7.89(for mangnesium), para. 7.93(for manganese), para. 7.98(for silicon metal) and para. 7.101(for 
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224 See Penal report, China-Rare Earths (2014), para.7.150. 
225 See above, China’s Protocol, section 3. China has undertaken a general obligation to eliminate export duties in 
its 2001 Accession Protocol, with the exception of 84 HS 8-digit products listed in Annex 6 to the Protocol. 
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constitution. During China’s WTO accession negotiations, other WTO members 
requested that it should be clearly stated in the Working Party Report that WTO rules 
would be directly and automatically applicable in domestic Chinese courts. Long 
Yongtu, the former negotiator on behalf of China’s delegation, rejected these requests, 
but agreed to include the following paragraph in the report: 
 
The representative of China stated that China had been consistently performing its 
international treaty obligations in good faith. According to the Constitution and the 
Law on the Procedure of Conclusion of Treaties, the WTO Agreement fell within 
the category of ‘important international agreements’ subject to the ratification by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC). China would 
ensure that its laws and regulations pertaining to or affecting trade were in 
conformity with the WTO Agreement and with its commitments so as to fully 
perform its international obligations. For this purpose, China had commenced a plan 
to systematically revise its relevant domestic laws. Therefore, the WTO Agreement 
would be implemented by China in an effective and uniform manner through 
revising its existing domestic laws and enacting new ones fully in compliance with 
the WTO Agreement.
226
 
 
China undertook a number of special commitments concerning domestic governance, 
including transparency, judicial review, and the uniform administration of the law. For 
instance, the Protocol requires China to provide a reasonable period for public 
comment on ‘all laws, regulations and measures’ pertaining to WTO matters before 
their implementation.
227
 It is doubtful that China can easily comply with the Protocol 
requirement that it first publish, in a designated official journal, all of its laws, 
regulations, and measures pertaining to trade before their implementation. The 
Protocol secondly requires China to translate all such laws, regulations and measures 
into one of the three official languages of the WTO within 90 days of their 
implementation.
228
 
    With respect to rules-making in the Doha Round, China has been seeking 
bilateral and regional trade (and investment) agreements outside the Doha multilateral 
                                                        
226 Working Party Report, para. 67. 
227  Protocol, section 2(c)(2). Exceptions are given to laws and regulations involving national security or 
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forum. The following section will discuss China’s economic situation, since China 
must find a suitable position for negotiating bilateral and regional agreements that 
meet its requirements for economic (and social) sustainable development. 
2.5 Figures Regarding China’s Performance in International Trade 
and Investment 
To find the rationale of Chinese FDI policies, and assess the value of investment 
treaty making, it is necessary to look at China’s economic situation. 
2.5.1 Export/Import 
China’s exports are growing rapidly year by year. Many countries have become less 
inclined to open up their own markets, while simultaneously asking for China’s 
further opening. But this rapid-growth is not in the same situation as before. 
 
Table 1: China’s Changing International Trade 
  1981  2014 Growth p/a 
Exports $ billions 14.6  2,343 16.6% 
Imports $ billions 14.6  1,960 16.0% 
Fuels and ores as a percentage of:    
 Imports 6.0 * 28.7  
 Exports 25.2 * 2.8  
Reserves $ billions 10.1  3,900 19.8% 
As % of imports 69%  199%  
   *refers to 1984, not 1981. (Source: World Development Indicators Online, 28
th
 Sep. 2015.)
 
 
     
As this table shows, Chinese exports and imports averaged 16% growth for over three 
decades.
229
 In 1981 Chinese trade was more or less balanced, whereas by 2014 
exports exceeded imports by about 20%. This means that in 2014 trade between China 
and its main partners was severely imbalanced.
230
 Moreover, China has shifted from 
                                                        
229 See L Alan Winters, “China and the World Trading System: Will ‘In and Up’ be replaced by ‘Down and 
Out’?”, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2015/82. 
230 But it is noticeable that before the 1978 reform, foreign trade in China was a balancing factor to fill gaps in 
supply and demand under national plans. The imposition of tariffs was for a revenue-raising purpose. The 
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being a net exporter of industrial raw materials, to being a large net importer.
231
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Main Export and Import Commodities, 2008 
Exports Imports 
Item Value 
(100 
million 
USD) 
Increase 
over 2007 
(%) 
Item Value 
(100 
million 
USD) 
Increase 
over 2007 
(%) 
Automatic data 
processing machines and 
components  
1,350 9.1 Crude oil 1,293 62.0 
Clothes and Clothing 
Accessories 
1,198 4.1 Iron ore 605 79.1 
Textile yarns and textile 
articles 
654 16.6 Plastic in Primary 
forms 
341 5.3 
Rolled steel 634 43.8 Petroleum 
products refined 
300 82.7 
Handheld mobiles and 
car telephones 
385 8.2 Rolled steel 234 14.0 
Footwear 297 17.2 Soybean 218 90.1 
Furniture 269 21.5 Copper and 
copper alloys 
192 -2.3 
Integrated circuit 243 3.3 Edible vegetable 
oil 
90 44.0 
Liquid crystal display 
panels 
224 13.9 Paper pulp 67 20.9 
                                                                                                                                                              
pre-reform Chinese trade regime was dominated between 10 and 16 Foreign Trade Corporations with effective 
monopolies in the import and export of their specified ranges of products. As decentralization of export activities 
took place and as more and more imports were conducted outside of mandatory planning, trade policy came to 
play an increasing role in China’s economic transition. Average industrial tariff is reduced from 43% in the late 
1980s to 40% in 1993, 23% in 1996, 15% in 2001, and 9% by 2006 under the WTO entry conditions. See Prof. G. 
Giovannetti, Presentation: “China’s Role in International Trade and Investments,” at Executive Training 
Seminar,” Global Governance Program, at the EUI (Florence) (April 2014). 
231 Nature resources, and energy; 
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Containers 91 3.6 Natural rubber 
(including latex) 
43 32.0 
Motor vehicles 
(including a complete set 
of spare sets) 
89 32.5 Synthetic rubber 
(including latex) 
33 17.5 
Coal 52 58.9 Aluminium oxide 18 -9.7 
   Cereals and cereal 
flour 
7 37.0 
(Source: Statistical Communiqué of the PRC on 2008.) 
 
    Firstly, from the above table, the presence of primary inducts (i.e., coal, rolled 
steel, motor vehicles) as the main import to some degree reflects China’s role as ‘the 
factory of the world’. Secondly, coal and rolled steel ranked as the first two places for 
their growth rate in exports, whereas soybeans and refined petroleum products took 
the first two places for their growth rate in imports.
232
 This comparison may show the 
impact on imports and exports of terms-of-trade changes triggered by the price surge 
of primary goods. The evidence is that the values of these products went up, yet the 
quantity went down. 
    China’s debt problem is now a deep concern. Many Western economists argue 
that China has supported domestic demand through a massive investment boom 
funded by extensive borrowing.
233
 This approach has helped to support aggregate 
demand, and also substantially reduce the Chinese trade imbalance. But in the long 
run, it is a big problem.
234
 
    China affected the world financial crisis in 2008-9, when world demand 
collapsed, as China’s measures stimulated official borrowing and investment.235 
                                                        
232 Changyuan Luo and Jun Zhang, ‘China Trade Policy Review: A Political Economy Approach,’ The World 
Economy, 2010, pp. 1390-1413. 
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235 See Rajan R, How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the Global Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
2009. Arguing that partly because competitive pressures from China and other low-cost producers constrained real 
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However, the investment exacerbated Chinese excess capacity in manufacturing, and 
significantly increased the Chinese stock of huge debt. As already was clear in 2007, 
this path requires the Chinese economy to move away from investment and exports as 
the drivers of domestic consumption and innovation. 
    In spite of these problems, China will still continue to provide a significant 
impetus to world demand. It is important for China to find a fairly good position for 
negotiations when considering the quality of the transformation over the last few 
decades. 
    China is facing the “impossible trinity”236 problem now, and it has to choose its 
RMB and capital regime trade-off.
237
 Resolving it, either by means of a devaluation 
of the RMB or tighter capital controls, will have far-reaching consequences. Western 
economic thinking recognizes China’s trilemma but insists that openness, freer 
markets, and liberalization are the way forward.  
Export growth accelerated from about 2001, partly as China’s accession to the 
WTO drew in FDI especially from other Asia countries. There was also a significant 
fall in import growth after 2004, mainly as the net import of heavy industrial products 
fell. This trend partly reflected a build-up of the stock of equipment over the 
preceding few years, but also the shift in Chinese capabilities so that domestic 
supplies increased strongly.
238
 However, China’s exports are slowing. Goods from 
China only account for around three percent of US expenditure, and hence can have 
only a small direct influence on US aggregate price indices. If China is to have a 
discernible effect on such indices, it has to be by influencing the prices at which other 
producers sell. 
2.5.2 FDI and Service 
                                                                                                                                                              
wages among less skilled workers, American policy-markets looked to private credit markers to boost their 
spending power; this, in turn, caused the real estate boom and the stock of toxic mortgages that so burdened the 
financial system and private portfolios. 
236 Formed by economist Robert Mundell in the late 1960s, this suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously 
pursue more than two of an independent monetary policy, a fixed exchange rate and free capital movements. 
237 George Magnus, China’s trilemma makes it vulnerable to more shocks, FT news, China has a fixed but 
adjustable exchange rate, plans monetary autonomy, and has promised to liberalize capital transactions. 
238 Winters, (2015). 
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China is increasingly engaging in outward FDI,
239
 implying that it may support 
negotiating multilateral disciplines on investment. But globally, China’s average share 
in world FDI outflows averaged only 5% during 2010-12, while its share of the 
world’s outward FDI stock was 3% in 2014.240 
It is still hard to ascertain how the country’s FDI is distributed across sectors and 
geographic regions, as more than two-thirds of China’s non-financial sector outflows 
are channelled via financial centres and tax havens, like Hong Kong, the Cayman 
Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Luxembourg, and Panama. Thus, it is not known in 
which countries and sectors they are ultimately invested.  
However, it seems likely that services and natural resources are the most 
important sectors, and that Chinese firms have invested substantially in both 
developed and developing countries.
241
 Trade-supporting FDI is also important, 
because of the country’s leading role in international exports in the past decades. Of 
further importance is the desire to access markets through direct investment (as 
opposed to trade). 
     China moved away from an export-driven, development model towards one that 
emphasizes domestic consumption and innovation. This change increases interest in 
service industries if they have much more market access, especially since China’s 
services sector has relatively low added value in an international supply chain. 
China has high barriers on service sectors. Nevertheless, China has made great 
strides in removing policy barriers as part of its WTO accession. Although it is highly 
open regarding trade outcomes, it still protects internal procedures from foreign 
competition. For example, China’s services sector policies are more restrictive than 
the average level of restrictiveness of low and middle-income countries. They are 
additionally much more restrictive than those of the high-income countries in all 
sectors, including financial, professional service, retail, and telecommunication, with 
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240 Id. 
241 Karl P. Sauvant and Michael D. Nolan, “China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment and International 
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transport as the only exception.
242
 
    The OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index notes that many service sectors 
face FDI restriction. Reflected by the data is that continued restrictions on the entry of 
foreign firms are an important contributor to the high barriers to service trade in 
China.
243
 Indeed, the OECD scores the barriers to market entry in certain industries in 
China higher than the OECD overall average barriers to service trade.
244
 
2.5.3 BIT’s Implication on FDI and Service 
For example, completion of a US-China BIT offers an important opportunity for the 
US and China to increase their trade in services. The US has a comparative advantage 
in trade in services. China needs to import more services to make its economy more 
driven by domestic consumer spending, rather than exports.  
    Given China has relatively high barriers to services trade,
245
 the two countries 
can address some of these impediments in their negotiation for a supposed US-China 
BIT. Furthermore, FDI can spur Chinese imports of services. The lack of data on the 
service sector hampers empirical analysis of this sector in China and elsewhere.
246
 
Increased trade would improve the level of service in telecommunications, 
finance, and other business services in China for both businesses and consumers. To 
move up the value chain in manufactured goods, China will need access to efficient, 
leading-edge services in engineering, design, development, testing, marketing, 
advertising, logistics, and distribution. Given the current relatively small size of its 
business services sector, it seems unlikely that China can become immediately 
self-sufficient in these activities. Importing these services is an obvious way to 
provide them. 
                                                        
242 See Borchert, Gootiz and Mattoo, ‘Restrictions on Services Trade and FDI in Developing Countries,’ World 
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243 Bridging the Pacific, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015, p174. 
244 Id., Service industries that have particularly high barriers to foreign firm entry include commercial banking, 
insurance, road transport, distribution, courier services, broadcasting, and motion pictures—all industries where 
the US has globally competitive firms. (“FDI in China is governed by rules tailored for each sector. Some sectors 
are encouraged, some permitted, some restricted, and some prohibited. Many service sectors face restrictions on 
FDI.”) 
245 Id. 
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3 China’s Practice of Forming Investment Treaties in 
Post-WTO Phase 
 
 
FDI often flow into international competitive sectors. Trade liberalization, 
accompanied by other policies that encourage investment can have a significant effect 
on economic development.
247
 Both the GATT and GATS have market-access 
commitments. By requiring reciprocity and MFN treatment, nations attempt to 
minimize the ‘free riding’ problem. However, due to the proliferation of bilateral 
agreements, countries are now negotiating market access for their exporting firms 
bilaterally. This trend has weakened reciprocity in the multilateral context, as it 
reduces the incentives for export interests to support liberalization during multilateral 
treaty negotiations.
248
 Other analyses take an opposing view, to argue that PTAs may 
create political economy forces, which generate support for expanding preferential 
liberalization to non-members and thus, eventually, multi-liberalization.
249
 
In practice, PTAs often include investment chapter as a package deal. This 
section will give a general description of Chinese BITs and investment chapters in 
FTAs, respectively. In particular, it will provide a literature review to observe whether 
signing investment treaties (FTAs and BITs) has any impact on capital flow. It will 
first analyse the legal rules and their economic rationale, to understand why a state 
may choose to switch from WTO to Preferential Trade Agreements. Then, it will 
examine Chinese FTAs to analyse the extent to which China has opened its market in 
the service sector (FDI) and assess the impact of signing FTAs. 
Intra-regional agreements are either part of an organization’s deeper economic 
integration agenda, such as ASEAN’s Comprehensive Investment Agreement, entered 
into force in 2013, or ad hoc, like the Trilateral China-Japan-South Korea Investment 
                                                        
247 Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, Political Economy of World Trading System: the WTO and 
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Treaty, signed in 2012. Regionalism has added a novel dimension to investment law 
due to the vertical overlap of BITs with regional investment agreements.
250
 In 
investment law regionalism may present an opportunity for coherence, as multi-party 
investment agreements can consolidate investment protection provisions.
251
  
    How do countries deal with vertical treaty overlap? Countries can leave 
overlapping treaties formally in place. But they can manage treaty interactions in such 
a way that only one of the treaties defines the relationship. One way is by 
incorporation, which means that one treaty may incorporate another treaty, or parts 
thereof, in order to avoid duplication. The China-Singapore FTA (2008) incorporates 
the ASEAN-China Investment Agreement (2009) in Article 84(1).
252
 Another way, is 
by suspension, which means the former BIT is suspended when the new FTA enters 
into force. States can also leave treaties merely in co-existence, rather than 
consolidating them. Yet another way is by keeping silence, which means that there is 
no language in treaties addressing the issue of overlapping BITs. However, some 
treaties explicitly affirm the existence of overlapping treaties, as parallelism. For 
instance, Article 25 of the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement 
(2012) states: 
 
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights and obligations of a Contracting Party, 
including those relating to treatment accorded to investors of another Contracting Party, 
under any bilateral investment agreement between those two Contracting Parties exiting 
on the date of entry into force of this Agreement, so long as such a bilateral agreement is 
in force. 
 
For the matter of confliction between treaties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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71 
Treaties lays down some principles relevant to aspects of this problem. In the light of 
these dynamics of treaty making, the Vienna Convention makes a distinction between 
‘amendment’—namely, the process of changing a treaty in a way which is intended to 
alter the obligations of all states—and ‘modification’—that is, changes proposed to 
modify the obligations between only some of the parties to a treaty.
253
 The details of 
the Vienna Convention’s law of treaties on amendment and modification can be found 
in Articles 40 and 41 respectively.
254
 
Some treaties have explicitly referred to existing agreements more generally, like 
the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA 2012) in Article 44: 
“Nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from the existing rights and obligations of 
a Member State under any other international agreements to which it is a party.”255 
The balance is gradually shifting from bilateral to regional treaty making.
256
 
Regional investment treaties could add an extra treaty layer to the already existing 
BITs, which cause the vertical overlap of investment treaties.
257
 According to the 
WTO Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) database,
258
 agreements listed there include 
treaties that have an investment protection component ‘substantively equivalent’ to 
those found in BITs.
259
 There are also framework agreements which cover only 
relative (i.e., non-discriminatory) provisions, but not absolute (i.e., expropriation) 
investment protection standards. An example of this is the China-Switzerland PTA. 
Relative clauses define the treatment that must be provided, by reference to the 
treatment provided to any other investment or investor. Absolute clauses describe the 
                                                        
253 Richard K. Gardiner, International Law, Pearson Education Limited, 2003, p. 93. 
254 Article 41(2) permit that only some of the parties to a treaty can change its terms as between themselves: 
(a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; or 
(b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and: 
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or 
the performance of their obligations; 
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. 
255 Art. 44, ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement. 
256 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (Geneva: United 
Nations, 2012), p. 86. 
257 UNCTAD’s definition of ‘other IIAs’ comprises a variety of investment-related treaties including PTAs with 
investment chapters, and also liberalization or framework agreements without substantive investment protection 
provisions. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for 
Development (Geneva: United Nations, 2013), p.101. 
258  Http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx. (visited 2 September 2014) The database lists 
preferential trade agreements notified to the WTO.  
259 Besides the specific agreements listed, there is investment agreement either concluded as part of the same 
regional integration project or signed alongside an FTA.  
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treatment that must be provided without reference to the treatment granted to those 
comparators. In addition, not all BITs grant Investor-State Arbitration (ISA), while 
some regional investment treaties also do not provide for such mechanisms, e.g., the 
Australia-US FTA. Rather, increasingly bi-directional investment flows, coupled with 
the threat of ISA, have given rise to a new generation of investment treaties. These 
protect investment abroad, while safeguarding policy space at home through more 
balanced treaties.
260
 
3.1 BITs  
Statistics show that China became the largest FDI recipient in the world in 2014.
261
 
At the same time, multilateral enterprises (MNEs) from developing Asian countries 
became the world’s largest investment group, accounting for almost one-third of the 
global total.
262
 Investment by Chinese MNEs grew faster than inflows into the 
country, reaching $116 billion.
263
 
While imposing certain limitations, China has been by far the most active and 
open country in pursuing a coherent policy on investment at the international level. 
Together with a number of domestic reforms, this has resulted in the creation of a 
better friendlier environment for foreign investors. 
China has signed 130 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that establish rules and 
proceedings to protect FDI.
264
 Over half of them (68 BITs) were entered into force in 
the 1990s, while others were signed in the 1980s (24 BITs) and the 2000s. Eleven 
BITs were renegotiated in the 2000s, either in the form of either a new BIT or an 
amendment protocol. Most of these renegotiated BITs were with European states, 
which signed BITs with China in the early years and updated the treaties in the 2000s. 
                                                        
260 Wolfgang Alschner, ‘Americanization of the BIT Universe: The Influence of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation (FCN) Treaties on Modern Investment Treaty Law’, 5 Goettingen Journal of International Law 455 
(2013); S.A. Spears, ‘The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International Investment Investments’ 13 
Journal of International Economic Law 1037 (2010); A. Van Asken, International Investment Law between 
Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis’, 12 Journal of International Economic Law 507 (2009). 
261 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2015, p. 4. 
262 Id., p. 5. 
263 Id. 
264 The list of Chinese BITs is on the basis of (1) a list of BITs that have entered into force, which is provided by 
the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China; online: (visited on 2 Oct. 2016); (2) the list of 
Chinese BITs provided by UNCTAD;  
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Also, China has concluded twelve free trade agreements (FTAs) that contain a 
BIT-type chapter. The overall structure, and most provisions may appear similar, 
while the differences—and the changes between one model and the other—reflect 
special Chinese attitudes towards international law and international dispute 
settlement mechanisms.
265
 
    Against the background of China’s changing international investment position, 
its role in the global governance of FDI has attracted more attention. The rationale 
behind China’s FDI policy has been changing from attracting inward FDI to 
promoting outward FDI. This change in policy priorities is reflected in the shift from 
a restrictive to a legalized BIT approach, resulting in higher levels of legal protection 
for foreign investors in China and Chinese investors abroad.
266
 
Instead of converging, trade and investment regimes remain largely distinct. The 
international trade regime seeks to promote trade liberalization through ‘reciprocal’ 
advantages directed toward the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade. The 
international investment regime, on the other hand, seeks to promote greater 
cross-border investment, through mutual protection under an international agreement. 
Before providing some political economic rationale of including investment 
provisions in PTAs, the following subsections will first discuss China’s BIT program, 
which serves as a benchmark for evaluating the changed investment rules in China’s 
PTAs. 
3.1.1 A Time Line 
The first generation of Chinese BITs (1982-1992), modelled on the European BIT 
approach, restricted national treatment, and while its Investor-State Arbitration (ISA) 
provisions were only concerned with the amount of compensation for expropriation. 
The second generation of BITs (1992-2001), also modelled on the European BIT 
                                                        
265 Over time, China has adopted three model BITs. China’s State Council drafted the first version of Model BIT 
in the early 1980s (around 1984). The model was revised in the late 1980s (around 1989). The third version was 
adopted in the 1990s (around 1997). The last version is the current working text for BIT negotiations. (Gallagher, 
Shan) 
266 Gallagher and Shan 2009, Schill 2007. 
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approach, applied national treatment, and adapted full ISDS.
267
 National treatment in 
these BITs was subject either to national law in developing countries,
268
 or 
non-conforming measures in developed countries.
269
 The third generation of BITs 
(post-2001) have been partly modelled on the NAFTA approach. They apply fair and 
equitable treatment in accordance with customary international law. MFN treatment 
does not extend to ISDS. But, MFN treatment does apply in pre-establishment phase 
of building investment.  
    A fourth period has started since 2006. In 2008, China signed a FTA with New 
Zealand, featuring an FDI protection regime which has been widely regarded as 
significant. Since 2006, China has ventured into the territory of FTAs featuring an 
investment chapter,
270
 followed by the stipulation (and completion) of multi-stage 
integrated FTAs comprising investment agreements.
271
 This occurred alongside with 
gradual shifts in the language and structure of the North American models.
272
 The 
following subsections will outline the evolution of China’s policy regarding 
international investment law. 
3.1.2 Geographical Partners 
Geographically, Chinese BITs cover most continents including Asia, Europe, Africa, 
Latin America, Oceania and North America (Canada). The US is not yet covered. The 
Chinese BIT network is most dense in Asia, covering forty states in the continent. 
Europe has the second largest number of treaties, with twenty-five members of the 
European Union being covered by China’s BIT network. In Africa, thirty-one states 
have a BIT with China. The Chinese BIT network also covers four Pacific states, 
including Australia and New Zealand. In Latin America, Chinese BITs cover thirteen 
countries. Notably, however, China has not yet signed a BIT with Brazil. The most 
striking exception to the extensive coverage of the Chinese BIT network is North 
                                                        
267 The China-Barbados BIT, signed in July 1998, can be described as a watershed because it was the first treaty to 
offer foreign investors unrestricted access to international arbitration. 
268 China-Guyana BIT (2003). 
269 China-Germany BIT (2003) and China-Belgium BIT (2009). 
270 China-Pakistan FTA (2006), China-New Zealand FTA (2008), China-Peru FTA (2009) 
271 China-ASEAN Investment Agreement (2009); China-Chile Supplementary Agreement on Investments (2012). 
272 China-Canada BIT (2012) and China-Japan-Korea TIA (2012). 
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America, notably the US, although negotiation has been proposed. However, China 
has signed BITs with the other two members of the NAFTA, Canada, and Mexico. 
3.1.3 Substantive and Procedural Provisions under BITs 
  a) National Treatment Provision 
 
China does not reject involving a post-establishment phase of MFN and national 
treatment in its BITs. National treatment clauses in Chinese BITs with 
capital-exporting countries—(e.g., with Germany, 2003, and Belgium, 2009)—allow 
China to maintain only existing non-conforming measures, subject to a “best efforts” 
rollback promise on the part of China.
273
 By contrast, in Chinese BITs with 
capital-importing countries—(e.g., with Guyana, 2003)—the application of national 
treatment is limited “without prejudice to its laws and regulations”, thus allowing both 
states to adopt new non-conforming measures.
274
 
  
b) Investor-State Arbitration Clause 
     
China ratified the ICSID Convention on February 6 1993.
275
 When China acceded to 
the ICSID Convention, only it consented to submit to the Centre’s jurisdiction 
disputes over the amount of compensation due to expropriation. After that, China 
updated the model BIT text. One reason for this may have been the surge of outward 
direct investments from China to the rest of the world, and the growing interest in the 
protection of Chinese investors in foreign countries using BITs. 
    The 1997 Chinese model BIT granted consent to international arbitration, 
including ICSID arbitration, for all Investor-State disputes. The first BIT based on the 
new model text was the 1998 China-Barbados BIT. It allowed access to ICSID 
arbitration for all Investor-State disputes. Since then, most new BITs have followed 
                                                        
273 The China-Germany BIT, Art 3. Protocol, Ad. Art.2 and 3. 
274 The China-Guyyana BIT, Art.3(2). 
275  575 UNTS 159. China’s accession entered into force on 6 February 1993. See ICSID homepage, 
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the new model, and included full access to ICSID jurisdiction. The 1997 China-South 
Africa BIT was the first in which China accepted investor-State dispute arbitration for 
all disputes; nevertheless, not being South Africa party to the ICSID Convention, Art. 
9 of the BIT featured only ad hoc arbitration. 
    China’s initial approach to dispute resolution in the form of Investor-State 
Arbitration was very restricted. For example, the Australia-China BIT provides for 
arbitration where the parties agree to it, or ‘where the dispute relates to the amount of 
compensation payable.’276 In the first arbitration case brought under a Chinese BIT, 
Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru,
277
 the investor was obliged to prove that the 
terms of the 1994 China-Peru BIT (which is very similar to the Australia-China BIT) 
allowed the tribunal to consider, not only the amount of compensation due to 
expropriation, but the question of whether expropriation took place.
278
 
The recent BITs, by contrast, represent China’s most recent position and allow 
for submission to ICSID arbitration, or arbitration under UNCITRAL, rules of ‘any 
legal dispute arising under this [Investment] Chapter,’ 279  subject to certain 
requirements relating to conciliation and administrative review. 
    Chinese companies investing abroad have to comply both with internal 
requirements and with the rules of the countries where they propose to invest. In cases 
of both inbound and outbound investment, the Chinese approval process is not 
transparent. Thus, it is difficult for a claimant to rebut claims that the application of 
the system is subject to government influence and protectionism.
280
 
3.1.4 A Balancing Approach to New Investment Policies 
a) Domestic Policy Relating to Inbound Investment 
                                                        
276 Article XII(2)(b). 
277 Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, 19 June 2009. ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/6. 
278 For the discussion of this case, see Nils Eliasson, ‘Chinese Investment Treaties: A Procedural Perspective,’ in 
Foreign Investment and Dispute Resolution Law and Practice in Asia, eds. by Vivienne Bath and Luke Nottage, 
Routledge, 2011, pp. 91-107. 
279 See, for example, the China-NewZealand FTA, Investment Chapter, Article 152. 
280 A Survey by the US-China Business Council (2010) suggests that US businesses are concerned by some 
factors that relate to equality of treatment, including competition with state-owned enterprises and growing 
protectionism. See: Areddy, J. (2011) ‘US Firms Decry China’s Heavy Hand: Alleged Bias by Regulations Is 
Likely to Be Contentious Issue Between Two Countries.’  
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Chinese policy towards investment has been amended and modified on numerous 
occasions since 1979, but the basic objectives have remained consistent.
281
 On the 
one hand, the Chinese government has encouraged foreign companies to invest in 
China. Incentives (many of which are no longer available) were provided at state level 
in the form of tax holidays and reductions, a special rate for foreign companies, and 
customs exemptions for the import of equipment.
282
 On the other hand, the Chinese 
government is keeping a policy that exercises strict regulatory control over both the 
admission of foreign investment and the scope of operations of foreign investors 
within China. For example, the primary source of scrutiny over the industries in 
which foreigners may invest is the ‘Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign 
Investment’, the most recent version of which was issued in 2007,283 which lists 
activities in which foreign investment is encouraged, restricted or prohibited. 
Investment in other activities should be permitted.
284
 
    As part of the preliminary negotiations between China and other countries before 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001,285 China opened up a considerable number of 
sectors to foreign investment and removed from many industries its traditional 
requirements for the import of technology, and export orientation.
286
 
 
b) Going Global Policy and Outbound Investment 
 
With the adoption of the ‘going global’ policy in 1999, China increasingly focused on 
                                                        
281 Vivienne Bath (2011), p. 69. 
282 For example, Article 7 of the original version of the Equity Joint Venture Law granted income tax holidays and 
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outbound investment. With regard to the BIT program, in 2003 China, with Germany, 
renegotiated the 1983 BIT. In this revised agreement, China agreed to particularly 
high standards of investment protection. This set the basis for the negotiations of 
investment discipline featured in Chinese FTAs since 2008, as well as for the BIT 
with Canada and the Trilateral Investment Agreement with Japan and Korea, both in 
2012. Some commentators have described the Chinese BITs since 2006 as a third, 
more balanced, generation of investment treaties.
287
 For instance, the 2006 
China-India BIT seeks to clarify indirect expropriation, and the 2008 China-Mexico 
BIT contains a waiver clause on Investor-State Arbitration. Nevertheless, it appears 
that such clauses are due more to negotiation bargains with specific states, rather than 
part of a systemic approach.
288
 
    This balanced approach is reflected in many recent BITs. Firstly, with regard to 
investment definition, prior BITs state: ‘any investments that are not properly 
approved by the Government would not qualify as an investment and therefore could 
not rely on the BIT protections.’289 The China-German BIT (2003) removed this 
‘subject to local law’ requirement in the definition of investment.290 However, in the 
Article on the admission of investments, the treaty provides that each contracting 
party is required only to ‘admit such investment by its laws and regulations.’291 
    Secondly, on the issue of treatment standards, in the earliest model BIT (before 
the 1990s), China did not include national treatment at all. The BIT with the UK, 
signed in 1986, was the first BIT where this standard of treatment was included, and 
even then, it was only a ‘best endeavour’ clause, requiring the contracting parties to 
implement it ‘to the extent possible’.292 The BIT with Japan in 1988 was the second 
such BIT, and its national treatment clause was also substantially qualified by 
subjecting it to ‘the sound development of economy.’293 More recent BITs, however, 
                                                        
287 See Gallagher and Shan, 2009. 
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have moved a step further from the current prototype. The German BIT, for example, 
has removed the ‘subject to local laws’ limitation in its national treatment clause, 
though it has replaced it with a ‘grandfather clause’ 294 for China in its Protocol. This 
provision allows for the continuation of existing non-conforming Chinese measures 
that are incompatible with the national treatment standard.
295
 
    The definition of ‘investment’ in the China-Japan-Korea Triangle Investment 
Agreement (CJKTIA) Article 1(5) also does not include the “pre-establishment” phase 
of investment. As mentioned, China has not conceded pre-establishment rights in its 
past BITs. Within the China-Canada BIT and the China-New Zealand FTA (with 
investment chapter), national treatment is afforded only for the ‘expansion, 
management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments.’ In the 
China-Korea FTA, both sides committed to launch negotiations on pre-establishment 
national treatment and the negative list mode.
296
 However the extent to which China 
will establish a meaningful precedent in its coverage of pre-establishment rights will 
depend on the scope of related exceptions (i.e., ‘non-conforming measures’). 
    As mentioned above, the CJKTIA establishes non-discriminatory national and 
MFN treatment for post-establishment investment. In particular, it includes 
commitments to prohibit performance requirements,
297
 enhance transparency,
298
 and 
provide protection for intellectual property,
299
 which is progress toward a more 
transparent climate for Japanese and Korean investors in China. Indeed, the CJKTIA 
may provide new FDI opportunities for Japanese and Korean firms, as the investment 
environment in Northeast Asia becomes more liberalized, and investment 
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opportunities shift as China moves up the value-added chain.
300
 Whether investors 
will be able to capitalize on any advantages in the Chinese market may hinge on 
enforcement regarding intellectual property rights and technology transfer provisions. 
    The most recent Chinese BIT with Canada (ratified in 2013) uses a broad 
definition of investment, including IPR. The Canada-China BIT does not provide 
national treatment for the pre-establishment phase of investment, but rather for the 
“expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments” (Article 6). However, MFN treatment does apply to both 
pre-establishment and post-establishment phases of investment. This is similar to the 
investment chapter of the China-New Zealand FTA. 
3.2 FTAs 
To discover the reasons why states may conclude FTAs, one could start with the legal 
rules in the WTO agreements. Art. XXIV GATT permits the formation of free trade 
agreements and customs unions. The formation of a PTA is subject to conditions: 
(1) external trade barriers after integration may not rise on average (Art. XXIV.5 GATT); 
(2) all tariffs and other regulations of commerce must be removed on substantially all 
intra-regional exchanges of goods within a reasonable length of time (Art. XXIV:8 
GATT); and 
(3) PTAs must be notified to the WTO (Art. XXIV.7 GATT).
301
 
 
    It is for the WTO Council for Trade in Goods to determine, by a recommendation 
of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA),
302
 whether FTAs meet the 
criteria reflected in Article XXIV GATT. The language of Article XXIV GATT is 
unclear on how to define ‘substantially all trade’, and how to determine whether the 
external trade policy of a customs union has become more restrictive on average. 
    Firstly, since the enactment of the ‘Transparency Mechanism’ in 2006, there is no 
                                                        
300 With increasing wages and production costs among other structural changes, the offshoring of labour-intensive 
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UNCTAD (2013). 
301 Art. XXIV.5, 7, 8, GATT. 
302 The CRTA is the first track to review the consistency of PTAs. It is composed of all WTO representatives and 
decisions are taken by consensus. The WTO members participating in a PTA must be persuaded that their PTA is 
WTO-inconsistent for a decision to this effect to be taken. 
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longer a multilateral review of notified PTAs. The CRTA has evolved into an 
‘information exchange’ system.303 Parties forming a PTA will respond to questions 
and provide additional information. Then, a report will be drafted to assess the 
consistency of the notified PTA with the multilateral rules. Members can always 
challenge this result before a GATT panel. Compared to the GATT 1947, the WTO 
clarifies some of the criteria and procedures for the assessment of agreements.
304
 
There is a ten-year maximum on the transition period for the implementation of an 
agreement, although exceptions may be allowed. While the definition of the term 
‘substantially all trade’ appearing in Art. XXIV.8 GATT, on the other hand, has not 
been clarified in WTO practice.
305
 
    Secondly, to satisfy the external trade policy requirement, a customs union must 
ensure consistency with Art. XXIV.5 GATT (relevant for both FTAs and CUs). In 
addition, Art. XXIV.6 GATT (which is pertinent only for the customs union) requires 
WTO members seeking to increase bound tariff rates upon joining a customs union to 
enter into renegotiations.
306
 If agreement cannot be reached within a reasonable 
period, the customs union may proceed as it wishes, and affected members may 
retaliate by withdrawing equivalent concessions. 
    To see the effect caused by these treaties, it is more important to question the 
economic rationale of signing PTAs with investment chapter. It remains to be seen if, 
and how, PTAs can deal with the cost-raising effects of regulatory differences. 
Furthermore, it has not yet been established whether they will go significantly beyond 
what is already covered by the WTO, and, if they do, to what extent this will be 
detrimental to countries that are not PTA members. 
                                                        
303 On 14th December 2006, the General Council adopted a decision concerning the Transparency Mechanism for 
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One explanation for the formation of PTAs is that they are not only pursued for 
commercial purposes. PTAs may support the WTO members desire for policy reform, 
with stronger incentives to enforce agreements. PTAs may also involve disciplines on 
domestic instruments that are not yet covered by the WTO, and rule-making already 
started among developed countries. 
  As shown below, PTAs may divert trade away from the most efficient suppliers 
in the world to more costly, but preferred, partners, who can sell more in the PTA 
because they are exempted from duties. Firms within a PTA may create more trade 
than they divert, by inducing consumers to switch from less efficient local producers 
to firms in partner countries if they are more efficient. However, PTAs that are 
beneficial to members may still have a negative impact on those countries that suffer 
from trade diversion. 
  Whether or not PTAs slow down multilateral liberalization remains a difficult 
empirical question. PTAs could be building blocks for multilateral liberalization, if 
their formation induces excluded countries to pursue WTO negotiations. This can 
lower the external tariffs of the PTAs to reduce diverting trade potential.
307
 Baldwin 
develops a theory aiming to predict who ‘goes preferential’ depending on the identity 
of the ‘spoke’ and the ‘hub’ that have already gone preferential.308 
A trading bloc will normally have more monopoly power in world trade than any 
of its members alone, which will improve ‘terms of trade’.309 In Saggi and Yildiz, the 
option to form bilateral FTAs can further the cause of multilateral liberalization by 
making non-participation costlier for reluctant liberalizers.
310
  
Winters and Schiff have argued that, it can be assumed that trust can be built and 
conflict can be avoided through the formation of PTAs.
311
 It is assumed that tariff 
preferences, the quintessence of PTAs in the early GATT years, are not the dominant 
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Europe,’ The World Economy 31 (2008): 5-30. 
309 Paul Krugman, ‘The Move Toward Free Trade Zones’, Economic Review November-December (1991): 1-24. 
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explanation for some of the more recent PTAs. Freund address this issue head on, and 
concludes that some Latin American PTAs did not behave as stumbling blocks, that is, 
their members cut tariffs on MFN basis subsequent to the conclusion of their PTA.
312
 
    Horn et. al. examine the subject matter of PTAs concluded by two hubs (EU, 
U.S.) with various spokes, and divide it into WTO+ (tariff cuts beyond the MFN 
level), and WTOx (issues that do not come under the mandate of the WTO). The 
WTOx part of the PTAs examined exceeds WTO+ obligations assumed under a PTA. 
They suggest that the rationale for going preferential should also be searched in 
WTOx type of obligations.
313
  
    Lastly, the PTA and WTO-extra issue (the subject matter for which no 
multilateral rules exist) indicates the problem that no test exists (other than MFN) to 
measure the consistency of WTO-x provisions with the WTO.
314
 The legal 
framework is important in answering this question. GATT Article XXIV allows 
deviations from MFN protection, but not deviations from MFN in general.
315
 The 
problem is that one might proclaim a PTA GATT-inconsistent because it does not 
meet an agreed definition of the substantially all trade requirement, and yet deny PTA 
participants benefits in the form of FDI, technical assistance in some policies, etc.
316
 
This does not mean that FDI and PTAs are indissolubly linked. Indeed, one could 
conclude a BIT without anchoring it in a PTA, as some countries do. However, there 
could be substantial advantages when negotiating one, instead of two, agreements 
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Arvind Panagariya (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). 
313 See Horn, Mavroidis, Sapir, “Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements”, 
The World Economy, 2010. 
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Yesterday and Today’, World Trade Review (2011), 10: 3, 375-387. 
315 Id. According to the GATT discipline, the only permissible form of protection is through tariffs. The term 
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duties and charges’ which, at the time when GATT Article XXIV had been agreed were not being negotiated—as 
the case now is—along with ordinary customs duties. The assumption aims to keep the current WTO mandate 
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316 Id. 
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(e.g., fixed costs, better enforcement), and disentangling them might be too 
onerous.
317
  
    The following parts will analyse the effect of PTAs on capital flow, especially 
FDI in the service industry, then give a general review of the provisions of Chinese 
PTAs and BITs respectively. 
 
3.2.1 Economic Significance of FTAs 
The state’s obligations towards investment treatments are often embodied in BITs, or 
where they exist, the investment chapters of PTAs. BITs typically contribute to 
“negative integration”, that is, precluding certain policies, rather than requiring 
policies to actively encourage investment, but they may play an important facilitating 
role in investment flows.
318
 Far more positive in its intent is the common argument 
that PTAs add credibility to government policies in general, and thus help to raise 
investment and attract FDI. However, South-South PTAs are unlikely to do this, and 
may hinder investment if they are not accompanied by trade liberalization with the 
rest of the world. North-South PTAs, on the other hand, can enhance a Southern 
country’s credibility, but typically only if the PTA is likely to enhance economic 
performance in its own right, and if the large Northern partner is willing to enforce 
investment-encouraging rules. 
    Investment is one of the main objectives of countries in pursuing regional 
economic integration. The logic is that larger markets and greater competition 
following trade liberalization, combined with improved policy credibility, will 
increase the incentives for investment.
319
 Investment provisions are now becoming 
common in PTAs. As well as PTAs, BITs are also concluded separately to promote 
investment flows by providing remedy to international dispute resolution. 
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    In theory, PTAs with investment chapters may help countries improve the 
credibility of an open investment regime.
320
 They also may help attract investment by 
lowering the risk of being confronted with adverse policy changes and regulatory 
expropriation. However, research shows that ‘recent PTAs that include language on 
investment may do little if anything to increase the flow of investment to developing 
country partners.’321 
There are few empirical studies on the impact of PTAs on investment. The 
strongest evidence for this impact is derived from FDI inflows, as investors from 
non-member countries confront greater incentives to locate companies within a new 
PTA.
322
 The impact on intra-bloc investment flows is ambiguous. Firms originally 
located in a member country receive access to the whole market without relocation, 
and so have less incentive to invest in other members. Firms located in third countries, 
on the other hand, will have greater incentives to locate new production facilities in a 
member country, and service the other members of the bloc through intra-PTA (i.e., 
preferential) exports. This may be termed ‘platform investment’.323 It is widely 
known that European integration has made member countries more attractive to firms 
that originate from third countries. The PTAs that result in larger markets attract 
greater FDI. The interaction between signing a PTA and the expanded market size 
associated with integrated markets is significant, and positively related to FDI.
324
 
    PTAs may have a major effect on investment in two ways. One way is through 
increasing market size, as a consequence of trade liberalization and accompanying 
legal rules, which eliminate restrictions on market access for foreign investment.
325
 
The other way is through stronger protection for investors. Since investors will face 
risks after their investment, such as on the repatriation of their profits, they will 
consider the protection of investment when making the investment decision. 
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    Most BITs do not deal with market access restrictions, such as sectoral entry 
prohibitions, equity limitations, etc., —per se. Some do impose disciplines on 
performance requirements and similar TRIMs, and they also guarantee MFN and 
national treatment. In some cases, the treatment that is guaranteed to foreign investors 
is better than that accorded to domestic investors, for example regarding access to 
foreign exchange or ability to transfer capital outside of the country, and sometimes 
even concerning investor rights. 
    Determining the payoffs of the inclusion of investment disciplines in PTAs has 
become more important, given the failure to include investment at the multilateral 
level. These PTAs may provide valuable lessons in the future for the potential 
extension of multilevel agreements to cover investment. 
3.2.2 How FTA’s Influence on Capital Flow Fares in the Context of China 
China is a major recipient of FDI, reaching a new record of US$105.74 billion in 
2010.
326
 The major investors in China in 2009 were: Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, 
Singapore, the US, South Korea, the UK, Germany, Macau and Canada.
327
 The total 
FDI in 2009 was US$56.5 billion, and much of this investment has been directed to 
the Asia-Pacific region, with Australia (total stocks of US$5.9 billion at the end of 
2009) and Singapore (US$4.9 billion) the largest recipients after Hong Kong 
(US$164.5 billion).
328
 It should be noted that the immense amount of funds which 
flow in and out of Hong Kong and other tax havens such as the Cayman Islands and 
the British Virgin Islands make it difficult accurately to access the sources and 
locations of Chinese outbound FDI.
329
 
As previously recounted, under China’s open-door policy before 1978, foreign 
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trade, investment, and capital flows were all tightly controlled in China. In that year, 
Chinese leaders decided to adopt the ‘reform and open door’ policies. After 1990, 
China formally agreed to adopt a market economy with Chinese characteristics. 
Furthermore, in 2001, China entered into the WTO, which marked China’s 
engagement in international and regional cooperation. Since 2007, China has 
established a ‘free trade area’ strategy for economic development. 
Regarding China’s performance at the WTO, critics have argued that it only aims 
to take the benefits of the world trading system, while avoiding the obligations.
330
 In 
the early 1990s, the Chinese reformer Deng Xiaoping brought forward his views on 
how China should deal with foreign affairs: “observe calmly; secure our position; 
cope with things calmly; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim 
leadership.”331 However, given China’s large impact on the world economy, it can no 
longer afford to follow Deng’s suggestions of assuming a passive role in international 
relations. The evidence suggests that China continues to be a stubbornly status quo 
oriented country that has learned the rules of the game, and plays within them.
332
 
Have Chinese strategies therefore preferred the predictability of bilateral relationships 
to the complexity of multilateralism? 
China has demonstrated a significant shift from a relatively protectionist policy 
on foreign investment to a gradually more liberal view. This change is reflected in the 
vast number of investment treaties concluded by China in recent years. By December 
2016, China had reached 130 BITs,
333
 and signed 20 treaties with investment 
provisions (TIPs).
334
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Type of agreement: Treaties with Investment (China) 
No. Short title Parties Date of 
signature 
Date of entry 
into force 
Status 
1 China-Macao Agreement 
on Trade in Services 
Macau, China SAR 28/11/2015  Signed 
2 Australia-China FTA Australia 17/06/2015 20/12/2015 In force 
3 China-Republic of Korea 
FTA 
Korea, Republic of 01/06/2015 20/12/2015 In force 
4 China-Switzerland FTA Switzerland 06/07/2013 01/07/2014 In force 
5 China-Iceland FTA Iceland 15/04/2013 01/07/2014 In force 
6 China-Japan-Korea 
Trilateral Investment 
Agreement 
Japan, Korea, Republic of 13/05/2012 17/05/2014 In force 
7 China-Taiwan Framework 
Agreement 
Taiwan Province of China 29/06/2010 01/09/2010 In force 
8 China-Costa Rica FTA Costa Rica 01/04/2010 01/08/2011 In force 
9 APTA Investment 
Agreement (2009) 
Bangladesh, Korea, Republic 
of, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Sri Lanka 
15/12/2009  Signed 
10 ASEAN-China Investment 
Agreement 
ASEAN (Association of 
South-East Asian Nations) 
15/08/2009 01/01/2010 In force 
11 China-Peru FTA Peru 28/04/2009 01/03/2010 In force 
12 China-Singapore FTA Singapore 23/10/2008 01/01/2009 In force 
13 China-New Zealand FTA New Zealand 07/04/2008 01/10/2008 In force 
14 China-Pakistan FTA Pakistan 24/11/2006 01/07/2007 In force 
15 Chile-China FTA Chile 18/11/2005 01/10/2006 In force 
16 Australia-China 
Framework Agreement 
Australia 24/10/2003 24/10/2003 In force 
17 China-Macao Partnership 
Agreement 
China; Macao, China Special 
Administration (SAR) 
17/10/2003 01/01/2004 In force 
18 China-Hong Kong 
Partnership 
China; Hong Kong, China 
SAR 
29/06/2003 29/06/2003 In force 
19 ASEAN-China 
Framework Agreement 
ASEAN (Association of 
South-East Asia Nations); 
China 
04/11/2002 01/07/2003 In force 
20 China-EC Trade and 
Cooperation 
China; EU (European Union) 21/05/1985 22/09/1985 In force 
21 RCEP ASEAN (Association of 
South-East Asia Nation); 
Australia; China 
  In 
Negotiation 
 
 
As seen in the table above, China has been increasingly active in its pursuit of 
89 
regional and bilateral trade agreements. China has 11 PTA partners: the Association of 
Southeast Asian Countries (ASEAN), Pakistan, Chile, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, 
Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, Korea, and Australia. China has signed Closer 
Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPA) with Hong Kong and Macau respectively, 
and signed an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with Taiwan on 
29 June 2010.
335
 
    China’s participation in regionalism can be classified into three types: (i) 
institutional arrangements, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization;
336
 (ii) 
forums; such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation;
337
 and (iii) bilateral 
arrangements providing for substantial trade and investment liberalization. China has 
shown particular interest in bilateral arrangements over the past few years. Having 
concluded Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements (CEPA) with Hong Kong and 
Macau in 2003, it then signed additional agreements with the two customs territories. 
China also concluded FTAs with Chile in 2005, and Pakistan in 2006. The 
China-Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) FTA,
338
 was launched in 
2002 with the conclusion of a framework agreement, which was subsequently 
expanded by the Goods Agreement in 2004 and the Services Agreement in 2007. 
China’s most important trading partners are East, and Southeast Asia. It has been 
argued that China’s trade policy priority is to create a strong Asian trading area, given 
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China’s important position in Asia. By allowing a targeted set of agriculture products 
phased-in, tariff-free access under an ‘early harvest’ scheme, China helped allay the 
fears of ASEAN members. Many of these, which used to view China as a threat, now 
view China as a competitor, and precipitated an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 
(ACFTA) goods agreement. China is also making investment and trade deals in 
infrastructure, agriculture, raw materials, energy, and even tourism, to win over both 
newer trade partners and prospective FTA partners, and to divert attention away from 
Chinese manufactured goods exported to those countries.
339
 
    Going beyond the Asia-Pacific region, China concluded an FTA with Peru in 
April 2009, which came into force in March 2010.
340
 In April 2010, it signed an FTA 
with Costa Rica, which entered into force at the end of the year.
341
 China has also 
made progress in its talks with Chile to add an investment agreement to their existing 
FTA framework. 
In addition, China has made process with countries seeking economically 
meaningful FTAs. It has recently signed FTAs with Switzerland (2014), Iceland 
(2014), and Australia (2015). China is still involved in FTA negotiations with the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, Norway, and the Southern African Customs Union. It is 
studying the feasibility of concluding trade and investment agreements with India, 
Mongolia, and Colombia. 
    Most of the existing PTAs are bilateral, and most partners are from Asia and 
belong to developing groups. While China’s previously concluded regional trade 
agreements are mainly with small developing countries, a few agreements have more 
recently been signed with OECD countries.
342
 
A further feature of China’s FTAs has been their link to BITs. Investment treaty 
negotiations typically either anticipate or follow a full FTA as a self-standing 
bargaining. The China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement (CJKTIA) is a 
triangle investment treaty dating from before the regional trade agreement among 
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these parties. BITs do not traditionally deal with the rules governing investment flow. 
So, given China’s interest now in outward foreign investment, a broader approach 
would be assumed to fit in with Chinese interest. 
3.2.3 Investment Chapters in FTAs 
As explained above, China has been establishing its bilateral economic relations 
through FTAs since 2001. In addition, a number of PTAs have been concluded, while 
older BITs have been updated. Each of China’s eleven FTAs343 has an investment 
chapter, except for the 2005 China-Chile FTA, which has an article on the promotion 
of investment and a commitment to negotiate a future agreement on trade in services 
and investment.
344
 China concluded a trilateral investment agreement with Korea and 
Japan in 2012, which anticipates the negotiation of a China-Korea-Japan FTA. The 
chapter on investment in the China-Singapore FTA does not include any expressly 
stated investment provisions, other than through incorporation by reference to the 
ASEAN-China Investment Agreement. 
    In addition to these newly concluded FTAs, China has strengthened its previous 
FTAs that were primarily concerned with trade in goods. In October 2008, China and 
Pakistan signed an Amending Protocol to their FTA, with the specific aim of 
increasing their bilateral investment, and in February 2009, they signed the FTA 
Agreement on Trade in Services,
345
 which entered into force in October 2009. The 
China-ASEAN FTA was also extended through an investment agreement signed in 
August 2009, with the expectation that the agreement would be operational by the end 
of 2010. China is also negotiating FTAs with various other countries and regions, and 
carrying out feasibility studies on FTAs with India. In addition to the China-New 
Zealand PTA, another PTA China concluded with a developed country partner is the 
China-Switzerland PTA. 
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    FTAs are designed and deployed to further increase investment flows between 
both its members and third countries alike. Many studies on the effectiveness of FTAs 
in fostering FDI flows have found such a positive relationship. FTAs add market 
access dimensions and regroup trade and investment provisions under the same 
agreement signed for an indeterminate period. Thus, they offer a better package of 
measures for investors.
346
 Investment liberalization, that is, granting foreign investors 
national treatment in the pre-establishment phase, is a case in point. Beyond market 
access provisions, FTAs also offer the flexibility to include other provisions such as 
intellectual property rights that go beyond the level of protection enshrined in the 
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs). 
Furthermore, FTAs often include references to sustainable development, human rights 
protection, investment promotion, and transparency, whereas such innovative treaty 
language is generally absent from BITs.
347
 
    China takes three approaches to include rules on investment in FTAs. The first 
category of PTAs entails provisions in which the contracting parties agree to seek 
deeper cooperation to promote mutual investment flows (e.g., the China-Chile FTA). 
    The second group of FTAs mirrors the mainstream BIT approach, by focusing on 
the protection of investments (e.g., the China-Pakistan FTA). These FTAs establish 
far-reaching rights for foreign investors, but limit the protection of investments to the 
post-establishment phase. Standard provisions such as national and 
most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, 
and transfer of funds only apply to foreign investments that are admitted by the host 
state. In most cases, foreign investors can have recourse to the ISDS mechanisms to 
enforce their rights in case of alleged breaches of the agreement by the host state.  
The third group of FTAs contains rules on the liberalization of investment flows. 
This categorization according to the three core elements of FTA 
practice—cooperation, protection, and liberalization—represents a useful framework 
that helps to illustrate the evolution of Chinese approaches to integrating investment 
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rules into FTAs (e.g. the China-Switzerland FTA). 
According to UNCTAD, FTAs that include investment chapters have a stronger 
impact regarding increased FDI flows than BITs.
348
 Consequently, China may join 
the trend to incorporate the investment discipline into FTAs. 
3.2.4 Why FTAs for China? 
Most FTAs are promoted by political concerns. Why then has China concluded FTAs? 
One possible reason is that China needs a steady supply of raw materials and energy. 
Another is that as most of the agricultural sector in China is not very competitive, 
China needs to ensure a steady supply of agricultural products to free up its labour 
from agriculture for manufacturing. This accounts for the pattern of trade between 
China and its existing FTA partners, which features a flow of raw materials, energy 
products, or agricultural products to China, and a flow of textile products and 
electronic products from China. China’s FTA partners are probably chosen with these 
considerations in mind. Moreover, many of the FTAs also include investment 
provisions, which is another way for China to make sure that it can invest in, and 
subsequently control, strategic resources. 
An even closer examination of China’s practice in launching FTA negotiation is 
needed to answer the question of why these particular partners were selected. Given 
the list of countries with which China has negotiated or is negotiating FTAs, however, 
it seems that China’s selection is quite random.349 Firstly, the top three trading 
partners of China, namely the EU, the US, and Japan, are not on the list. Furthermore, 
even when the scope is expanded to include the top ten trade partners of China, only 
three, the ASEAN, Singapore, and Australia, have concluded FTAs with China. 
    Among the other countries/regions which have concluded or are negotiating 
FTAs with China, many only have a negligible trade volume. It seems that trade 
volume is not the most important factor for China in selecting its negotiating partners. 
    Then, what is the approach by which China selects an FTA partner? 
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    In an interview in May 2007, former vice minister Yi Xiaozhun of MOFCOM 
suggested some considerations: (1) the country has good political and diplomatic 
relationship with China; (2) the country’s economic structures and trade patterns are 
complementary with China’s; (3) the country either has substantial domestic market, 
or serves as an FTA hub in a particular region.
350
 
    First, the political and friendly relationship seems to carry the most weight. For 
example, Pakistan has been a close ally of China for a long time. 
    Second, a large portion of China’s FTA partners compete with China. These 
countries share with China an industrial structure that features labour-intensive 
manufacturing sectors and relies heavily on exports (e.g., in electronics and textile 
products). Other FTA partners and China are economically complementary, such as 
Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand, Australia, Chile, and Peru. The first two of 
these partners are highly competitive in services exports, while the latter four 
countries are very competitive in agricultural industries. In contrast, China is 
relatively weak in both services and agriculture sectors. 
    Third, many of China’s FTA partners share one thing in common: they are 
members of other FTAs. While FTAs have been found to have hub-and-spoke effects, 
the spoke effect seems more important than the market size of the hub country.
351
 The 
domestic markets of these countries are rather small. But almost all of them are 
relevant FTA hubs. For example, Singapore has FTAs with the US, Japan, Korea and 
Australia. Chile is an associate Member of Mercosur.
352
 Iceland and Norway are 
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which has a free trade 
relationship with EU via the European Economic Area (EEA). Through signing FTAs 
with these countries, China can potentially enter into the bigger markets created by 
the FTA agreements already in place, although this is a highly cost-effective way of 
exploring new markets. 
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To sum up, China’s overall PTA policy is driven by economic as well as political 
reasons that are also reflected in the choice of partner countries.
353
 The agreements 
with Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, ASEAN, and Pakistan were primarily driven by 
geopolitical concerns, because China can benefit from a safe and prosperous regional 
environment. Meanwhile, China has also negotiated PTAs to secure the supply of 
resources and agricultural products. The agreements with New Zealand, Peru, Chile, 
Costa Rica, and Australia reflect this resources-seeking strategy. China’s economic 
model during the 1990s was characterized by increasing dependence on exports as a 
driver of growth. Thus, China might depend on raw materials and intermediary goods 
from resource-rich countries and tried to secure these inputs through signing PTAs 
with these countries. 
3.3 Investment Provisions in BITs and PTAs: A Comparison 
To what extent do Chinese PTAs represent a departure from the previous generation 
of Chinese BITs? PTAs go beyond the level of investment protection and 
liberalization usually found in the older BITs. 
    With investment rules, China has been flexible and responsive to the model texts 
proposed by its partner countries, as is explained in detail below. The first two, the 
2003 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangements with Hong Kong and Macao, do not 
provide for investment protection (or liberalization). The 2006 China-Pakistan FTA 
features a chapter on investment, but the text uses the 1997 Chinese Model BIT as a 
stereotype. Pakistan’s government grants specific advantages to Chinese investors. It 
contains no rules on investment liberalization. With the FTA concluded in 2008 China 
and Singapore, rather than updating their bilateral investment protection regime 
(based on a 1985 BIT), decided to incorporate the investment agreement at the time 
still being negotiated, as part of the multi-stage integrated FTA, between China and 
ASEAN. 
    As of the investment chapter in the 2008 China-New Zealand FTA, China agreed 
                                                        
353 Nakagawa, J. and W. Liang (2001): A comparison of the FTA strategies of Japan and China and the 
implications for multilateralism, RCCPB Working Paper, October 2011, pp. 17-18. 
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to conclude new clauses and to change the formulation of those it was already 
accustomed to. The agreement features post-entry national treatment, a grandfather 
clause for existing non-conforming measures, MFN for both pre- and post-entry stage, 
full Fair and Equitable Treatment, conditions for lawful expropriation (with “Hull 
rule”),354 and ‘a priori’ consent to international arbitration for any legal dispute 
directly concerning investments. Nevertheless, it does not set out the objective of 
progressive liberalization. 
    The investment chapter in the 2009 China-Peru FTA may resemble, at first 
glance, that of the China-New Zealand FTA (overall architecture of dispositions); but 
a more careful analysis shows that some provisions depart from this template and 
draw from the parties’ respective backgrounds.355 
    The 2009 Agreement on Investment between China and ASEAN (CAIA), as part 
of a multi-stage FTA, displays remarkable similarities with the ASEAN Agreement on 
Investment of the same year. The CAIA also features commonalities with both the 
China-New Zealand FTA as well as the China-Peru FTA. In 2010, the China-Costa 
Rica FTA operated a renvoi to the 2007 BIT between the two states. The text of 
China-Costa Rica BIT is entirely drawn from the 1997 Chinese BIT model. 
    In 2012, the Supplementary Agreement on Investment (SAI) between China and 
Chile, as part of the multi-stage integrated FTA signed back in 2005, replaced the 
1994 China-Chile BIT which was itself entirely drawn from the 1984 Chinese model 
text. 
Underlying the geopolitical rationale of the agreement, the 2013 FTA with 
Iceland, simply operates a renvoi to the 1994 BIT between the parties (featuring the 
text of Chinese 1989 Model BIT). The FTA with Switzerland from the same year does 
not cover investment protection at all. Chapter 9 of the FTA, limited to ‘investment 
promotion’, features only two generic provisions.356 The investment matter between 
                                                        
354 Require ‘full, adequate, and prompt’ compensation for legally expropriation. 
355 It is different from China 1997 model BIT, and is not similar with the US-Peru FTA 2006 either. 
356 Article 9.1 [Investment Promotion] 
The Parties recognize the importance of promoting cross-border investment and technology flows as a means for 
achieving economic growth and development. Cooperation in this respect may include:  
(a) identifying investment opportunities; 
(b) exchange of information on measures to promote investment abroad; 
97 
the parties is thus left to the 2009 BIT which replaced the 1986 agreement in a move 
from the Chinese model to Swiss model. In 2015, the China-Australia FTA was 
signed, and came into force at the end of the same year.  
Regarding the coverage of China’s FTAs in general, it is evident that the earlier 
FTAs usually merely dealt with trade in goods, and focused on traditional trade issues 
such as reducing tariffs, eliminating barriers, remedies, and other trade facilitation 
measures. The later FTAs have gradually covered trade in services and investment. 
Evidently, China has now become more inclined to conclude package agreements that 
include investment matters.
357
 
Compared with China’s BITs— FTAs show some new characteristics. For 
example, in defining ‘investment’, China’s recent FTAs have included more and 
broader provisions. In contrast to most BITs, which usually require investment to be 
made ‘in accordance with the laws and regulations’ of the host country, recent FTAs 
such as the China-New Zealand FTA do not require foreign investment ‘to be made by 
following the host country’s law’. Almost all of China’s FTAs—(such as the 
China-New Zealand and China-Peru FTAs, as well as the China-ASEAN Investment 
Agreement)—provide national treatment to investors from the partner countries.358 
The following subsections will discuss some innovations shown in FTA investment 
chapters, namely national treatment, social responsibility clauses, and dispute 
settlement remedies. 
3.3.1 Revise National Treatment Provision 
China maintains a very prescriptive approach to the admission and establishment of 
investments.
359
 The 1988 China-Australia BIT states, ‘[E]ach Contracting Party … 
                                                                                                                                                              
(c) exchange of information on investment regulation; 
(d) assistance of investors to understand the investment regulations and the investment environment 
in both Parties; and 
(e) the furthering of a legal environment to increase investment flows. 
357 Wang Guiguo, ‘China’s FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implications’, The American Journal of International 
Law, vol.105, No3 (2011), p496. Also see Francis Snyder, ‘China, Regional Trade Agreements and WTO Law,’ 
Journal of World Trade 43, no. 1 (2009), p.500. 
358 China-New Zealand FTA, Art.138; China-Peru FTA, Art.129; China-ASEAN Agreement on Investment, 
Art.4. 
359 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1999) distinguishes between admission 
(the right to enter or be present in a jurisdiction) and establishment (the right to enter or be present in a jurisdiction) 
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shall, in accordance with its law and investment policies from time to time, admit 
investments’.360 The 2015 China-Australia FTA, which refers to national treatment, is 
limited to ‘management, conduct, operations, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal’ of investment, and the responsibility of the host state is qualified by being 
limited to treatment no less favourable than that accorded, in like circumstances, to its 
own investors.
361
 Similar to the China-New Zealand FTA, Article 139 of the 
China-Australia FTA goes further, by according to investors of each party ‘treatment 
no less favourable than that accorded, in like circumstances, to the investments and 
associated activities by the investors of any third country with respect to admission, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment and 
disposal.’ A provision granting MFN treatment to the admission and establishment of 
investments is also included in the ASESN-China Investment Agreement.
362
  
3.3.2 Added Social Responsibility Clauses 
Another new feature is that a few PTAs added provisions safeguarding the right to 
regulate for sustainable development. For example, they contain exceptions to 
transfer-of-funds obligations or prudential carve-outs.  
    The China-New Zealand FTA (2008) is China’s first FTA that contains a binding 
Environment Cooperation Agreement and a binding Memorandum of Understanding 
on Labour Cooperation. It is also the first Chinese investment agreement (as a 
package deal of FTA) that explicitly prohibits the use of performance requirements by 
incorporating the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures.
363
  
    To take the China-ASEAN FTA for example, its transfer clause includes a 
number of exceptions, including the right to impose capital controls in the case of a 
serious balance of payment crisis.
364
 Additionally, it includes chapters on general 
                                                                                                                                                              
and establishment (the right to set up a particular type of entity). For the purpose of this chapter, the terms are used 
primarily to refer to the question of admission of investments. 
360 Article II (1). 
361 The China-Australia 2015 FTA, Art. 138. 
362 Article 5(1). 
363 Also, see the China-South Korea BIT (2007), Art. 2(3) states that the contracting parties shall not ‘impose 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures on investments by investors of the other Contracting Party concerning 
local content, technology transfer or export performance requirements.’  
364 China-ASEAN PTA, Art. 10(5). 
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exceptions and security exceptions, as well as a chapter on transparency requirements. 
A novel feature of the China-ASEAN FTA is that its chapter on the promotion and 
facilitation of investment originates from the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement, and also reflects the original objectives written down in the Framework 
Agreement. China and ASEAN countries have committed in the Framework 
Agreement to strengthen cooperation and to ‘progressively liberalize and promote 
trade in goods and services as well as create a transparent, liberal and facilitative 
investment regime.’365 
3.3.3 Limited Application of Investor-State Arbitration 
China’s FTAs usually contain friendly and conflict-avoiding methods for dispute 
settlement. As can be found in most of China’s FTAs, the objective of dispute 
settlement is ‘to encourage the Parties at all times to endeavour to reach a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of the dispute arising under this Agreement through 
cooperation and consultations; and … the Parties may, at any time, reach a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of any matter through consultations.’366 If the dispute cannot 
be settled through amicable negotiations and consultations within a period (usually six 
months), the parties may resort to other means, such as conciliation, mediation, or 
arbitration (namely, Investor-State Arbitration). 
    Most of China’s recent FTAs provide for Investor-State Arbitration, with the 
purpose of investment protection. On the other hand, they cautiously regulate 
investor-state dispute settlement by limiting treaty provisions that are subject to 
investor-state dispute resolution. 
    Under the China-Pakistan FTA, for example, disputes may be submitted to a 
competent domestic court of the host country, or for arbitration by the ICSID.
367
 
However, once a local court is chosen, that choice will exclude the possibility of 
submitting the same dispute to the ICSID for arbitration. The China-New Zealand 
                                                        
365 The Framework Agreement, Art. 1(b).  
366 See China-New Zealand FTA, Art 163(1). 
367 China-Pakistan FTA, Art 54(2). 
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FTA also allowed investors to submit disputes to ICSID for arbitration, but before that 
can occur, a condition of six months’ notice is required.368 The purpose of this 
provision is that it allows the host country to require that the investor concerned must 
go through the administrative review procedures. The laws and regulations of the host 
country often define these procedures. The China-New Zealand FTA also has detailed 
rules on arbitration procedures, which have the effect of modifying the domestic laws 
of the parties and the ICSID regulations governing dispute settlement.
369
 One such 
modification is that the time limit for the submission of disputes is set at no longer 
than three years from “the time at which the disputing investor became aware, or 
should reasonably have become aware, of a breach of obligation” by the host country 
that has caused loss or damage to the investor, or its investments.
370
 Also under 
Chinese law,
371
 when the provisions of an international treaty concluded by China are 
in conflict with those of national laws, the treaty provisions prevail. 
    Although China has renegotiated several of its first-generation BITs, many 
investments in China and Chinese overseas investments remain covered by them. The 
Peru-China BIT (1994) is one example of a first-generation BIT which is still in force. 
Tza Yap Shum v. Peru
372
 is the first case brought under a Chinese BIT. The case 
concerned alleged breaches of the Peru-China BIT (1994). Mr. Tza Yap Shum made 
an investment in TSG Peru S.A.C (TSG), a Peruvian Company in the business of 
producing fish-based food products and their subsequent exports to Asian markets. In 
2004, the Peruvian Tax Administration started a number of actions, which the 
claimant Shum alleged destroyed TSG’s business operations and economic viability.  
Shum claimed that Peru had violated a few articles in the China-Peru BIT, 
including ‘no expropriation without compensation’ (according to Article 4 of 
China-Peru BIT). Peru objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and argued that the 
claims brought by Mr. Shum did not fall within the scope of the arbitration clause in 
                                                        
368 China-New Zealand FTA, Art 153(1). 
369 China-New Zealand FTA, Art 153(4), states that the FTA’s provisions on dispute settlement prevail over the 
arbitration and conciliation procedures of both ICSID and the UN Commission on International Trade Law. 
370 Id., Art. 154(1). 
371 See Chinese Civil Procedure Law, Art. 238. 
372 Mr Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Competence, 19 June 2009.  
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the Peru–China BIT. However, the tribunal found that the expropriation claim was 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
    Peru defended that, according to Article 8(3) of the Peru-China BIT, disputes 
involving the amount of compensation for expropriation may be referred to arbitration 
under the ICSID Convention. Other disputes may only be referred to arbitration 
following a separate agreement between the investor and the state accepting the 
investment. However, the tribunal did not accept Peru’s argument that the 
expropriation claim was outside its jurisdiction. The tribunal held that: 
 
The BIT uses the word ‘involving’ which, according to the Oxford Dictionary means ‘to 
enfold, envelope, entangle, include.’ A bona fide interpretation of these words indicate 
that the only requirement established in the BIT is that the dispute must ‘include’ the 
determination of the amount of a compensation, and not that the dispute must be 
restricted thereto. Obviously, other wording was available, such as ‘limited to’ or 
‘exclusively’, but the wording used in this provision reads ‘involving’.373 
 
The Tribunal concluded that to give meaning to all the elements of the article; it must 
be interpreted that the words: 
 
Involving the amount of compensation for expropriation includes not only the mere 
determination of the amount but also any other issues normally inherent to an 
expropriation, including whether the property was actually expropriated in 
accordance with the BIT provisions and requirements, as well as the determination of 
the amount of compensation due, if any. In the opinion of the Tribunal, a contrary 
conclusion would invalidate the provision related to ICSID arbitration since 
according to the final sentence of Article 8(3), turning to the courts of the State 
accepting the investment would preclude definitely the possibility of choosing 
arbitration under the ICSID Convention. Consequently, since the Claimant has filed a 
prima facie claim of expropriation, the Tribunal, pursuant to Articles 25 and 41 of the 
ICSID Convention and Rule 41 of the Arbitration Rules, considers that it is 
competent to decide on the merits of the expropriation claim filed by Claimant.
374
 
 
    However, there have also been awards concluded which state the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is limited to the quantification of damages. The different result may 
depend on the wording of the arbitration clauses in different BITs. In another case, the 
                                                        
373 Ibid., para. 151. 
374 Ibid., para. 188. 
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Chinese financial services company Ping An, filed an international arbitration against 
Belgium under the China-Belgium BIT.
375
 The 1984 BIT limited investors to 
pursuing ad hoc arbitration only in relation to ‘disputes over the amount of 
compensation owing in cases of expropriation or nationalization.’376 The tribunal 
rejected the Chinese investor’s claim on the jurisdiction.377 
    To sum up, Chinese PTAs and revised BITs are influenced by a new investment 
policy that seeks a better balance between the protection of foreign investors and host 
countries’ regulatory rights. Although China may have been defensive about 
commitments that go beyond the level of investment liberalization found in Chinese 
BITs, China is willing to grant MFN treatment in the pre-establishment phase. PTAs 
do not depart from previous BITs, as they maintain the high standards granted to 
foreign investors for their interests. However, PTAs could have a balancing function 
to give the host country some regulatory space concerning foreign firms’ social 
responsibility. 
3.4 A Cross-Issue Link: Investment and Service in PTAs 
Services are similar to goods with regard to the economic effects of removing barriers 
to trade. The overall result is to allow greater competition from foreign firms. 
Inefficient firms face the risk of exiting the market if they fail to improve their 
performance. This contest will finally lead to resource re-allocation, although 
someone may confront adjustment costs and losses. But, if there are economies of 
scale, and greater foreign participation with more competition, there will be a larger 
scale of activity. However, different from trade in goods in terms of their 
‘cross-border’ economic impact, the ‘import’ of services are often locally produced. If 
foreign participation merely substitutes for domestic production, and the sector does 
                                                        
375 Ping An v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29. 
376 Article 10 (3) of China-Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union BIT (1984). 
‘… [a] dispute which arises from an amount of compensation for expropriation, nationalization or other similar 
measures and has not been settled within six months from the date of notification may, as the investor prefers 
referred for settlement either to: 
(1) a judicial body of the Contracting Party accepting the investment, or, 
(2) an international arbitration without resort to any other means.’ (Emphasis added) 
377 The claimants file a counter-memorial on jurisdiction on May 12, 2014. 
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not expand, then there may be no positive growth impact. 
    Empirical research finds that there is a positive link between service 
liberalization and inward FDI in service; the firms that use services from FDI have 
greater productivity growth.
378
 Policy reform on service markets may face more or 
less opposition. Some industry sectors may support the policy as they have an interest 
in a wider market entry for service inputs. Consumers may oppose liberalization 
because of concerns about quality, or the geographical supply of certain services, such 
as health, education, transport, and telecommunications etc. Governments have to 
evaluate these interests to implement reforms. One way to overcome some constraints 
and support reform is by signing international trade agreements. In services, this 
depends on where exports’ interests exist.379 
    Exports interests of services may learn the way from exports of goods. If firms 
can access to service inputs with a high-quality and competitive price, it will help 
their exports of goods. Meanwhile, it is important to obtain information and assess the 
impact of status quo services policies. FDI is one of the modes of supplying services. 
Therefore, foreign investors may have a high ‘export’ interest and thus support the 
multilateral negotiation. A business that would benefit from higher quality and lower 
priced services is more inclined to support service liberalization. In practice, those 
countries which first implement liberalization will obtain a strategic advantage. 
Consequentially they will have further incentives to pursue domestic reforms. 
Therefore, narrow reciprocity, in the form of equivalent concessions between trading 
partners, is less of a priority for those countries.
380
 By contrast, countries are always 
willing to ‘mutually’ liberalize further merchandise trade. 
    Given the severe investment restrictions that exist in service industries, this is the 
area where PTA-based market access can have a significant beneficial impact on 
investment flows. Foreign investment in the service sector is mainly market seeking. 
                                                        
378 FDI in service promotes industry’s production. The logic is that i.e. they find a positive relationship between 
policy reforms in banking, telecommunications, and transport and the productivity of Indian firms in 
manufacturing industries. See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), p.328. 
379 Bernard M. Hoekman and Aaditya Mattoo, “Liberalizing Trade in Services: Lessons from Regional and WTO 
negotiations,” EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/34. 
380 Hoekman and Messerlin (2000).  
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The services concerned require the commercial presence of affiliates, branches, or 
offices to deliver the service. Barriers to entry into services markets usually take the 
form of regulatory restrictions on the entry of foreign markets, foreign equity 
ownership limitations, quotas on outputs and requirements or restrictions on the legal 
form of establishment. 
    The NAFTA was the first regional agreement to combine BIT-like disciplines 
with comprehensive trade in services standards. Through the GATS the WTO brought 
the supply of services into the realm of multilateral trade rules for the first time. These 
two important developments have expanded the landscape of regional agreements and 
the possible types of interaction between investment and service disciplines. 
    The granting of preferential access could make foreign firms with higher costs 
gain a competitive advantage relative to investors from outside the region, because 
preferential mover advantages and barriers to entry (for outsiders) make it difficult for 
those lower cost suppliers from other countries to enter the regional market.
381
 This is 
one of the reasons why MFN matters.
382
 In addition, the rules of origin (ROO) that 
are included in PTAs for investors in services (and other industries), will identify the 
extent to which intentions are discriminatory or not. 
    Multilateral, explicitly MFN-based liberalization, is likely to produce even larger 
gains than preferential regional agreements. This is also because multilateral 
liberalization opens the market to the largest number of competitors, and maximizes 
consumers’ choices. Another way of assessing the likely impact of PTAs, is to ask to 
what extent they go beyond the GATS in the elimination of discrimination in service 
markets. As with the GATT, the GATS does not preclude members from entering into 
a preferential agreement with other members, nor does it prevent members from 
granting one another mutual recognition of their regulatory standards and certification 
requirements.
383
  
                                                        
381 Trade diversion. 
382 The extent to which such discriminatory policies are applied to services in the PTA context is difficult to know. 
383 While GATS applied a positive list approach to schedule commitments for services trade, the plurilateral pact 
(Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA)) is moving toward a hybrid approach: members will still schedule market 
access commitments under the positive list approach, but national treatment obligations will be handled under a 
negative list approach, in which members commit to national treatment in all sectors except those where an 
exception is scheduled. 
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    This part will give a review on the liberalization commitments previously 
scheduled in the WTO/GATS and two Chinese FTAs (with Costa Rica, and Chile for 
example).
384
 The normative text and most of the contents of China’s services 
schedules are similar in these two agreements. The FTAs that China has negotiated 
with partners in Asia, particularly ASEAN, have been less ambitious and contain less 
comprehensive sectoral coverage. 
    China made several commitments in its WTO Accession Protocol (2001). The 
difference between the GATS and the new bilateral agreements is most striking for 
China in mode 3 (FDI), where Chinese FTAs have scheduled greater opening for 
direct investment.    
    China has preferred to negotiate the services component of its FTAs under the 
positive list format. Under this approach, restrictions that could affect services and 
investment are set out differently than under a negative list approach. Measures 
affecting the entire economy are listed under the horizontal limitation section, while 
measures affecting individual service sectors are listed according to the 12 main 
sectors and 157 subsectors, which the WTO has defined in Classification List 
W/120.
385
 Most-Favoured-Nation-Treatment limitations are listed at the end of the 
Schedule. 
These two FTAs (with Costa Rica and Chile respectively) have built on China’s 
GATS schedule, which was considered to be very comprehensive at the time of 
China’s accession to the WTO (2001), particularly for infrastructure services such as 
telecommunications, financial services, distribution, and transport.
386
 
 
a) Horizontal Measures Affect Services Trade and Investment. 
     
China has maintained the same horizontal commitments in its FTAs that it set out in 
                                                        
384 Service barriers come in many flavours, are deeply embedded in regulatory practices, and are not eliminated 
nearly as easily as tariffs. World Bank’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) is a method for measuring 
service barriers. China’s barriers in 18 service sectors were more restrictive than the average scores for 40 other 
developed and developing economies. 
385 The Service Sectoral Classification List is WTO document MTN.GNS/W/120.  
386  Sherry M. Stephenson, “Service Barriers,” at Bridging the Pacific, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, 2015. pp.185-186. 
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its GATS Services Schedule, 2002. Limitations in this section apply to two areas: FDI 
(mode 3) and labour movement (mode 4). In FDI, China imposes a minimum equity 
of 25% for Joint Ventures and no horizontal equity ceiling, though ceilings are special 
for individual sectors. There is no guarantee that foreign firms can establish branches 
in China, unless indicated for specific sectors. As land is state-owned in China, 
foreign firms cannot purchase land but must lease, and leases have specific term 
lengths: 70 years for residential use, 50 years for industrial, and only 30 years for 
commercial, tourist, and recreational purposes. Foreign firms in several enumerated 
sectors—including audio-visual, aviation, and medical—as well as in new service 
sectors cannot obtain subsidies. 
 
b) Sectoral Measures Affecting Services Trade and Investment 
 
Most of the restrictions by sector are found in mode 3 (commercial presence, usually 
FDI). In legal advisory services, foreign law firms can provide legal services only in 
the form of representative offices and international conventions.
387
 Joint ventures are 
required for professionals in the areas of taxation, medical and dental services, market 
research activities, photographic services, convention services, environmental services, 
business services (i.e., those incidental to agriculture, forestry, hunting, fishing, and 
mining), and oil and gas exploration.
388
 In the construction sector, China imposes a 
restriction on the types of construction activities that foreign investors can undertake, 
limiting these essentially to those funded by foreign sources, or those in which 
Chinese expertise is limited.
389
 Regarding distribution, in the area of retail sales, 
China imposes restrictions on the number of retail outlets to less than 30. Additionally, 
no wholly foreign-owned retailers are permitted for chain stores. An education 
requirement calls for the establishment of joint schools. The areas of telecoms,
390
 
                                                        
387 See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, Addendum, Schedule CLII-The People’s 
Republic of China, Part II—Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services List of Article II MFN Exemptions, 
WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2, 1 October 2001.  
388 Id. 
389 Id. 
390 Information and communications technology (ICT) firms must get approval (for operation) from the Chinese 
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). In 2013 MIIT released an updated catalogue of 
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transport,
391
 and financial services
392
 operate under limits on FDI. 
    Despite the requirement that China imposes on investors to establish a joint 
venture in many service sectors, there is nonetheless no equity limit for many of these 
activities, and 100 percent equity participation is often possible. Wholly 
foreign-owned enterprises are permitted for most professional services. Relatively few 
equity ceilings remain in China’s FTA schedules on service activities. Wholly 
foreign-owned subsidiaries are also allowed in the travel and tourism sector for hotels, 
restrictions, and tour operators, except those which deal with trips to Hong Kong, 
Macao, and Chinese Taipei. There are no restrictions on recreational, cultural, and 
sporting services activities for cross-border trade, or FDI. 
    Most PTAs negotiated since the early 1990s include provisions on services. 
Although many PTAs do not go much beyond the GATS, some recent agreements 
have tended to have a higher level of ambition when measured by sectoral coverage. 
The substantive rules that are included in many PTAs are similar to those in the GATS, 
i.e., the depth of the associated commitments often does not go much beyond what 
PTA members committed to under the WTO. 
    In these areas (services in FTAs) it seems easier for governments to agree to 
common rules and disciplines in the WTO/GATS context.
393
 One of the exceptions is 
                                                                                                                                                              
telecommunication services, subjecting four new categories to licensing requirements: long-term evolution (LTE) 
4G, wire access infrastructures services, satellite-based fixed communication services, and mobile resale. Foreign 
firms doing business in these categories will need a license from MIIT to operate in the named subsectors and 
must use a joint venture with no more than 50 percent foreign ownership. 
391 In the area of transport services, China’s FTAs exclude passenger transport. There are no restrictions on rail or 
road transport in China’s schedule, and wholly owned foreign subsidiaries are permitted, though maritime 
transport and air transport are restricted. Less than 49 percent equity participation in FDI is allowed in maritime 
shipping as well as in auxiliary services for maritime, and ships can operate only under China’s national flag. 
Shipping on inland waterways by foreign vessels is not permitted. 
392 China did not include updated financial services commitments in its FTAs with Chile and Costa Rica. The 
baseline accordingly reflects China’s WTO schedule of commitments, in effect since 2002. Several areas of 
China’s financial services sector seem relatively open according to its WTO commitments. There are no equity 
limits, geographical limitations, or clientele limitations on FDI in insurance lines—with the overriding exception 
of life insurance, while licenses must be obtained for nearly all financial activities, they are issued without 
quantitative restrictions, but they require compliance with prudential standards, which states flexibly interpret. 
393 The WTO deals with investment policies only through the GATS (insofar as a member decides to make mode 
3 commitments for a service sector). Investment disciplines lodged in RTA services chapters are usually based on 
the GATS (Investment is covered in the narrower form of a “commercial presence”. MFN treatment and 
Transparency are the general obligations. Obligations on market entry and national treatment arise to the extent 
liberalization commitments are listed in separate schedules. Domestic regulation issues are also addressed. 
Avoidance of restrictions on international payments and transfers is the only significant ‘protection’ provided by 
the trade in services chapters, and even so, only in sectors where liberalization commitments are scheduled.) 
Houde, et al. Survey some PTAs on the comparison between the schedules of commitments in the RTAs and GATS 
commitments in Mode 3, “Interaction between Investment and Service Chapters in RTAs,” OECD Working Paper, 
(2007) (suggesting that all those agreements are WTO-plus.) 
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in investment protection. Several PTAs have disciplines on investment protection, and 
some even provide for arbitration in the case of investor-state dispute.
394
 Often these 
are general and not services-specific, but services are covered. The level of 
investment protection is determined by the scope and coverage of the investment 
protection provisions. 
To sum up, the liberalization of investment in services in FTAs.
395
 goes further 
than in the GATS.
396
 Regional agreements are supposed to provide a higher degree of 
liberalization to be consistent with WTO rules (GATS Article V). The regional trade 
agreement is intended to create a degree of mutual reciprocity in the commitments, 
particularly in agreements between developed and developing countries (the latter 
have made fewer commitments under the GATS). Chinese RTAs may promote further 
investment liberalization in services. 
 
 
 
                                                        
394  Today’s RTA investment chapters typically provide broad investment coverage, strong protection and 
non-discrimination commitments and recourse to investor-state arbitration. The level of investment protection is 
determined by the scope and coverage of the investment protection provisions, such as on expropriations, transfers, 
compensation for losses or investor-State dispute settlement.  
395 e.g., Chinese RTAs with Chile, Costa Rica. 
396 See e.g., In Telecom services, “China’s services schedule for telecoms in its FTA with Costa Rica is 
considerably simpler than its WTO GATS schedule of a decade earlier; …and a simplified schedule that 
encompasses all telecom activities is a useful innovation…” Sherry M. Stephenson, “Service Barriers”, at Bridging 
the Pacific, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015. p.188. 
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4 Interpretation on Substantive Investment Provisions in 
FTAs and BITs 
 
 
A new generation of investment treaties look very different today than they did in the 
last century. The texts are longer and more complex, with substantive obligations in 
greater detail, and increasingly they contain reservations, carve-outs, exceptions, 
explanatory notes, schedules, and so on.
397
 While they may still be a long way from a 
multilateral investment agreement, the provisions of BITs nowadays have developed a 
great deal of similarities by referring to one another in model BITs.
398
 In this way, 
states are slowly developing an increasingly coherent and predictable discipline of 
international investment law and procedure.
399
 
    Trade and investment regimes already share some common substantive 
provisions in their standard baseline treaties.
400
 The principle of non-discrimination is 
at the heart of investment neutrality.
401
 Trade law may influence the interpretations of 
ad hoc tribunals on national treatment standards. 
    How frequently do investment tribunals consider jurisprudential concepts 
developed in the case law of the trade regime, when resolving their cases? To date, 
they have done so only on select occasions, for a very limited set of substantive issues. 
Most instances are confined to the issue of national treatment, a fundamental concept 
of non-discrimination shared across the two regimes. The basic principle is that 
governments are obliged to treat foreign and domestic entities indiscriminately. 
Critical to this analysis is the issue of identifying proper comparators—a question 
                                                        
397 For example, the MFN provision in the recent signed China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Investment Agreement 
states that the obligation to accord MFN treatment to investors and their investment does not include treatment 
accorded by provisions concerning the settlement of investment disputes.  
398 Meg Kinnear, “ICSID and International Investment Treaty Arbitration: Progress and Prospects,” in W. Shan 
ed., China and International Investment Law, Twenty Years of ICSID Membership, Brill Nijhoff Press, 2014. 
399 Id. 
400 Despite this, international investment treaties, have traditionally contained only specific and, not general 
exceptions. 
401 Investment flows, under the principle of investment neutrality, should be allocated by market forces rather than 
by political intervention. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and 
Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 337. 
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which was considered by both WTO panels and investment tribunals. However, while 
investment tribunals may consider what the relevant WTO jurisprudence has to offer 
on this matter, they have rejected, with regularity, the tests developed by WTO panels 
and the Appellate Body. Rather than borrow from WTO case-law, investment 
tribunals have chosen instead to formulate and apply their own tests. 
4.1 National Treatment (NT) 
In the past, national treatment was considered to apply to foreign investors only after 
their investments were made, or after their entry into the market. For example, the 
2012 Trilateral Investment Agreement between China, South Korea, and Japan, 
Article 3, provides that: “Each Contracting Party shall in its territory accord to 
investors of another Contracting Party and to their investments treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords in like circumstances to its own investors and their 
investments with respect to investment activities.”402 Some recent BITs, however, 
contain NT provisions that apply to pre-entry activities.
403
 
    Another feature of NT provision is that sometimes the BIT provides such 
treatment separately for investments and investors. It is also sometimes the case that 
NT and MFN treatment are stipulated within the same provision. Still, other BIT 
provisions require that whichever — (NT or MFN treatment)— is more favourable 
should apply. For example, Article 10(7) of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
404
 states 
that ‘Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its Area of Investors of 
other Contracting Parties, and their related activities including management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, treatment no less favourable than that which 
it accords to Investments of its own Investors or of the Investors of any other 
                                                        
402 See Agreement among the Government of the People’s Republic of China, the Government of the Republic of 
Korea and the Government of Japan for the Promotion, Facilitation, and Protection of Investment entered into on 
May 13, 2012; text available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/pdfs/0513_01_01.pdf. 
403 According to an UNCTAD report, such BITs are typically the ones “entered into by Canada and the United 
States (apart from the Friendship Commerce and Navigation (“FCN”) treaties of the United States), [which] have 
extended national treatment to the pre-entry stage so as to ensure market access for foreign investors on terms 
equal to those enjoyed by national investors.” See UNCTAD, Report on National Treatment 1999 (hereafter 
“UNCTAD Report”), UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11, Vol. IV, p. 4. 
404 Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference: 69/5-69/114. See Peter D. Cameron, International 
Energy Investment Law, the Pursuit of Stability, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 153. 
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Contracting Party or any third state and their related activities including management, 
maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, whichever is the most favourable.’405 The 
exceptions to the NT and the MFN clauses are limited in scope, number, and duration, 
while being clearly known and transparent at the time of signature.
406
 
    The purpose of NT is to ensure non-discrimination against foreign investments 
and investors. From the following parts on the review of treaty practice, it is clear that, 
as an extension of treatment standards on trade, NT in the case of investments is only 
applicable ‘in like circumstance’, as opposed to for ‘like products’ in the case of trade. 
The most important question is how to establish ‘like circumstances’ and ‘less 
favorable’ treatment, because the language of many BITs does not contain the words 
‘like circumstance’, or similar references. A related question is whether the intent of 
the host state to discriminate against foreign investors is required or whether a 
discriminatory effect is sufficient. The third question is whether precedents arising 
from trade tribunals, such as the panels and Appellate Body of the WTO, can serve as 
a reference for settling investment disputes.
407
 
    As will be explained in following sections, tribunals consider competition as a 
relevant condition for ‘like circumstances’. But should competition be as a necessary 
condition for ‘like circumstance’? In SD Mayer v. Canada, the tribunal instead 
determined ‘likeness’ from a ‘business perspective.’408 In its view, the ‘likeness’ test 
requires an inquiry into the competitive relationship between domestic and foreign 
investors. It stated that to establish whether less favourable treatment is accorded to a 
foreign investor, the foreign investor and the comparable domestic investor must be in 
the same sector, which “has a wide connotation that includes the concepts of 
‘economic sector’ and ‘business sector.’”409 The S.D. Myers Tribunal then concluded 
that, from a business perspective, “SDMI and Myers Canada were in ‘like 
circumstances’ with Canadian operators” because they “all were engaged in providing 
                                                        
405 Art. 10(7) ECT. 
406 Peter D. Cameron, (2010), p. 157. 
407 For a comparison between the two fields, see: J. Kurtz, The WTO and Investment Law: Converging Systems, 
Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
408 S.D Myers v. Canada, First Partial Award (November 13, 2000), para. 251. 
409 Ibid., para. 250. 
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PCB waste remediation service.”410 The rationale the tribunal gave is that SDMI was 
in a position to attract potential customers from the Canadian operators.
411
 The S.D. 
Myers Tribunal’s decision was in essence based on its establishment of the 
competitiveness of the claimant and domestic comparators. 
    This section will first examine how the national treatment standard on 
cross-border trade has evolved in the context of investment, followed by how 
investment tribunals have applied the standard. 
4.1.1 WTO Case Law 
The role of national treatment is to ensure that liberalization concessions are not offset 
through the imposition of domestic taxes and similar measures. A WTO member 
claiming that its goods, have been treated discriminatorily might need to establish the 
origin of its goods since MFN is relevant to goods of (some) WTO origin.
412
 The 
WTO Agreement does not contain a harmonized benchmark for conferring origin. 
WTO members can choose their standard for conferring origin but then have to apply 
it in a non-discriminatory way to domestic and imported ‘like’ goods.413 
Policy choices on economic variables, both at home and abroad, as well as 
government evaluation of the effects of their policies, decide the scope for beneficial 
trade contracts.
414
 
When unilaterally making tax policy, a government may be tempted to pursue 
the ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ policies. Therefore, trade agreements are reciprocal 
exchange concessions.
415
 NT works against the protectionist use of domestic policy 
instruments to circumvent tariff bindings.
416
 
                                                        
410 Ibid., para. 251. 
411 Ibid., para. 251. 
412  Mavroidis and Hoekman, The World Trade Organization: Law, Economics, and Politics, 2nd edition, 
Routledge Press, 2016, p. 36. 
413 Id. 
414 ‘Unilateral policy choices are likely to be inefficient when evaluated from the perspective of the world as a 
whole.’ See Gene M. Grossman and Henrik Horn, ‘Why the WTO? An Introduction to the Economics of Trade 
Agreements,’ in Horn and Mavroidis, (ed.), Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, p. 15. 
415 The final property of design of trade agreements is that they entail reciprocal reductions in tariffs, and other 
trade barriers. See ibid., p. 35. 
416 NT is meant to outlaw the protectionist use of domestic instruments. See: Gene M. Grossman, Henrik Horn, 
and Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘National Treatment’, in Horn and Mavroidis, (ed.), Legal and Economic Principles of 
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The following part will discuss how panels test the application of NT provisions 
and detect the protectionist purpose of government measures. 
 
a) The Coverage of the National treatment obligation 
 
With regard to domestic instruments, Art. III. 1 GATT stipulates an extremely broad 
coverage by referring to 
 
“…internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations, and requirements… 
having the effect of 
…affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or 
use of products in specified amounts or proportions….”417 
 
The same broad approach is continued in Art. III.2 GATT, which states that exports of 
a member shall not be subject, 
 
“…directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess 
of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products…”418 
 
Similarly, Art.III.4 requires no less favourable treatment of imported products with 
respect to 
 
“… all laws, regulations, and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, 
purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”419 
 
Art. III GATT covers direct taxes on goods (Art. III.2 GATT), as well as indirect 
taxes and non-fiscal impositions (Art. III.4 GATT). A fiscal imposition on goods 
affects trade by modifying the price of the goods concerned. This explains why Art. 
III.2 GATT (which covers fiscal measures) does not include the words affecting trade, 
whereas these words are found in Art. III.4 GATT (which covers non-fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                              
World Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 205. They explore an economic analysis to find that the 
extent to which the GATT achieves its purpose (in the preamble) depends on how the regulations it imposes affect 
the working of markets. p. 206. 
417 Art. III.1 GATT 
418 Art. III.2 GATT 
419 Art. III.4 GATT 
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measures). 
Art. III GATT does not enumerate one by one the domestic instruments to which 
it applies, except in the case of local content requirements that are explicitly 
mentioned in Art. III.5 GATT. Two policy measures have been explicitly exempted 
from the coverage of the NT obligation by Art. III.8 GATT: subsidies and government 
procurement. 
 
b) Establishing a Violation of National Treatment 
 
The language in GATT Art. III.2 (fiscal measures) and Art. III.4 (other internal 
policies) is divergent. The legal test for seeing the consistency of measures is different. 
WTO Case-Law reflects that Art. III.1 GATT discourages the protectionist use of 
domestic legislation irrespective of whether fiscal or non-fiscal measures are used. 
    The national treatment obligation requires a double comparison as the treatment 
of foreign goods may not be less advantageous than that accorded to domestic ‘like’ 
goods. The MFN on subjective measures accorded to one foreign product must 
immediately and unconditionally be accorded to all ‘like’ foreign products. As a result, 
the treatment accorded to domestic products must be accorded to all foreign ‘like’ 
products. 
    For a violation of Article III GATT to occur, a successful complainant must 
establish that a WTO member has intervened through regulatory means ‘so as to 
afford’ protection to domestic competing ‘like’ products. Hence, the complainant must 
persuade the WTO adjudicating body that the product pair at hand (domestic-foreign) 
is like and that the measure being challenged treats the domestic product in a more 
advantageous manner. 
    Relevant GATT/WTO case law has clarified three criteria for likeness to be 
determined: first, demand-side factors are relevant; second, econometric or other 
indicators may be used; and third, all ‘like’ products have to be directly competitive or 
substitutable. “Some criteria were suggested for determining, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether a product is ‘similar’”: to test the product’s end-uses in a given market; 
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consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the product’s 
properties, nature, and quality.”’420 
    The AB reports on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II and on Korea-Alcoholic 
Beverages excluded supply-side criteria in establishing likeness and limited the 
relevant criteria to the demand side in the marketplace. The first reported attempts to 
apply standard economic criteria, such as the cross-price elasticity, in determining 
likeness,
421
 while the second report allowed complainants to use other criteria such as 
physical characteristics, consumer preferences, and end-uses.
422
 
For products to be ‘like’ they have to share some properties beyond what any two 
directly competitive or substitutable products share. The AB report on 
Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, states that “two directly competitive or substitutable 
products which come under the same HS classification are considered to be like.”423 
In Philippines-Taxes on Distilled Spirits,
424
 the EU and the US each brought 
forward a complaint, with respect to the WTO-consistency of the Philippines excise 
tax on distilled spirits. In the appeal, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding 
that, ‘through its excise tax, the Philippines subjected specific types of imported 
distilled spirits to internal taxes in excess of those applied to like domestic spirits of 
the same type made from designated raw materials in violation of Art. III:2, first 
                                                        
420. ‘Like’ products is a subset of directly competitive or substitutable products: all like products are, by definition, 
directly competitive or substitutable products, whereas not all ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ products are 
‘like’. The AB in its report on Korea-Alcoholic Beverages held that like products is a subset of DCS products: if 
two products are like, they are, by definition, DCS as well. ( 118) see Appellate Body Report, Korea-Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999.  
421 The AB, in its report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II provides its understanding of DCS products. This 
dispute arose because of a Japanese taxation scheme which, while neutral on its face-value, subjected 
predominantly Western products to a heavier taxation than predominantly Japanese products. As a result, sochu 
(an alcoholic beverage predominantly produced in Japan) was subjected to less burdensome taxation than, inter 
alia, whisky (an alcoholic beverage predominantly produced in Europe and the US). Europe and the US protested, 
arguing that all of the products concerned (with the exception of vodka that was deemed to be a ‘like’ product to 
sochu) were DCS products. The AB upheld the panel’s findings in this regard. In its review, (a) physical 
characteristics; (b) common end-users; and (c) tariff classification, are appropriate elements to take into account 
when defining whether two products are DCS. Upholding the panel’s findings in this regard, the AB made it clear 
that the test to define whether two products are DCS is in the marketplace, in the sense that, it is consumers who 
will ultimately decide whether two products are indeed in competition with each other. To this effect, 
“econometric indicators (for instance, the cross-price elasticity) are relevant to define whether two products are 
indeed in competition with each other.” For comments on this case, see: Horn and Mavroidis, (eds.) Legal and 
Economic Principles of World Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 253-4. 
422 Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 17 February 1999. 
423 Appellate Body Report, Japan on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 
adopted 1 November 1996. 
424 Philippines - Taxes on Distilled Spirits, DS396. DS403 (adopted on 20 January 2012). 
116 
sentence.’425 The Appellate Body, however, reversed the Panel’s additional finding 
that all distilled spirits at issue in the dispute, irrespective of their raw material base, 
and their origin or type (brandy, whisky, rum, gin, vodka, tequila, and 
tequila-flavoured spirits), were ‘like products’ within the meaning of Art. III:2, first 
sentence.
426
 “Likeness” was not necessarily confined to goods with high 
substitutability between them. 
 
c) ‘Application of NT to Afford Protection’ 
 
A key condition for a measure to violate national treatment is that it has the effect of 
affording protection. Many adjudicating bodies use proxies to establish whether 
protection has indeed been accorded through regulation. 
    With respect to fiscal policies, Art. III.2 GATT requests that foreign products (i) 
should not be taxed in excess of ‘like’ domestic products427 whereas, (ii) they should 
not be taxed in a manner that affords protection to domestic directly competitive or 
substitutable products.
428
 The key term in (i) is ‘in excess’. This has been equated in 
Case-Law to a pure arithmetic difference in taxation, irrespective of the margin (i.e., 
for a violation to occur, the more burdensome taxation must be imposed on the 
foreign products).
429
 For a violation of (ii) to occur, the tax differential must be more 
than de minimis (with this to be determined on a case-by-case basis).
430
 
    The Appellate Body’s conclusion in the Chile–Alcoholic Beverages case 
                                                        
425 Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits, DS403, adopted on 20 January 2012.  120-122. 
426 Id., 148. 
427 “With respect to like products, taxation in excess should be understood as an instance of a measure operating 
applied so as to afford protection precisely because the imported product was taxed higher than the domestic like 
good.” Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, pp.18-19. 
428 “Although it is true that the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, nevertheless its protective 
application can most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of a measure. 
The very magnitude of the dissimilar taxation in a particular case may be evidence of such protective application… 
Most often, there will be other factors to be considered as well.” Appellate Body Report on Korea—Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, ( 150). 
429 The AB has stated that even a minimal tax differential suffices to satisfy the in-excess criterion. See: Appellate 
Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 23. 
430  For comments on Appellate Body’s Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II, “Regulatory intent can, 
consequently, be an issue in the limited case where two products are DCS, and the tax differential is not large 
enough, keeping in mind that case law has not provided a quantitative benchmark to decide what large actually 
means.” See: Horn and Mavroidis, (eds.) Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, p. 260. 
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illustrates the need for rethinking the interpretation of Art. III.
431
 The national 
treatment obligation was originally designed as an instrument for non-discrimination 
and not as a tool for de-regulation, since the over-arching function of Art. III GATT is 
to combat “protectionism.”432 
    When it comes to non-fiscal measures, Art. III.4 GATT imposes an obligation 
not to accord to imported products less favourable treatment than that accorded to 
domestic like products. To establish whether a regulation operates in a protectionist 
manner, a complainant does not have to show either protective effects
433
 or protective 
intent.
434
 
The TBT
435
 and SPS
436
 Agreements reflect more elaborate understandings of 
the non-discrimination obligation. A domestic regulation can simultaneously fall 
under Art. III GATT, the TBT, and the SPS Agreements. According to the TBT 
Agreement, a WTO member enacting a technical regulation or standard must respect 
the national treatment (assuming no relevant international standard exists, which must 
be followed according to Art. 2.4 TBT). Furthermore, a state will have to ensure that 
its legislation is necessary for it to achieve its unilaterally set regulatory objective. 
                                                        
431 The AB first held that the tax differential across the two categories of lower and higher alcoholic content drinks 
was more than de minimis. ( 44ff) The AB then asked the question of whether the dissimilar taxation supported 
the conclusion that it was ASATAP to the domestic product. ( 62-66) The AB agreed that, as a matter of fact, 
most of the alcoholic drinks hit by the higher taxation were of Chilean origin. However, it dismissed the relevance 
of this observation for the interpretation of the ‘applied so as to afford protection’ requirement in the following 
terms ( 67): “This fact does not, however, by itself outweigh the other relevant factors, which tend to reveal the 
protective application of the New Chilean System. The relevant proportion of domestic versus imported products 
within a particular fiscal category is not, in and of itself, decisive of the appropriate characterization of the total 
impact of the New Chilean system under Article III:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994. This provision, as 
noted earlier, provides for equality of competitive conditions of all directly competitive or substitutable imported 
products, in relation to domestic products, and not simply, as Chile argues, those imported products within a 
particular fiscal category. The cumulative consequence of the New Chilean System is, as the Panel found, that 
approximately 75 percent of all domestic production of the distilled alcoholic beverages at issue will be located in 
the fiscal category with the lowest tax rate, whereas approximately 95 percent of the directly competitive or 
substitutable imported products will be found in the fiscal category subject to the highest tax rate.” Appellate Body 
Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, adopted 12 January 2000.  
432 “Protectionism” here means a policy that causes negative international externalities, for example, when a tariff 
exceeds the (international) efficient negotiation level. 
433 In US-Superfund (1987), the US. response was that the difference was so minimal that it could not reasonably 
have had an impact on the prices in the US market. The GATT panel dismissed the U.S. argument. In this view, the 
fact that the effects on the market were negligible was a nonissue: Art. III GATT should be constructed and 
understood as a mechanism protecting legitimate expectations as to the quality of competitive conditions. ( 5.1.9). 
see: GATT Panel Report, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175, adopted 
17 June 1987. 
434 WTO panels did not totally exclude the relevance of an intent test. Case law state that the subjective intent of 
the legislator does not matter. In the Appellate Body’s report on Chile-Alcoholic beverages, it brought objective 
regulation purpose, that is, the purpose as revealed through the design and architecture of the measure, within the 
analysis of the ‘applied so as to afford protection’ criterion. (71-72). 
435 Technical barriers to trade (TBT) Agreement. 
436 Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement. 
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    The necessity test means that WTO members can pursue any objective they think 
proper, while simultaneously choosing the means that will have the least possible 
negative impact on international trade. ‘Necessity’ requirement does not oblige WTO 
members to target this objective by using the most efficient method to realize a social 
preference. For instance, the SPS Agreement obliges WTO members to base their 
interventions on scientific evidence and a process of risk assessment, as well as to 
ensure some coherence in their health and environmental policies.
437
 
 
d) Exception Clause 
 
Trade liberalization, market access, and non-discrimination rules may conflict with 
other important societal values and interests.
438
 General exception clauses allow 
members, under specific conditions, to adopt and maintain legislation and measures 
that promote or protect other important societal values and interests, even though this 
legislation or these measures are inconsistent with the substantive disciplines imposed 
by the GATT 1994 or the GATS. These exceptions clearly allow members, under 
specific conditions, to give priority to certain societal values and interests over trade 
liberalization, market access and non-discrimination rules.
439
 
General exceptions may exclude certain measures from the scope of the 
application of the ‘national treatment’ obligation in the GATT. 
Art. XX GATT contains a list of grounds that justify deviations from the GATT 
obligations. The GATT/WTO case law has clarified a few points on how to interpret 
this provision. First, it is the WTO member invoking Art. XX GATT that carries the 
burden of proof.
440
 The burden of persuasion varies across the various 
sub-paragraphs included in Art. XX GATT. Second, Art. XX GATT contains an 
exhaustive list of policy objectives that may serve as grounds for an exception from 
                                                        
437 Article 5.5 SPS Agreement. 
438 Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013, p. 544. 
439 Ibid., p. 545. 
440 The respondent has the burden of proof to establish eligibility for an Art. XX GATT exception.  
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other obligations in the GATT.
441
 Third, the conformity of an otherwise 
GATT-inconsistent measure must be established by using one of the sub-paragraphs of 
Art. XX GATT as a benchmark. The legal standard for compliance is not the same in 
each and every sub-paragraph of Art. XX GATT. For example, whereas sub-paragraph 
(b) requires that measures used are necessary (that is, are not more trade restrictive 
than what is required to achieve the stated objective) to reach a goal, sub-paragraph (h) 
requires that measures are simply relating to the attainment of the objective. Therefore, 
sub-paragraph (h) is a substantially less demanding standard, equivalent more or less 
to an appropriateness test (i.e., it establishes if a particular measure is appropriate to 
reach a certain goal, independently of whether it is the least restrictive option). 
    Once substantial conformity has been satisfied, WTO members must ensure that 
they apply their measure in a manner consistent with the chapeau of Art. XX GATT. 
Hence, there is a dichotomy between the subparagraphs and the chapeau. The former 
are relevant so long as substantial conformity is concerned; whereas the latter is 
relevant only when the application of an otherwise WTO-consistent measure is 
concerned.  
Case-law on the ‘two-tier’ test under Article XX of the GATT 1994 is reflected 
in US-Gasoline (1996).442 Also, the Appellate Body in US–Shrimp (1998) further 
clarified that, to determine whether a measure can be justified under Article XX, one 
must always examine, first, whether this measure can be provisionally justified under 
one of the specific exceptions listed in paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX; and, if so, 
whether the application of this measure meets the requirements of the chapeau of 
Article XX.
443
 Hence, an analysis under Article XX must first focus on the measure 
at issue itself, before then concentrating on the application of that measure. 
The following subsections will discuss one of the specific exceptions, and its 
requirements, provided for in paragraphs (b) of Article XX: as Article XX(b) 
concerns measures which are ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
                                                        
441 Horn and Mavroidis, (eds.) Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 
2013, p. 319. 
442 Appellate Body Report, US-Gasoline (1996), para. 22. See also Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated 
Tyres (2007), para. 139. 
443 See Appellate Body Report, US-Shrimp (1998), paras. 119-20. 
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health.’444 It sets out a two-tier test to determine whether a measure is provisionally 
justified under this provision: (1) the policy objective pursued by the measure is the 
protection of the life or health of humans, animals or plants; and (2) the measure is 
necessary to fulfil that policy objective. 
First, the policy objective of a measure was for the protection of the life or health 
of humans, animals or plants. In China-Raw Materials (2012), China submitted 
regarding the export restrictions on certain raw materials at issue in this case that 
these export restrictions were: 
Part of a comprehensive environmental protection framework whose objectives are 
pollution reduction for the protection of health of the Chinese population.
445
 
 
However, the respondents in this case (the EU, the US and Mexico), argued that 
China’s export restrictions were not designed to address the health risks associated 
with environmental pollution, and that China’s invocation of environmental and 
health concerns was ‘merely a post hoc rationalization developed solely for purposes 
of this dispute’.446 The panel found that China was unable to substantiate that the 
export restrictions at issue ‘were part of a comprehensive programme maintained in 
order to reduce pollution. Thus, this cast serious doubts over whether the policy 
objective pursued by the export restriction was for the protection of the life or health 
of humans, animals or plants.
447
 
Second, the ‘necessity’ requirement is much more complex than the first element. 
In its report on Brazil – Retreaded Tyres (2007), the Appellate Body summed up how 
the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(b) is currently being interpreted and applied, 
as follows: 
[I]n order to determine whether a measure is ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article 
XX(b) of the GATT 1994, a panel must consider the relevant factors, particularly the 
importance of the interests or values at stake, the extent of the contribution to the 
achievement of the measure’s objective, and its trade restrictiveness. If this analysis yields a 
preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, this result must be confirmed by 
comparing the measure with possible alternatives, which may be less trade restrictive while 
                                                        
444 GATT, Art. XX(b). 
445 Panel Reports, China-Raw Materials (2012), para. 7.498. 
446 Ibid., para. 7.499. 
447 Ibid., para. 7.516. 
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providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective. This comparison 
should be carried out in the light of the importance of the interests or values at stake. It is 
through this process that a panel determines whether a measure is necessary.
448
 
 
The Appellate Body emphasized that the ‘weighing and balancing’ required to 
determine whether a measure is ‘necessary’ is a ‘holistic operation that involves 
putting all the variables of the equation together and evaluating them in relation to 
each other after having examined them individually, in order to reach an overall 
judgment.’449 
When considering the ‘weighing and balancing’ process applied to determine 
whether an otherwise GATT-inconsistent measure is ‘necessary,’ the third factor is the 
restrictive impact of the measure at issue on international trade. In Brazil–Retreated 
Tyres (2007), the Appellate Body clearly suggested with regard to this factor, that the 
more restrictive the impact of the measure at issue is on international trade, the more 
difficult it is to consider that measure ‘necessary’.450 The panel then assessed the 
existence of less trade-restrictive alternative measures. 
With regard to the contribution of the achievement to the value or policy 
objective pursued, the Appellate Body ruled in Brazil–Retreated Tyres (2007) that a 
measure contributes to the achievement of the objective ‘when there is a genuine 
relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and the measure at 
issue.’451 Furthermore, the Appellate Body held in Brazil–Retreated Tyres (2007) that 
a measure must bring about a material contribution to the achievement of its objective; 
and that whether a measure brings about such a contribution can be demonstrated 
either by evidence that the measure: (1) has already resulted in a material contribution; 
or (2) is opted for produce a material contribution.
452
 
Another case law example on the ‘necessity’ requirement of Article XX(b) is the 
                                                        
448 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres (2007), para. 178. Emphasis added. 
449 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres (2007), para. 182. 
450 See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated tyres (2007), para. 150. 
451 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated tyres (2007). In this case, the Appellate Body rejected the European 
Communities’ argument that the contribution of the measure at issue to the achievement of its objective must be 
quantified by a panel. It held instead, that either a quantitative or a qualitative evaluation is permissible. What is 
required is ‘a genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and the measure at issue’.  
452 See ibid., para. 151. 
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reports of the panel in China–Raw Materials (2012).453 The panel examined whether 
the objectives of the export restrictions were for the protection of health and the 
environment.
454
 The panel concluded that China had not demonstrated that the export 
restrictions at issue were ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article XX(b).455 China 
did not appeal this finding of the panel. 
Lastly, the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994, with regard to measures 
provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs of Article XX, imposes:  
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.
456
 
 
The Appellate Body in its report on US–Shrimp, expressed the view that it is the 
language of the chapeau that makes it clear that all exceptions appearing in Art. XX 
GATT are limited and conditional.
457
 
This section will conclude by briefly summing up the understanding of case-law 
about NT. Firstly recall that the role of NT is to prevent countries from pursuing 
internationally inefficient (beggar-thy-neighbour) policies.
458
 Interpretation of the 
terms applied in Art. III GATT disputes, can become consistent with the rationale of 
the provision. Art. XX GATT provides a hierarchy between trade commitments and 
national social preferences. Public morals, the protection of human health, etc., which 
                                                        
453 On the availability of Article XX to justify export restrictions inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994, 
as opposed to the unavailability of Article XX to justify export duties inconsistent with China’s Accession 
Protocol.  
454 The panel did not examine the importance of the policy objective pursued. It noted that, in the Appellate Body 
Report in Brazil – Retreated Tyres (2007), it was stated that ‘few interests are more “vital” and “important” than 
protecting human beings from health risks, and that protecting the environment is no less important. See Panel 
Reports, China – Raw Materials (2012), para. 7.482. 
455 The Panel also considered: ‘whether the export restrictions at issue already made, or were apt to produce, a 
material contribution to the achievement of the policy objective pursued; what was the impact of the export 
restrictions on trade; and whether there were WTO-consistent or less trade-restrictive alternative measures that 
could be used instead of applying export restrictions.’ See: Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials (2012), para. 
7.615. The Panel found – assuming arguendo that Article XX was available to justify export duties inconsistent 
with China’s Accession Protocol – that China had not demonstrated that these export duties were ‘necessary’ 
within the meaning of Article XX(b). See: Panel Reports, China–Raw Materials (2012), para. 7.616. 
456 Art. XX, GATT. 
457  Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998. 157. 
458 ‘The general objective of the regulation of domestic instruments in the GATT is to limit the use of domestic 
instruments for protectionism, while allowing legitimate use of such instruments, even if this causes adverse 
consequences for trading partners by shielding import-competing products from foreign competition.’ Horn and 
Mavroidis, (eds.) Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 301. 
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are listed in this provision, are more important than trade commitments.
459
 
The previous section presented interpretations of Art. III GATT and Art. XX 
GATT based on the case-law. These interpretations may affect the determinations in 
other cases. The next section will switch to the area of international investment law to 
examine how investment tribunals apply the national treatment principle. 
4.1.2 Investment Case-Law 
In the investment context, the basic function of NT is to protect foreign investors from 
internal regulations which afford more favourable treatment to domestic investors. 
What does one mean by ‘granting NT’ or, in other words, prohibiting discrimination 
based on the nationality of the investor (or investment)? In addition, if a measure has 
a detrimental impact (or adverse effect) on foreign compared to domestic investors, 
can it be said to discriminate even though, on balance, is it a sensible measure? To 
answer these two related questions, it is essential to delineate two basic features of the 
NT standard: ‘nationality discrimination’ and ‘public policy justification.’ 
    The relationship between discrimination and the policy justification underlying 
the measure at issue may change depending on what one means by 
‘discrimination’.460 Furthermore, when the NT principle is extended to cover national 
measures which have a detrimental impact on foreign investors, the test of the 
principle is not about the detrimental impact per se, but about whether the measure 
(with detrimental impact) is related to a legitimate regulatory purpose.
461
 The fact 
that the national measure has a detrimental impact becomes a ‘threshold’ question,462 
where the justification analysis is the real key test. 
The first step in a national treatment case involves identifying the appropriate 
                                                        
459 Trade thus is not elevated to the supreme common value that all Members must observe at any cost. Ibid., p. 
303. 
460 Federico Ortino,‘Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Investment Disputes’, in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco 
Francioni, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, (ed.), Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 351. 
461 ‘What matter most is not the position of [foreign and domestic] investments in relation to each other in the 
market (competition test), but rather the factual support for the government’s distinction between the two when 
taking regulatory action (regulatory context test).’ See DisMascio and Pauwelyn, at 81.  
462 ‘The idea that competition has a natural role to play in the likeness inquiry relates to its ability to against 
possible instances of protectionism.’ See Jürgen Kurtz, The WTO and International Investment Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2016, p. 96. 
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domestic comparator against which the treatment accorded the allegedly injured 
investment (or investor) can be measured. A second step requires the identification of 
treatment that was less favourable than that given to the domestic comparator. Finally, 
tribunals have to consider whether the host government had legitimate reasons that 
justified the difference in treatment.
463
 
   This analysis is not always undertaken in separate steps or in the order suggested 
above. In practice, tribunals have recognized that the type of treatment at issue is not 
necessarily separate from the ‘like circumstances’ inquiry.464 
 
a) Nationality Discrimination 
 
The jurisprudence applying the NT standard focuses on the following two key 
elements: ‘like circumstances’ and ‘less favorable treatment. 
 
“Like Circumstances”: 
 
Identification of the appropriate comparator is a key step in testing national treatment 
standards, because the outcome in most cases depends on whether the more 
favourable treatment was accorded to an entity ‘in like circumstances’. If the 
allegedly favoured entity is not in ‘like circumstances’, the inquiry ends. In rare cases, 
there may be no actual comparator. In the case of de facto national treatment 
violations,
465
 a claimant has to demonstrate that an ostensibly neutral measure has 
discriminatory effect for the claim to prevail. However, it is hard to show a 
                                                        
463 See C. Mclachlan, L. Shore, and M. Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles 
(2007), pp 253-254. 
464 Dean Cass noted that ‘one might determine that two entities are not in like circumstances because of the 
different treatment they receive, rather than because there were legitimate reasons for structuring the differential 
treatment. For example, a State might apply different pollution control regimes to high pollution areas of the 
country such that different companies in the same economic sector could be affected differently. In such a situation 
the treatment accorded—a stricter regulatory regime—might affect the like circumstances determination such that 
only factories in the affected areas are deemed to be in like circumstances with respect to the implementation of 
pollution control measures.’ See United Parcel Service of America Inc v Canada (NAFTA), Separate Statement of 
Dean Cass, 24 May 2007, paras 49-50. 
465 ‘There are laws or regulations that do not explicitly differentiate on nationality grounds. They may pose a 
greater adverse burden on the foreign investor and thereby may be considered illegitimate as constituting de facto 
discrimination.’ See Merrill & Ring Forestry L. P. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Administrated, 
Award, 31 March 2010, para. 94. 
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discriminatory effect if no other entity receives any treatment whatsoever. By contrast, 
in the case of de jure measures, one need not show that a domestic entity has received 
any treatment.
466
 
    The manner in which tribunals have approached identifying the comparator has 
varied. It is fair to say that the approach is flexible, and varies according to both the 
circumstances of the investment (or investor) and the treatment at issue. One 
formulation was borrowed by the S.D. Myers v Canada tribunal from WTO practice: 
‘the accordion of “likeness” stretches and squeezes in different places as different 
provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied.’467 According to the Pope & Talbot v 
Canada tribunal: 
 
[…] [b]y their very nature, ‘circumstances’ are context dependent and have no 
unalterable meaning across the spectrum of fact situations […] the concept of ‘like’ can 
have a range of meanings, from ‘similar’ all the way to ‘identical.’
468
 
 
The ‘like circumstances’ analysis involves considering whether the appropriate 
comparison is between the like-circumstanced investments (or investors), and the 
like-circumstanced treatment. This means that the comparison can take into account 
the regulatory context, in addition to the relationship between the investments (or 
investors). In fact, many tribunals do so when determining the appropriate 
comparators.
469
 It is also consistent with the placement of the modifier in many 
treaties. The US Model BIT, for example, provides that: ‘Each Party shall accord to 
investors of the other Party treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to its own investors […]’.470 In a related vein, the existence of a 
competitive relationship between the comparator and the claimant is not seen as 
                                                        
466 A. Newcombe, L. Paradell, and D. Krishan, ‘National Treatment,’ The Law and Practice of Investment 
Treaties, 2008, 35, discussing possible breach if preferential tax treatment is given only to qualified domestic 
investments. 
467 S.D. Myers Inc v Canada (NAFTA), Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 244, citing Japan—Alcoholic 
Beverages, WT/DS38/AB/R, paras 8.5 and 9. 
468 Pope & Talbot Inc v Canada (NAFTA), Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, para.75. 
469 For example, in Corn Product v. Mexico, the tribunal channeled the political economy of host state policy to 
foreign investment, stating: ‘the fact that economic competitors have—and lobby for—different interests is not at 
all surprising. On the contrary, it is a fact of economic and political life which may be observed in any open 
society…[I]t is precisely where the interests of foreign investors and domestic investors are in conflict that the 
principle of non-discrimination becomes most important.’ See Corn Products International Inc. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 15 January 2008, para. 135. 
470 Article 3(1) US Model BIT 2012 (emphasis added). 
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irrelevant to a finding of ‘like circumstances’, but is considered as well.471 In an 
investment case, the protection which a measure apparently gives a competing entity 
may give rise to an inference of nationality-based preference.
472
 
Most early arbitral cases embrace competition as a condition of likeness between 
foreign and domestic investors in a national treatment inquiry. In SD Myer v 
Canada,
473
 to decide whether SD Myers was in ‘like circumstances’ with Canadian 
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) waste-disposal companies, the tribunal awarded that 
generally comparisons should be made between firms operating in the same sector 
(which included both business and economic sectors).
474
 The tribunal considered not 
only environmental concerns, which justified treating companies differently to protect 
the public interest, but also obligations to avoid trade distortions, not justified by 
environmental concerns.
475
  
It finally awarded that the claimant and its investment in Canada were in ‘like 
circumstances’ with the Canadian PCB remediation companies, and highlighted their 
competitive relationship when ruling: 
 
‘It was precisely because SDMI [S.D. Myers International, the Canadian corporation 
deemed to be an investment] was in a position to take business away from its Canadian 
competitors that [they] lobbied the Minister of the Environment to ban exports when the 
US authorities opened the border.’
476
 
 
In Occidental case, by contrast, the tribunal suggested that ‘like situations’ were 
not limited to situations where the investor was competing with a domestic enterprise 
in the same sector.
477
 Ecuador permitted certain exporters, including those dealing 
                                                        
471 Jürgen Kurtz, 2016. 
472 Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‘National Treatment’, in August Reinisch, edited, Standards of Investment Protection, 
Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 39. 
473 The question was whether Canada’s closing of the border to the export of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) 
waste violated Canada’s obligations by unduly affecting SD Myers; a US company which aimed at competing with 
Canada for contracts to process PCB waste at its Ohio remediation facility. See S.D. Myers v. Canada, Partial 
Award, paras 248-250. 
474 S.D. Myers Inc v Canada, para. 250. 
475 Ibid., paras. 247, 250. 
476 Ibid., Para. 251. 
477 For example, the Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v Ecuador tribunal found two entities to be in 
‘like circumstances’ despite the lack of any competitive relationship between them. See Occidental Exploration 
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with flowers, mining, and seafood products, to claim a refund of VAT on all exports, 
but exclude Occidental from a claim for VAT refund on exports of oil. Thus 
Occidental claimed a violation of the NT obligation according to the Ecuador-US 
BIT.
478
 However, the tribunal rejected Ecuador’s arguments. It held that the purpose 
of the national treatment obligation is to protect foreign investors and that it would be 
inappropriate to address ‘[…] exclusively the sector in which that particular activity is 
undertaken’,479 furthermore, exporters should not be placed at a disadvantage in 
foreign markets because they had to pay more taxes in their country of origin.
480
 It 
suggested that ‘like situations’ were not limited to situations where the investor was 
competing with a domestic enterprise in the same industry. 
The Occidental tribunal’s award was quite different from previous cases. It 
depends on the situations of a particular case for the ‘like circumstances’ 
determination, whereas the lack of any competitive relationship between the 
comparators would generally be a difficult hurdle to overcome. In fact, the tribunal’s 
decision is not surprising to the extent that it reflected an assessment that ‘VAT 
refunds were denied to the oil exploration sector because it was dominated by foreign 
competitors.’481 Therefore, the policy considerations underlying the treatment could 
remarkably affect the outcome. 
In Pope & Talbot v Canada, another NAFTA Chapter 11 case, a US investor that 
owned three lumber mills in British Columbia, challenged Canada’s implementation 
of the US/Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement.
482
 The claimant did not challenge 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, 1 July 2004, paras 
175-176. 
478 Ecuador argued that the VAT refund was not available to any exporters of oil, including Petro-Ecuador, the 
state-owned oil company, and that there was thus no evidence of any attempt to discriminate against foreign 
companies. See Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Ecuador, para. 60. 
479 Ibid. para.175. 
480 Id. 
481 Ecuador moved to set aside the award, but its petition was denied. See SD Franck, ‘International Decision: 
Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador,’ 99 American Journal of International Law 
(2005) 675,679-680. 
482 Under the Softwood Lumber Agreement, Canada agreed to limit the export of softwood lumber from the four 
‘covered’ provinces—Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario —that had historically been the largest 
exporters of softwood lumber to the United States. In return, the US would not institute any unfair trade remedies 
cases against Canadian softwood lumber exporters, for the five years that the Agreement remained in effect. Under 
the Agreement up to 14.7 billion board feet of lumber could be exported free of charge; exports between 14.7 and 
15.35 billion board feet would be charged a duty at the rate of US$50 per board foot; and exports in excess of 
15.35 billion board feet would be charged a duty at the rate of US$100 per board foot. Lumber exports from the 
non-covered provinces were not limited. In each of the covered provinces, Canada allocated a quota among 
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the Softwood Lumber Agreement itself, but only the manner in which Canada had 
implemented it. It claimed a violation of Article 1102, NAFTA’s national treatment 
provision, because lumber producers in the non-covered provinces were not subject to 
the quota, and were thus accorded more favourable treatment than lumber producers 
in the covered provinces.
483
 It also claimed that it was treated less favourable than 
certain other producers in the covered provinces, including producers in British 
Columbia and Quebec.
484
 
    Thus, the first question for the Pope & Talbot tribunal was whether the claimant 
was in ‘like circumstances’ with lumber producers in other non-covered provinces. In 
effect, the tribunal approached this question of ‘like circumstances’ with whether the 
government offered a rationale for the difference in treatment. It then awarded that the 
first order of business was to determine whether the foreign investor was in ‘like 
circumstances’ with the allegedly more favourably treated domestic investor, which 
required merely establishing that the two entities, operating in the same economic 
sector, received differential treatment.
485
 If the claimant could make a prima facie 
case, the burden of proof then shifted to the respondent to show that certain legitimate 
government objective justified the differential treatment and thereby demonstrate that 
the two were not indeed in ‘like circumstances’: ‘[…] once a difference in treatment 
between a domestic and a foreign-owned investment is discerned, the question 
becomes, are they in like circumstances?’486 
    The tribunal concluded that the foreign investor’s investments in British 
Columbia were not in ‘like circumstances’ with any of the allegedly more favourably 
treated investments. It considered the policy reasons which Canada, the respondent, 
was able to offer to explain the differences in treatment. First, the tribunal considered 
that the manner in which Canada implemented the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement—limiting exports only from the four covered provinces—was rational 
                                                                                                                                                              
Canadian lumber producers based on their historic levels of export to the US. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, para. 18. 
483 Id. 
484 Id. 
485 Ibid., para. 78. 
486 Ibid., para. 79. 
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given the historical background of the case.
487
 The US had never imposed duties on 
products in these non-covered provinces, and thus, limiting exports from only the 
covered provinces was ‘[…] reasonably related to the rational policy of removing the 
threat of CVD [countervailing duty] actions’.488 Secondly, the tribunal determined 
that the allegedly more favourable treatment granted to producers in Quebec than to 
producers in British Columbia was also justified.
489
 Canada had set aside some 
quotas, to allocate to new entrants into the lumber industry, but most of those new 
entrants were in Quebec, therefore, British Columbian producers were not in ‘like 
circumstances’ with Quebecois new entrants; but in any event, Pope & Talbot was not 
a new entrant.
490
  
    Some tribunals have been confronted with cases in which the question is of 
discriminatory effect, but there are few comparators against which to compare the 
treatment accorded. For example, Feldman v Mexico involved a challenge to a 
Mexican tax rebate law by the investor in a Mexico enterprise, CEMSA, that resold 
and exported cigarettes from Mexico.
491
 Feldman claimed that Mexican laws, though 
neutral at face-value, discriminated against his company because the rebates were 
available only to exporters who were also producers of cigarettes, rather than to 
resellers of cigarettes alone. However, there were very few potential firms in ‘like 
circumstances’. 
    The Feldman tribunal concluded that CEMSA was not in ‘like circumstances’ 
with the producers/exporters, as it noted that Mexico had a rational basis for treating 
producers differently from resellers, including ‘[…] better control over tax revenues, 
discouraging smuggling, protecting intellectual property rights, and prohibiting grey 
market sales’.492 
                                                        
487 Ibid. para. 87. 
488 Id. 
489 Ibid. para. 93. 
490 Id. Also, Pope & Talbot v. Canada Award on the Merits of Phase 2 notes that application of the standard will 
require evaluation of the entire fact setting surrounding the genesis and application of the regime as well as the 
overall legal context. See Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of 
Phase 2, 10 April 2001. paras. 75-78. 
491 Marvin Roy Feldman v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award on Merits, 16 
December 2002.  
492 Ibid., para. 170. Also, this case demonstrates that the burden of proof will shift if the claimant makes out a 
prima facie case of discrimination. Ibid., paras 76-78. 
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    Methanex Corp v United States involved the challenge brought by a Canadian 
producer of methanol against California’s ban on methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), 
a gasoline additive for which methanol is a feedstock.
493
 MTBE is an oxygenate 
added to gasoline to help it burn more cleanly; high-pollution areas in the US are 
required to sell only oxygenated gasoline in order to improve air quality. The only 
effective competitor of MTBE is ethanol, because other oxygenates are not yet 
commercially viable. The claimant argued, inter alia, that California banned MTBE in 
order to assist the US-dominated ethanol industry.
494
 In order to prevail on its 
national treatment, Methanex had to demonstrate that it was ‘in like circumstances’ 
with producers of ethanol, who received the more favourable treatment, rather than 
with producers of methanol, or producers of MTBE. As the Methanex tribunal stated, 
this was a difficult hurdle to overcome because, 
 
[…] it would be as perverse to ignore identical comparators if they were 
available and to use comparators that were less ‘like’, as it would be perverse 
to refuse to find and to apply less ‘like’ comparators when no identical 
comparators existed.
495
 
 
    The tribunal concluded that because Methanex was found to be in ‘like 
circumstances’ with other producers of methanol, all of whom were affected in the 
same manner by the ban on MTBE, it could not prevail on its national treatment 
claim.
496
 
 
“Less Favourable Treatment”: 
 
In addition to identifying the appropriate comparator, a claimant alleging a national 
                                                        
493 Methanex v United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 August, 2005. Part IV, Ch. B. 
494 See Loukas Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation: UPS v. Canada and Methanex Corp v. 
USA.’ in Todd Weiler, eds., International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, 
NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, 2005, CAMERON MAY, p.186. 
495 Ibid., para. 17. 
496 Ibid., para. 28. 
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treatment obligation must demonstrate that the treatment is less favourable than that 
accorded to the domestic comparator. As in the case of the ‘likeness’ criterion, arbitral 
tribunals have differed in the tests adopted for establishing whether a measure affords 
‘less favourable treatment’ to the foreign investor.  
National treatment obligations preclude de jure or de facto discrimination by 
nationality. One of the strongest statements of the nationality-based discrimination 
approach can be found in the GAMI decision.
497
 The GAMI tribunal disposed of any 
suggestion that mere differential treatment could result in a successful national 
treatment claim. There was no question in GAMI that some sugar mills had not been 
expropriated, but that the US investor’s mills had been. They were thus in receipt of 
less favourable treatment than had been some Mexican-owned mills. 
Two separate issues may be identified in this regard. First, arbitral tribunals have 
differed regarding whether the arguable measure’s adverse effect on foreign investors 
is sufficient to establish less favourable treatment, and on whether discriminatory 
intent is also an indispensable element in the national treatment equation. Several 
investment tribunals seem to rely on the measure’s effects only, excluding the 
relevance of the measure’s intent. In Myers, the NAFTA tribunal stated as follows: 
 
“Intent is important, but protectionist intend is not necessarily decisive on its own. The 
existence of intent to favour nationals over non-nationals would not give rise to a breach of 
Chapter 1102 of the NAFTA if the measure in question were to produce no adverse effect 
on the non-national complainant. The word ‘treatment’ suggests that practical impact is 
required to produce a breach of Article 1102, not merely a motive or intent that is in 
violation of Chapter 11.”
498
 
 
    The second issue surrounding the ‘less favourable treatment’ test is whether 
nationality discrimination is established simply by showing that one foreign investor 
has been treated less favourably than at least one domestic investor in ‘like 
circumstances’, or whether a broader ‘nationality imbalance’ needs to be established 
by the claimant (i.e., to show that foreign investors as a whole are treated less 
                                                        
497 GAMI Investment Inc v Mexico (NAFTA), Final Award, 15 November 2004, paras. 113, 115. 
498 S.D. Myers, at para. 254. 
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favourably than similar domestic investors as a whole). 
    In Pope & Talbot, for example, the tribunal noted that a breach of NAFTA, 
Article 1102 is presumptively established, ‘once a difference in treatment between a 
domestic and a foreign-owned investment is discerned’.499 Canada had argued in its 
defence that in cases of alleged de facto discrimination, a violation of the NT 
obligation can be found only if the measure in question ‘disproportionately 
disadvantages’ the foreign-owned investments or investors.500 The tribunal rejected 
Canada’s ‘disproportionate disadvantage’ approach. The tribunal noted that ‘the 
recognition that the NT obligation can be violated through de facto measures has 
always been based on an unwillingness to allow circumvention of that right by skilful 
or evasive drafting’ and that such a ‘result would be inconsistent with the investment 
objectives of NAFTA, in particular Article 102(1)(b) and (c), to promote conditions of 
fair competition and to increase substantially investment opportunities’. 501 
Furthermore, the Tribunal emphasized the ‘practical implications’ of Canada’s 
suggestion,
502
 how ‘unwieldy’ it would be to show disproportionate disadvantage, 
and ‘how it would hamstring foreign-owned investments seeking to vindicate their 
Article 1102 rights.’503 
 
b) Justification on Public Policy Grounds 
 
Analysis under the NT standard does not necessarily end with a finding of nationality 
                                                        
499 Pope & Talbot, Inc v The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 
2001, at para 79. 
500 According to Canada, the tribunal must determine ‘whether there are any Canadian-owned investments that are 
accorded the same treatment as the Investor… Then, the size of that group of Canadian investments must be 
compared to the size of the group of Canadian investments receiving more favourable treatment than the 
Investment. Unless the disadvantaged Canadian group (receiving the same treatment as the Investor) is smaller 
than the advantaged group, no discrimination cognizable under Article 1102 would exist.’ See Pope & Talbot, at 
para. 44. 
501 Pope & Talbot, paras 69-70. 
502 The investor would need ‘to ascertain whether there are any other American owned lumber producing 
companies among the more than 500 softwood lumber quota holders operating in Canada. If so, the treatment 
accorded those companies as a whole would have to be measured and then weighed against the predominant 
treatment, whatever that might mean, accorded Canadian companies operating in like circumstances. A violation of 
Article 1102 could then only be found if the differing treatment between the class of American investments and 
their Canadian competitors in like circumstances is “disproportionately” in favour of the domestic investments, 
whatever that might mean’. See Pope & Talbot, at para. 71. 
503 Ibid. 
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discrimination. In cases where such a finding is based on the adverse effect on the 
foreign investor, it may be justified on public policy grounds. The justification may be 
expressly provided for in the ‘general exceptions’ provisions of investment treaties, 
usually formulated on the basis of GATT, Article XX. However, since the use of these 
general exceptions provisions in international investment treaties is not common, 
tribunals have given relevance to public policy justifications even when no such 
general exceptions provision was included in the text of the underlying treaty. 
NAFTA tribunals have interpreted the ‘in like circumstances’ language in Article 
1102 as a de facto public policy justification mechanism. Accordingly, if the less 
favourable treatment afforded to a foreign investor vis-à-vis a domestic one may be 
justified on the basis that such differentiation is related to a legitimate public policy, 
then there is no violation of the NT obligation. This may be viewed as the second 
function of the phrase ‘in like circumstances’ in NAFTA, Article 1102 (the first one 
being the determination of the relevant comparator). In Myers, for example, the 
tribunal expressly noted that ‘the assessment of “like circumstance” must also take 
into account circumstances that would justify governmental regulations that treat them 
[i.e., a foreign investor and a domestic investor competing in the same business sector] 
differently in order to protect the public interest’.504  
Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada Award on Jurisdiction and admissibility finds that if a 
prima facie case is made under the three-part UPS v. Canada test,
505
 the host State 
can still show that there is no breach, because the discriminatory treatment identified 
is somehow justified, or that the discriminatory treatment is not sufficiently linked to 
nationality, but merely an incidental effect of the reasonable pursuit of domestic 
policy objectives, as the tribunal viewed that, 
                                                        
504 According to the tribunal, such interpretation conforms with the general principles emerging from the legal 
context of the NAFTA, including both its concern with the environmental concerns. See Myers, at paras 247-250. 
505 ‘The Tribunal notes that three distinct elements which an investor must establish in order to prove that a Party 
has acted in a manner inconsistent with its obligations under article 1102. These are: a) the foreign investor must 
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establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investment. b) The foreign investor or investment 
must be in like circumstances with local investors or investments: and c) The NAFTA Party must treat the foreign 
investor or investment less favourably than it treats the local investors or investments.’ See United Parcel Service 
of America, Inc. v. Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award on the Merits, Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. 
Cass, 24 May 2007, para. 83. 
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‘… once a prima facie case is made out under the three-part UPS test, the onus is on the 
host state to show that a measure is still sustainable within the terms of Article 1102. It is 
the host state that is in a position to identify and substantiate the case, in terms of its own 
laws, policies and circumstances, that an apparently discriminatory measure is in fact 
compliant with the “national treatment” norm set out in Article 1102.’
506
 
 
To sum up, national treatment is a viable and important cause of action in 
investment treaty cases. Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of the concept, 
however, it can be difficult to apply. The majority of tribunals agree that the national 
treatment obligation is directed at measures that distinguish on the basis of nationality. 
Moreover, it is well established that a claimant need not establish discriminatory 
intent, but that discriminatory effect will suffice to sustain a claim.
507
 Deciding 
whether a state has violated its national treatment obligation in a given case, however, 
requires an often-difficult assessment of whether it is appropriate to treat the allegedly 
less favoured entity differently.
508
 This assessment usually requires consideration of 
the kind of treatment accorded, in addition to analysing the competitive relationship 
between the two entities.
509
 The existence of a competitive relationship could be 
helpful for a national treatment claim, since most of the time the aggrieved entity will 
be in competition with the more favourable treatment entity. 
4.1.3 Trade Law’s Influence on Tribunal’s Interpretation of National Treatment 
As explained in previous sections, trade law’s focus on market access makes NT as 
one corn principle in the GATT, on efficiency concerns, namely preventing tariff 
concessions from circumvention. GATT national treatment ensures equal competitive 
opportunities. In contrast, investment law is about protecting investors, and its NT 
                                                        
506 William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton & Bilcon Delaware Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, PCA Case No.2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 17 March 2015, para. 723. 
507 Tribunals holding that it is not necessary to prove an intent to discriminate, but evidence of such intent will be 
considered. For example, in ADM v. Mexico, the Tribunal finds that ‘both the intent and effects of the measure 
show the discriminatory nature of the measure.’ See Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle 
Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award, 21 November 2007, 
para. 209-210. Similarly, S.D. Mayers v. Canada Partial Award holds that ‘intent to discriminate in favour of 
nationals over non-nationals will not give rise to a breach if the measure in question were to produce no adverse 
effect on the non-national complainant.’ See S.D. Myers v. Canada, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, para. 254. 
508 Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‘National Treatment’, in August Reinisch, ed., Standards of Investment Protection, 
Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 58. 
509 Id. 
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principle is to provide security and fairness to private foreign investors for their 
business operations.  
NAFTA Chapter 11 has been the most fertile source of decisions regarding 
national treatment obligations. As case-law decided by arbitral tribunals plays an 
important role in formulating international investment law, this section will be 
devoted to scrutinizing the often-different awards.  
As mentioned before, the most quoted method for discovering nationality-based 
discrimination was first suggested by the tribunal in the NAFTA case S.D. Myers v. 
Canada. The tribunal turned to WTO jurisprudence to examine the meaning of the 
word ‘like’ as it applied to the national treatment obligation found in NAFTA Article 
1102.
510
 The tribunal also highlighted language from the WTO Appellate Body’s 
ruling in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages that the ‘likeness determination’ is a 
‘discretionary decision’ whose definition is shaped by the legal context in which the 
phrase appears.
511
 Yet, the Tribunal chose not to borrow from the ‘likeness’ test 
developed by the WTO Appellate Body, which evaluates such claims on the basis of a 
multi-factor test. In rejecting the WTO’s approach, the Tribunal emphasized 
contextual differences between the treaties governing the WTO regime and the 
investment regime.
512
 
    The tribunal in the Pope & Talbot v. Canada dispute subsequently refined the 
analysis from S.D. Myers into a coherent ‘like circumstances’ test.513 Similarly, it is 
another case that shows the contextual differences between trade and investment 
regimes. In this case, Canada argued that in evaluating a claim of a de facto national 
treatment violation, an investment tribunal formed under NAFTA Chapter 11 ought to 
apply a ‘disproportionate advantage’ test.514 After analysing two WTO decisions 
                                                        
510 ‘In considering the meaning of “like circumstances” under Article 1102 of the NAFTA, it is similarly 
necessary to keep in mind the overall legal context in which the phrase appears.’ See Partial Award dated 
November 13, 2000 at para. 245. 
511 ‘The tribunal addresses that legal context first and then turns to the other facts of this case.’ Ibid., para. 247. 
512 Corn Products v. Mexico Decision on Responsibility cites Myers and Pope & Talbot in finding that it is 
necessary to consider the entire factual and legal context. See Corn Products International Inc. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/1, Decision on Responsibility, 15 January 2008, para. 118. 
513 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, paras 75-77. 
514 Ibid., para. 71.  
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(EC-Asbestos,
515
 and US-Malt Beverages
516
), the tribunal concluded that Canada 
misread the applicable WTO case law. In its ruling, the tribunal emphasized the 
vindication of the rights of individual entities within the investment regime and the 
lack of an emphasis on modifications to the conditions of competition.
517
 
Consequently, it rejected Canada’s proposal for the incorporation of a WTO 
jurisprudential concept. 
In subsequent cases, the arbitral tribunal continued to identify the different 
reasons for rejecting borrowing from WTO case law. In evaluating the national 
treatment claim in Occidental v. Ecuador, the tribunal suggested that ‘like situations’ 
were not limited to situations where the investor was competing with a domestic 
enterprise in the same sector. A key reason, the tribunal stressed, was because the 
WTO’s concern is with comparing ‘like products’ whereas the US-Ecuador BIT at 
issue in the case required a comparison of ‘like situations’. This textual difference, the 
tribunal concluded, required that it perform a broader analysis than that applied under 
WTO law.
518
 However, the Occidental tribunal’s understanding of GATT/WTO law 
was inadequate. There are national treatment norms that apply to services and 
intellectual property, and not only to goods, and this suggests a broader purpose for 
the national treatment obligation in the GATT/WTO system than reflected by the 
tribunal.
519
 
    A year later, in the Methanex dispute, an investment tribunal again considered 
the question of whether it ought to turn to WTO jurisprudence when evaluating a 
national treatment claim. The tribunal declared that, ‘it would be unwarranted for a 
                                                        
515 The Appellate Body stressed that finding less favourable treatment of imports is not simply a matter of 
identifying one single imported product that is banned and one like domestic product that is permitted. See 
Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos, para. 99, WT/DS135/R (adopted 5 
April 2001). 
516 Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23/R-39S/206 (adopted 19 
June, 1992). Rarely, it moved away from a strictly objective evaluation of likeness. The panel used an evaluation 
of a regulation’s “aim and effect” within the like-products analysis. 
517 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001, para. 78. 
518 Since “the purpose of national treatment in this dispute … is to avoid exporters being placed at a disadvantage 
in foreign markets because of indirect taxes paid in the country of origin,” the tribunal held that “no exporter ought 
to be put at a disadvantageous position as compared to other exporters.” The tribunal rejected the business or 
economic sector test within the regulatory context of VAT refunds. See Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA case No. UN3467, Final Award, 1 July 2004. Para. 175-176. 
519 See: Jürgen Kurtz, ‘The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its 
Discontents’, EJIL (2009), Vol. 20 No. 3, 749-771. 
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tribunal interpreting the provision to act as if they had, unless there were clear 
indications elsewhere in the text that, at best, the drafters wished to do so, or at least, 
that they were not opposed to doing so’.520 The award reads,  
 
In any event, the drafters did not insert the above italicized words in Article 1102; 
and it would be unwarranted for a tribunal interpreting the provision to act as if 
they had, unless there were clear indications elsewhere in the text that, at best, the 
drafters wished to do so or, at least, that they were not opposed to doing so. In fact, 
the intent of the drafters to create distinct regimes for trade and investment is 
explicit in Article 1139’s definition of investment.
521
 
 
    Therefore, although parties to investment disputes have invoked WTO 
jurisprudence, the investment tribunals apply a national treatment test that is 
significantly different from that applied by the trade regime. 
In addition, the extent to which tribunals recourse to WTO case-law, may vary 
according to the interpretative challenges they face, regarding the specific investment 
instruments they are applying.
522
 In a regional trade agreement (e.g., NAFTA), 
investment provisions are set within a broader scope of economic integration; whereas 
it is different situation when a tribunal faces a BIT between states of different levels 
of development or different political and economic systems.
523
 Under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31 and 32, the first duty of the treaty 
interpreter is fidelity to the treaty regime it is interpreting, including the context of 
that particular regime, the acquis of practice, and, to some extent, its negotiating 
history.
524
 
Lastly, this diversity in interpretation also provides an immensely useful learning 
ground, for policy makers aiming to improve the content of investment treaties. In this 
sense, within the investment context, there is a strong dialectic between the arbitral 
                                                        
520 See e.g., Joel Trachtman, ‘FDI and the Right to Regulate: Lessons from Trade Law,’ in UNCTAD, The 
Development Dimensions of FDI: Policy and Rule-making Perspectives, 189, UN Doc.UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4 
(2003), at 193, suggesting ‘caution regarding any efforts to transplant constraints on domestic regulation from the 
field of international trade law to the field of foreign investment law.’ Tribunal in Methanex v. United States, 
Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005), referred to textual differences. 
521 Methanex Corporation v. U.S., UNCITRAL, Final Award, 3 August, 2005. (Part IV, Chapter B, Paragraph 35.) 
522 Robert Howse and Efraim Chalamish, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: A Reply 
to Jürgen Kurtz, The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 20 no. 4, 2009. p. 1089. 
523 Id. 
524 Id. 
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jurisprudence on one hand, and political/legislative arm on the other. It indicates that 
states may learn from the jurisprudence and make changes to their investment policies 
and treaty-making. 
4.1.4 National Treatment Provision in Chinese BITs 
The BITs signed by China in recent years include relative standards (NT and MFN) 
and absolute standards (fair and equitable treatment).
525
 For instance, the 1986 
China-UK BIT was the first BIT signed by China that included NT. Its Article 3(3) 
stipulates that “either Contracting Party shall, to the extent possible, accord treatment 
in accordance with the stipulations of its laws and regulations to the investments of 
nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party the same as that accorded to its 
own nationals or companies.”  
    Since 2002, however, most of China’s new and renegotiated BITs have included 
provisions for full national treatment. Consider the BITs signed by China with 
Germany and France as examples. The early BITs, signed in 1983 and 1984, 
respectively, only provided MFN treatment for investors and activities relating to 
investment, while the 2003 China-Germany BIT and the 2007 China-France BIT 
include both MFN treatment and NT.  
In the newest BITs, the scope of MFN treatment and NT has also been expanded. 
In the 2003 China-Germany BIT, MFN treatment and NT are to be provided for 
“investments and activities associated with such investments”. 526  For NT, the 
“activities associated with such investments” are defined in the Protocol to the BIT to 
include “more particularly, but not exclusively… the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment and disposal of an investment,”527 whereas those activities for which MFN 
treatment shall be applicable are nowhere defined. In comparison, the 2004 
                                                        
525 In practice, the expressions “relative standards” and “absolute standards” are not used by BITs, but only reflect 
academic usage. In general, the difference between them is that relative standards focus on ensuring that each 
contracting party grants treatment to investments of nationals and companies of the other party on a basis relative 
to how it treats the investments of its own nationals and companies or those of a third country, while absolute 
standards focus on ensuring that treatment provided by either contracting party is consistent with the requirements 
of international law.  
526 See: 2003 China-Germany BIT, Article 3(2) and (3). 
527 See ibid., Protocol, para. 4(a). 
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China-Finland BIT explicitly provides that NT is applicable to “the operation, 
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, expansion, sale or other disposal of 
investments that have been made,” 528  whilst MFN treatment applies to “the 
establishment, acquisition, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
expansion, sale or other disposal of investments.”529 The 2004 China-Finland BIT 
and the 2009 China-Switzerland BIT also stipulate that investors have the right to 
enjoy whichever is the more favourable of NT or MFN treatment.
530
  
    One of the trends in the contemporary development of bilateral investment 
protection is the extension of the application of NT and MFN treatment to the 
pre-establishment phase of investment.
531
 Previously, BITs usually provided that they 
did not protect the investors’ interests in the pre-establishment phase, and that the host 
country could authorize foreign investments; set up the requirements for their 
establishment; or reserve some industries for domestic investors or those from a third 
country; without violating any obligations to provide NT and MFN treatment.
532
 
However, most contemporary BITs exclude these rights of the host country, which 
levels the playing field for foreign investors and domestic investors with regard to 
market access. In practice, China has extended the application of MFN treatment to 
the pre-establishment phase,
533
 but this is not yet the case for NT.  
    In addition, there are restrictions on the application of NT provisions. These 
include: (1) existing non-conforming measures; (2) the continuation and amendment 
of non-conforming measures, provided that such amendments do not increase the 
                                                        
528 Agreement between the Government of Finland and the Government of the People’s Republic China on the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Article 3(2). 
529 Ibid., Article 3(3). 
530 Ibid., Article 3(4); Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Article 4(3). 
531 For example, Article 3 and 4 of the 2012 US Model BIT extend NT and MFN treatment, respectively, “with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition 
of investments in its territory.” 
532 This was mainly due to the different levels of economic and technological development of individual countries. 
Compared with those from developed countries, enterprises in developing countries usually have lesser or no 
international competitiveness. In such a situation, according foreign investment NT for the market access phase 
may result in their superior status, and domestic industries will not be effectively protected. See Yu Jinsong, 
“Issues on national treatment for foreign investment of the market access phase in China’s development”, Jurist 
Review, Vol. 6, 2004 (in Chinese).  
533 Article 3(3) of the 2004 China-Finland BIT and Article 4(3) of the 2009 China-Switzerland BIT are examples 
of this. Article 5(1) of the 2009 China-ASEAN BIT is even more explicit, extending MFN treatment to “admission, 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, maintenance, use, liquidation, sale, and 
other forms of disposal of investments.” 
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degree of non-conformity; and (3) measures that would not fall into the NT 
obligations of an existing BIT that a party has concluded.
534
 This having been 
stipulated, the parties are under an obligation to progressively remove the 
non-conforming measures.
535
 
4.2 Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Treatment 
The MFN principle has applied to all the WTO Agreements covering trade in goods, 
trade in services, intellectual property, and non-tariff barriers. With regard to 
international investment, the MFN clause can be found in literally every BIT and FTA, 
as well as in the treaties and agreements on intellectual property. The MFN is 
embodied in international treaties and agreements. However, its interpretation is 
sometimes divergent. According to the publication by the UN’s International Law 
Commission of the Draft Articles on MFN clauses, MFN treatment is defined as 
follows: 
 
“Most-favoured-nation treatment is treatment accorded by the granting State to the 
beneficiary State, or to persons or things in a determined relationship with that State, not 
less favourable than treatment extended by the granting State to a third State or to 
persons or things in the same relationship with that third State.”
536
 
     
In the WTO, the scope of MFN is wider: customs themselves are covered and any 
measures affecting trade are covered. 
The MFN provision is a generalizing provision. If a country has guaranteed a 
particular kind of treatment to investment in any of its BITs, then, at least in the case 
of substantive treatment it has guaranteed that treatment to investment covered by any 
BIT with an MFN treatment provision.
537
 
                                                        
534 China-New Zealand FTA, Article 141. 
535 The China-New Zealand FTA does not provide specifically what may constitute a non-conforming measure. It 
instead incorporates the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures mutatis 
mutandis. See id. 
536 Article 5 of UN Report of the International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, 
July 1978. “Granting State” means a state which has undertaken to accord MFN treatment while “beneficiary 
State” means a state to which a granting state has undertaken to accord such status. 
537 Some tribunals have held that the term ‘treatment’ in the MFN treatment provision does not apply to 
procedural provisions in BIT. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, p. 350. 
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If a country has entered into an economic integration agreement and hopes to 
extend special preferences to investments from other members, it can address this 
wish through a specific exception to the MFN treatment provision. 
One difficulty presented by an MFN treatment provision is that it potentially 
creates the ‘free-rider problem’. One way to address the free rider problem, apart from 
specific exceptions to limit the range of agreements, is to adopt a conditional MFN 
treatment provision. Under a conditional MFN treatment provision, a country enjoys 
benefits granted by its treaty partner to third countries only if that country grants the 
same benefits to its treaty partner. Such a provision, however, reduces to some degree 
the generalizing effect of an MFN treatment provision. BITs rarely use conditional 
MFN treatment provisions. 
    In the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), the OECD Member States 
agreed to the suspension of the negotiations in 1998 to include the MFN and NT 
standards in the Draft Agreement as follows: 
 
[…] each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting Party and to their 
investments, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords [in like circumstances] 
to investors of any other Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
and sale or other disposition of investments.
538
 
 
    Despite it being the very common practice throughout the 19
th
 century to include 
MFN treatment in treaties relating to bilateral economic relations, there is no 
customary obligation on states to grant MFN treatment according to the predominant 
position.
539
 Economic theory, especially in the field of trade, has shown that 
liberalization, even unilaterally, is more likely to lead to increased welfare and hence 
often recommends unconditional MFN treatment. Conditional MFN treatment, 
therefore, is a right to obtain the more favourable treatment upon the condition to do 
the same (reciprocity). MFN clauses found in new BITs are unconditional, but they 
may be limited in scope and subject to exceptions. 
                                                        
538 MAI draft. 
539 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 351. 
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4.2.1 Defining ‘Unconditional’ MFN 
Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 requires that any advantage granted by a WTO 
member to imports from, or exports to, any country must be granted ‘immediately and 
unconditionally’ to imports from, or exports to, all other WTO members. 
According to the Panel in Indonesia—Autos (1998), the requirement to accord an 
advantage ‘unconditionally’ means that such advantage: 
 
cannot be made conditional on any criteria that [are] not related to the imported product 
itself.
540
 
 
The Panel in Canada—Autos (2000) rejected the interpretation of Article I:1 
advocated in this case the complainant, Japan. According to Japan’s interpretation the 
term ‘unconditionally’ in Article I:1 must be interpreted to mean that subjecting an 
advantage to conditions not related to the imported product itself is per se inconsistent 
with Article I:1.
541
 The panel in Canada—Autos (2000) ruled that: 
 
Whether conditions attached to an advantage granted in connection with the 
importation of a product offend Article I:1 depends upon whether or not such 
conditions discriminate with respect to the origin of products. 
 
In another panel report, the reports on Colombia—Ports of Entry (2009), the 
panel explicitly referred to the interpretation of the term ‘unconditionally’ in the panel 
report on Canada—Autos (2000).542 The panel in Colombia—Ports of Entry (2009) 
stated: 
[T]he panel reiterates the view expressed in Canada –Autos that conditions attached to an 
advantage granted in connection with the importation of a product will violate Article I:1 
when such conditions discriminate with respect to the origin of products.
543
 
4.2.2 Applying MFN Clause in Investment Treaties 
The clauses relating to MFN treatment in BITs have only recently raised certain 
questions (in the 20
th
 century), concerning the scope of the MFN; that is, whether the 
                                                        
540 Panel Report, Indonesia—Autos (1998), para. 14.143. 
541 See Panel Report, Canada—Autos (2000), para.10.29. 
542 See Panel Report, Colombia—Ports of Entry (2009), paras. 7.362-7.366. 
543 Panel Report, Colombia—Ports of Entry (2009), para. 7.366. 
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clause also applies to procedural rights (dispute settlement). The following section 
will try to classify the existing awards and opinions relating to the proper application 
of MFN clauses in investment agreements. 
    The MFN clause was rediscovered in the context of international investment 
arbitration, following the decision of an arbitral tribunal in the case of Maffezini v 
Spain in 2000.
544
 Since then, a number of tribunals have had to address the issue of 
the correct application and interpretation of the MFN clause.
545
 The following 
provides a very short overview of the most relevant cases with respect to their 
contribution to the discussion on MFN. 
    Maffezini v Spain: An Argentinian investor in Spain requested the application of 
the MFN clause contained in Article IV(2) of the Spain-Argentina BIT to benefit from 
the allegedly more favourable provision in the Chile-Argentina BIT (This stipulated 
for no waiting period of 18 months until an arbitral tribunal could be seized). The 
tribunal rejected Spain’s argument that the application of the MFN clause was limited 
to substantive matters or material aspects of the treatment granted to investors, and 
therefore did not cover procedural or jurisdictional questions.
546
 
    In Tecmed v Mexico, a Spanish investor tried to overcome jurisdictional 
limitations ratione temporis by invoking a MFN clause in the Mexico-Spain BIT 
(1995), and then borrowing the more generous clause of temporal scope in the BIT 
between Mexico and Austria (1998). The ICSID Tribunal did not allow the retroactive 
application of substantive standards as contained in this treaty with a third party   
“[…] because it deemed that matters relating to the application over time of the 
Agreement […] due to their significance and importance, go to the core of matters that 
must be deemed to be specifically negotiated by the Contracting Parties.”
547
 
 
    In MTD v Chile, a Malaysian company had invoked the MFN clause contained in 
                                                        
544 Maffezini v Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, paras 53. 
545 For an overview of the case law see M. F. Houde and F. Pagani, ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment in 
International Investment Law,’ in OECD (ed.), International Investment Law: A Changing Landscape—A 
Companion Volume to International Investment Perspectives (2005), Chapter 4. 
546 See P. Acconci, ‘Most-Favoured Nation Treatment and International Law on Foreign Investment’, in P. 
Muchlinski, F. Orrino, and C. Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, Section 1. 
547 Ténicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v the United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 
29 May 2003, para. 69. 
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the Chile-Malaysia BIT in order to benefit from two other BITs concluded by Chile 
with Denmark and Croatia. These contained more detailed treaty language on fair and 
equitable treatment. The tribunal agreed to incorporate the provisions of the Croatian 
and Danish treaties into the Treaty between Malaysia and Chile by the ‘wide scope’ of 
the latter treaty’s MFN clause,—and further deemed this importation to be ‘in 
consonance with’ the purpose of the Chile-Malaysia BIT.548 
    In Siemens v Argentina, the investor, the German company Siemens, invoked the 
more favourable terms of a bilateral investment treaty between Argentina and Chile, 
(which permitted the absence of a waiting period of 18 months before an arbitral 
tribunal could be seized), through the MFN clause contained in the 
Argentina-Germany BIT. Argentina argued that Siemens failed to exhaust the 
18-month period, set out in the Argentina-Germany BIT, for recourse to local courts, 
before turning to international arbitration. The arbitral tribunal determined that the 
relevant MFN clause allowed the investor to choose more favourable dispute 
settlement provisions from various other agreements.
549
  
    Salini v Jordan: The Italian investor invoked the MFN clause in the BIT between 
Jordan and Italy to benefit from more favourable dispute settlement provisions in the 
BITs with the US and the UK. In the view of the claimant, the US and UK treaties 
contained a dispute settlement clause ‘which is more favourable than that contained in 
Article 9 of the Jordan-Italy BIT’, by its supposed inclusion of contractual breaches. 
The relevant MFN clause was silent on the question of the application of MFN to the 
dispute settlement process; accordingly, the tribunal rejected the claimants’ contention 
that the MFN clause should be interpreted so as to apply to procedural matters.
550
 
    The dynamic nature of the MFN clause is intended to operate only in situations 
where a treatment occurs in ‘like situations’ or ‘like circumstances’. When it comes to 
the application of the MFN clause in the basic treaty to invoke the application of a 
                                                        
548 MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd and MTD Chile S.A v Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 
2004, para. 103.  
549 Siemens A.G. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, 
para. 120. 
550  Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 November 2004. 
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specific treatment provision in a third party treaty, this principle is normally referred 
to as the ‘Ejusdern Generis’ principle.551 It is normally understood to mean that the 
third party must, in principle, regulate the same subject-matter as the basic treaty, 
otherwise the specific treatment standard would be taken out of its context and thus 
not be accorded in ‘like circumstances’. No other rights can be claimed under an 
MFN clause than those falling within the limits of the subject matter of the clause.  
    Some MFN clauses are very general in scope. A typical example is the clause in 
the Spain-Argentina BIT, as it was at stake in the Maffezini decision. Article IV(2) of 
the Argentina-Spain BIT is relatively open or unspecific with regard to the exact 
scope of the MFN clause: 
“In all matters subject to this Agreement, this treatment shall not be less favourable than 
that extended by each Party to the investments made in its territory by investors of a 
third country.”
552
 
 
    Certain MFN clauses go further in their explicitness to define the types of 
situations in which the treatment is subject to the MFN standard. For example, the 
NAFTA includes not only the ‘management, conduct, operation, and sale or other 
disposition of investments’, but also their ‘establishment, acquisition, expansion’, and 
thus extends MFN treatment to market access or establishment, (i.e., rights normally 
related to the pre-establishment phase of foreign direct investment). The extension of 
the MFN clause is limited to certain operations (including pre-establishment rights) 
and only applies in ‘like situations’. 
    It is possible to include an additional MFN standard in a specific treaty provision 
thereby limiting the scope of this particular provision to the specific standard. Some 
BITs, such as certain treaties negotiated by the UK, clearly specify that their MFN 
treatment clauses are to be also applied to dispute settlement. The ICSID tribunal in 
Maffezini v Spain noted, however, that such clear intention, explicitly mentioned in 
the text, was not very common as far as investment treaties were concerned.
553
 As a 
                                                        
551  Andreas R. Ziegler, Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Treatment, in August Reinisch, (ed.), Standards of 
Investment Protection, Oxford University Press, 2008, P. 10. 
552 Argentina-Spain BIT, Art. IV(2). 
553 Maffezini v Spain, para. 42. 
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consequence, several states have started to prefer to clearly state, in the negotiating 
history or in the agreement itself, what should be exempted from the application of an 
MFN clause. 
4.3 Market Access 
Investment treaties have dealt with the entry of foreign investment from a home to a 
host country using one of two models. The ‘admission’ model—also sometimes 
referred to as the ‘investment-control’ model—is found in traditional BITs initially 
concluded by European countries and followed by the vast majority of developing 
countries.
554
 Over 90 per cent of the BITs concluded to date follow the admission 
model approach. Under this model, the host country does not grant positive rights of 
entry and establishment to investors from the other contracting party. It may apply any 
admission procedures for foreign investment and determine the conditions under 
which foreign investment will be allowed to enter and operate in the country. 
    The other approach that has been used consistently by counties seeking to 
liberalize conditions for the entry and operation of their investors, in addition to 
ensuring their protection, is the ‘pre-establishment’ or ‘combined National Treatment 
and Most-Favoured-Nation’ treatment model.555 Under this model, foreign investors 
are granted NT (‘treatment no less favorable than that accorded to nationals engaged 
in the same line of business as the foreign investor’) and MFN treatment (‘treatment 
no less favorable than that accorded to other foreign investors in the same line of 
business’) regarding the entry and establishment of the investment. This approach is 
found in BITs concluded by Canada and the US. 
a) Admission Model 
Treaties following the admission model encourage the parties to promote 
favourable investment conditions between them, but leave the conditions of entry and 
establishment up to the discretion (i.e., laws and regulations) of each country. Foreign 
                                                        
554 Anna Jobin-Bret, Admission and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protection, in August Reinisch 
(ed.), Standards of Investment Protection, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 10. 
555 E.g., Articles 10.3, 10.4 Peru-United States Trade Promotion Agreement (2006). 
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investors will face risk and uncertainty, since the laws and regulations relating to the 
entry of foreign investment may change over time. There is no guarantee as to a 
certain level of entry conditions, or to the elimination of discriminatory regulations 
which affect the establishment of foreign investment (unless the BIT states 
otherwise). 
    However, once admitted, foreign investment is granted full national treatment 
and MFN treatment. Treaties using the admission model do not contain specific 
exceptions (closed sectors, operational conditions, entry requirements, etc.) to MFN 
and National Treatment, as the entry and establishment of foreign investment is at the 
complete discretion of the host country, there is no need for such exceptions. 
b) MFN only 
Some BITs, despite containing an admission clause, also provide some rights, 
namely MFN treatment, to investors at the pre-establishment state. For example, the 
BIT between China and Finland grants no right of entry beyond rights included in the 
domestic legislation of the parties but grants MFN in the pre-establishment phase. 
c) Pre-establishment Model 
National Treatment and MFN treatment are granted at all stages of the lifespan of 
an investment: establishment, acquisition and expansion, management, use, conduct, 
operation, sale, and other disposition of the investment. The term ‘establishment’ or 
‘acquisition,’ is defined in the pre-establishment phase, when the investor is still 
seeking to make, or in the process of making, investments. It is also defined in some 
cases where ‘expansion’ requires special approval procedures. 
    Essentially, under this model, each host state accepts, to a certain extent, a limit 
on its sovereignty to regulate foreign investment. However, this is subject to the right 
of host states to adopt or maintain exceptions to this general commitment. Thus, in 
contrast to the admission model, BITs using the pre-establishment model include lists 
of exceptions (‘negative lists’) to National Treatment and MFN treatment. A variation 
of this is the ‘positive list’ approach, whereby National Treatment and MFN are only 
granted for certain enumerated sectors or activities. 
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4.3.1 “In accordance with domestic laws” Provision in Investment Treaties 
The question here is whether the protection afforded by a BIT is subject to the 
admission requirements in accordance with the laws and regulations of the host 
country. First, the reference to the laws and regulations of the host state may also be 
found in some treaties in the articles on ‘Definitions’ or on the ‘Scope of application.’ 
For example, the BIT between China and Luxemburg states that: 
 
“[t]he term investment means every kind of assets invested by investors of one 
Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and regulations of the other Contracting 
Party in the territory of the latter, …”
556
 
 
In some treaties, a reference to the laws and regulations of the host country can also 
be found in a separate article defining the scope of the application of the treaty. For 
example, the China and Peru BIT states: 
 
“This Agreement shall apply to the investments which are made prior to or after its entry 
into force by investors of either Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and 
regulations of the other Contracting Party in the territory of the Latter.”
557
 
  
Similarly, the China-Mexico BIT states: 
 
This Agreement shall apply to investments made after the entry into force of this 
Agreement by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting 
Party, as well as to investments made in accordance with the applicable laws of the 
Contracting Parties and existing at the entry into force of this Agreement. However, the 
provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to claims arising out of events which occurred, 
or to claims which had been settled, prior to its entry into force.
558
 
 
a) Definition of Investment in Chinese BITs: the Illustration List 
     
In all Chinese BITs, the general definition of investment is supplemented by an 
                                                        
556 Article 1(2), China-Luxemburg BIT. 
557 China-Peru BIT, Article 11. 
558 China-Mexico BIT, Article 29 [Application of the Agreement]. 
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illustrative list of particular assets covered by the BIT. Typically, Chinese BITs 
include five categories: investment, namely movable and immovable property; 
interests in companies; contractual rights; intellectual property rights; and business 
concessions. The exceptions to the illustrative list are the China-Poland BIT and 
China-Bulgaria BIT, which include the first four categories of investment but exclude 
business concessions. 
Article 135 of the China-New Zealand FTA (2008) makes progress in trying to 
draw a distinction between investment and trade debts. The FTA lists ‘…(f) bonds, 
including government issued bonds, debentures, loans and other forms of debts, and 
rights derived therefrom’559 as a separate category of investment, parallel to normal 
company participation in the form of shares and stocks. It continues clarifying this 
loan and debts clause by adding in a footnote that: 
 
“Loans and other forms of debt, which have been registered with the competent 
authority of a party, do not mean trade debts where the debts would be non-interest 
earning if paid on time without penalty.”
560
 
     
    This qualification, therefore, helps to avoid certain unintended claims to be 
brought under the protection of a BIT. The China-Gabon BIT defines investment to 
include every kind of investment invested directly or indirectly by the investors of one 
party in the territory of the other party, in accordance with its laws and regulations.  
    The revised China-Germany BIT (2003) also refers to ‘invested directly and 
indirectly’ but omits the ‘in accordance with its laws and regulations’ requirement. 
Moreover, the BIT includes an explanation on ‘invested indirectly’, which reads: 
 
“…invested indirectly’ means invested by an investor of one Contracting Party through a 
company which is fully or partially owned by the investor and having its seat in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party.”
561
 
 
This treaty thus clarifies that investment made by foreign investment enterprises 
                                                        
559 China-New Zealand FTA, Article 135. 
560 Id. 
561 The Protocol to the 2003 Germany BIT, Ad Art 1. 
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in China that are fully or partially owned by German investors are also investments 
covered by the BIT. The China-Portugal BIT (2005) also adopts the concept of 
‘investment invested directly and indirectly’ in the definition of investment but does 
not further define the meaning of investment indirectly. The China-Spain BIT (2005) 
does not refer to ‘investment invested directly and indirectly’, but nevertheless has a 
provision which effectively covers ‘indirect investment’, as defined in the 2003 
Germany BIT. The provision reads:  
 
‘Investments made in the territory of one Contracting Party by any company of that same 
Contracting Party which is actually owned or controlled by investors of the other 
Contracting Party shall likewise be considered as investments of investors of the latter 
Contracting Party if they have been in accordance with the laws and regulations of the 
former Contracting Party.’
562 
 
The introduction of the ‘foreign control’ test serves to expand the coverage of the BIT. 
    Most Chinese treaties, however, do not have a separate clause dealing with the 
scope of application of the treaty. They will define investment, investors, and the 
other key terms of the treaty, whereas the admission clause is the only substantive 
provision which both describes the laws and regulations of the host state, and gives 
them a determining role to permit investment. 
    Many North American treaties use the denial of benefits clause to precisely deny 
the benefits of the treaty to certain categories of investments. Alternatively, the same 
can be achieved by the reference to laws and regulations of the host state in the 
admission model BIT, where the protection does not need to be denied because it must 
be granted positively. In the admission model approach, it is only after the admission 
of the investment that the investor will enjoy the full benefits of the BIT.  
    The relevant question is to identify the laws and regulations that are referred to in 
the treaties, relating to admission of investments by foreign investors. Almost all 
countries have legislation specifically addressing investments by foreign investors, in 
the form of investment laws, exchange control regulations, and specific procedural 
requirements such as permits, licenses, authorizations, and registrations.  
                                                        
562 China-Spain BIT (2005), Art 1(1). Emphasis added. 
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    In addition, to the specific, substantive, and procedural rules and conditions to 
the quality, entry, and operation of a foreign investor, all the laws and regulations of 
the host country will apply to the investor, as they would to any other economic actor 
in the host country. Foreign investors will be subjected to the general legal framework 
consisting of tax laws, environmental laws, and intellectual property laws, etc. They 
have to abide by these laws and regulations like any other national economic operator. 
 
     
b) Domestic Legislation on Foreign Investment (in China) 
 
In order to choose the proper ‘category’ of investment, a foreign investor may check 
China’s domestic legislation on foreign investment in China. The two key documents 
are “the Guidance on the Direction of Foreign Investment” (Investment Guidance) 
and its attached “Guiding Catalogue of Industries for Foreign Investment” (Guiding 
Catalogue). The Department of Treaty and Law of China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM)
563
 first issued the Investment Guidance in 2002 and the Guiding 
Catalogue in 2007 (updated in 2012). 
    The Guidance and the Catalogue classify all the foreign investment projects into 
four sub-catalogues: Encouraged, Restricted, Prohibited, and Permitted. The 
Encouraged, Restricted and Prohibited industries are specifically defined while all 
others are classified as Permitted industries by default. Foreign Investment Projects 
(FIPs) in the Encouraged Catalogue may enjoy taxation incentives.
564
 By contrast, 
FIPs in the Restricted Catalogue are subject to certain restrictions, sometimes 
depending on the modes of investment. 
    There are three modes of foreign investment in China: Equity Join-Ventures 
(EJVs)
565
, Contract Join Ventures (CVJs)
566
, and Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises 
                                                        
563 Department of Treaty and Law of China’s Ministry of Commerce [hereinafter MOFCOM], taking charge of 
Chinese investment treaty’s negotiation. 
564 Their imported equipment can continue to enjoy the exemption of import duties and import VAT, and their 
purchase of domestically produced equipment can enjoy rebate of VAT. 
565 A joint venture, may be an Equity Joint Venture, under which the rights and obligations of the JV partners are 
divided in accordance with the equity (shares) they possess. See: The Law of Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures, 
adopted on 1 July 1979. 
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(WFEs)
567
. This section will explore how China has revised these laws. 
An Equity Joint Venture (EJV) is a joint venture set up by foreign firms in 
conjunction with Chinese firms within the territory of China. The joint venture 
agreement, a contract between the joint investors, which is subject to approval by the 
government, is the legal basis of the venture that stipulates the rights and obligations 
of the parties. An EJV takes the legal form of a Limited Liability Company (LLC). 
Each party can contribute capital in cash, or, in industrial or property rights. There is 
no ceiling on the proportion of foreign investment, but there is a minimum capital 
contribution requirement consisting of twenty-five percent of the registered capital. 
The parties share the profits, risks, and losses in proportion with their respective 
contribution to the registered capital. The Board of Directors, the Chairman of which 
may be Chinese or foreign, shall decide all the major policies in the venture, while the 
day to day operations are under the charge of its general manager. The features of an 
EJV are: a joint contribution of investment; joint management; and a share of risks, 
profits and losses in proportion to capital contributions. 
    A Contract Joint Venture (CJV) is another form of a joint venture in China. It is 
established jointly by a Chinese partner and a foreign partner by contributing cash, 
materials, industrial property, and know-how, or other kinds of investment, though 
these contributions are not necessarily represented by shares.
568
 Consequently, the 
partners do not have to share the profits and losses in precise proportion to their 
contributions as in an EJV, but they agree on a way of sharing in their contract
569
. 
Also, there is no minimum or maximum requirement of foreign investment proportion. 
If it is qualified to be a judicial person, it may take the form of a limited liability 
company. Otherwise, it could carry out the co-operation on an individual basis, with 
unlimited liability.
570
 
                                                                                                                                                              
566 A Contract Joint Venture, may be a contractual joint venture, under which everything is defined by the JV 
contract between the partners. See: The Law of Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures, adopted on 13 April, 1988. 
567 A wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFE) is an enterprise established in China with capital solely invested by 
one or more foreigners. WFEs are excluded or restricted in certain fields, as stipulated in the Investment Guidance 
and the Guiding Catalogues. See Art. 2, the WFEL. The Law of Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises was adopted 
on 12 April 1986, and last revised on 12 April 2001. 
568 The Chinese –Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures law (CJVL), Article 2 & 8,  
569 Ibid, Art. 22. 
570 Ibid. Art. 2 
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    Moreover, the decision-making body of the joint venture may be a joint 
management committee or a Board of Directors with the Chairman being either a 
Chinese or foreign partner
571
. Alternatively, the joint ventures might entrust a third 
party to manage the joint venture.
572
 
A Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise (WFE) is an enterprise established in China, 
with capital solely invested by one or a few foreigners, excluding branches or offices 
which foreign enterprises, or other organizations, have in China.
573
 A WFE is 
required to be beneficial to the development of the Chinese Economy and to be able 
to achieve remarkable economic consequences.
574
 
Furthermore, WFEs are excluded or restricted in certain fields, as stipulated in 
the Investment Guidance
575
 and the Guiding Catalogues. Once a WFE is approved 
and established, it can enjoy an autonomy of management according to its approved 
Articles of Association, free from any intervention.
576
 
4.3.2 China’s Opening Market: Adopt a “Negative List” in Shanghai Free Trade 
Zone 
In the Shanghai Free Trade Zone, China has practiced a unilateral market opening 
model by adopting a “negative list”. This policy is to grant national treatment at the 
pre-establishment stage of an investment. China has agreed to switch from a positive 
list (where permitted investments are exhaustively enumerated), to a negative list 
(where only the sectors where foreign investment is prohibited are listed, the rest 
being libera terra). 
China had used a positive list for decades, according to its Catalogue of 
Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment (‘Catalogue’), which delineated the sectors 
where foreign investment was encouraged, allowed, and prohibited. This positive list 
system was coupled with a post-establishment national treatment protection— (i.e., 
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575 Art 8, Investment Guidance. 
576 Art.11, the WFEL. 
154 
NT only after approval by the Chinese administration). 
Before, China directed more of its attention to the role of the host country, while 
currently, in China, it has become more acceptable to have a higher-level protection 
for investors and for reducing limits on access. China adopted the Negative List 
Approach in the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone in September 2014. China has a 
range of laws and regulations that govern FDI, including basic laws and one Guiding 
Directory.  
    In 2001, China made a radical commitment to liberalize services in its accession 
to the World Trade Organization. This commitment caused a change of FDI in the 
2000s, from manufacturing to service industries. China’s WTO accession commitment 
still adopted a Positive List Approach (GATS model) that included limits on sectors 
and regions, which was included and reflected later in the revised Guiding Directory. 
The current (2015) version of the Guiding Directory lists three catalogues 
(encouraged, restricted and prohibited). The last three decades have witnessed China’s 
efforts to shorten the restrictive and prohibited lists, and to facilitate administration 
procedures by decentralizing approval powers; eliminating or simplifying documents 
and other measures.  
    Although China has attempted to streamline foreign investment administration, 
the substantive general requirements for approval have not been modified. All of the 
deregulation attempts by the government have been mainly concerned with delegating 
some approval authority to the local governments because the revision of the Guiding 
Directory did not result in any major liberalization. For example, the 2015 Negative 
List retains the same eighteen industrial sector categories that were restricted or 
prohibited from foreign investment in the 2013 List.
577
 
4.4 Performance Requirements 
                                                        
577 That is: agriculture/forestry/animal husbandry/fishery, mining, manufacturing, electricity/heating/gas and water 
production and supply, construction, wholesale and retail, transportation/warehousing/postal service, information 
transmission/software/information technology (IT) services, finance, real estate, leasing and business services, 
scientific research and technology services, water conservation/environmental/public facility management, 
education, health and social work, and culture/sports/entertainment. 
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Related to the issue of the entry or establishment of investment is the ability of the 
host country to impose conditions on that entry. One type of condition that host 
countries often impose is a ‘performance requirement’ on an investment project. As a 
condition of entry, such requirements on an investment project may include: exporting 
a certain proportion of its production; restricting its imports to a certain level; or 
purchasing a minimum quantity of local goods and services. Although most 
investment treaties have not dealt with the question of performance requirements, the 
NAFTA specifically provides that no NAFTA party may impose any one of seven 
defined performance requirements in connection with the ‘establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct or operation of an investment…’578 
The Investment Chapter of the China-New Zealand FTA (2009) is the first 
Chinese investment agreement that explicitly prohibits the use of performance 
requirements by incorporating the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures. 
    As Article 9 [Performance Requirements] in the China-Canada BIT (2012) 
states, 
“The Contracting Parties reaffirm their obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), as amended from time to time. Article 2 and the Annex of the TRIMs 
are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement.” 
 
    In a similar vein, Article 7 [Prohibition of Performance Requirements] in the 
China-Japan-Korea TIA states that, 
 
“1.The provision of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures in Annex 1A of the WTO 
Agreement are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement, mutatis mutandis and shall apply 
with respect to all investments under this Agreement. 
2. No Contracting Party shall, in its territory, impose unreasonable or discriminatory measures on 
investment by investors of another Contracting Party concerning performance requirements on export 
or transfer of technology.” 
 
Countries permit foreign investment to access their domestic markets as they regard 
                                                        
578 Article 1106 of the NAFTA, 
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foreign investment capable of bringing prosperity to their economy.
579
 For example, 
FDI can bring new technology and expertise into the host state; FDI can also develop 
trade links, particularly for exports, which will generate foreign exchange and balance 
of payments. By contrast, many countries are sceptical about FDI and thus impose 
certain requirements, often known as performance requirements, on foreign 
investment as a condition of granting access to their economy. These requirements are 
intended to ensure that foreign investment operates in a way that contributes to 
economic development and prosperity. 
    A small number of BITs contain prohibitions on performance requirements. 
Typically, no definition of the term “performance requirements” appears in a BIT. 
Prohibited performance requirements usually are host-state restrictions on the use of 
inputs and outputs by investments. Examples include local hiring requirement, 
domestic content requirements, import restrictions, technology transfer requirements, 
and export requirements. BITs that prohibit performance requirements most often 
prohibit only those requirements that are included in an exhaustive list. Those 
performance requirements not on the list are permitted. 
    Two justifications will be addressed to understand the reasons why prohibitions 
on performance requirements exist. The first is that such requirements interfere with 
the investor’s control of the investment.  
    For foreign direct investment, one key difference from the portfolio is that the 
former provides control over the enterprise to the investor. Performance requirements 
represent a limited diminution of that control. 
    Some investors accept performance requirements in exchange for some 
incentives (e.g., tax incentives). The investor has thus bargained away control. The 
investor will calculate the cost of the performance requirements and conclude that the 
benefits received from the incentives exceed the costs imposed by the requirements. 
However, some BITs prohibit certain performance requirements, even though 
investors might sometimes accept that particular requirement. Thus, the loss of 
                                                        
579 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation, Oxford University 
Press, 2010, p.419. 
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control is not the sole justification for a performance requirement prohibition.  
    A second justification for the prohibition on performance requirements is that 
they are trade distorting. Performance requirements can restrict international trade 
since they often regulate the source or use of inputs, or the destination of outputs. 
Performance requirements thus have an impact, not merely on the covered investment, 
but on international trade flows.  
    As a result of their trade distorting character, certain performance requirements 
are also prohibited by the TRIMs. The TRIMs agreement applies to performance 
requirements that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment or the 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions in the GATT. 
    The 2012 US Model Negotiating Text, at Article 8, prohibits certain performance 
requirements whether imposed on investment or accepted by the investment in 
exchange for a benefit. Such performance requirements include local content 
requirements, restrictions on imports, and restrictions on local sales.  
    In addition, the 2012 model prohibits export requirements and technology 
transfer requirements, when imposed by the government, but allows them if accepted 
as a condition of receiving a benefit. The 2012 US Model BIT also includes a number 
of exceptions in the text and allows the parties to reserve the right to maintain or 
adopt other exceptions, by specifying them in an annex to the treaty.  
    The performance requirements provision has been the subject of very few 
international arbitrations. All three publicly available awards involving the 
performance requirements provision were issued in cases arising under the NAFTA. 
These awards suggest that tribunals are giving a literal reading to the performance 
requirements provision, applying it only to requirements that are explicitly included in 
the exhaustive list.  
    Given that the list in the NAFTA is exhaustive and given the specific nature of 
the language, a literal approach would seem appropriate. In Pope & Talbot v. 
Canada,
580
 the claimant challenged a Canadian measure that required payment of a 
                                                        
580  Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award on Merits – Phase one, 26 June 2000, pp.22-27. 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada_pope.htm. 
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fee for softwood lumber exports that exceeded the exporter’s assigned quota. The 
measure had been adopted by Canada pursuant to an agreement with the US to limit 
softwood lumber exports. The tribunal found the measure not to fall within the terms 
of any of the prohibited performance requirements. More specifically, the measure did 
not require the claimant to export a given level or percentage of its product. In fact, 
the measure limited exports. It also did not restrict the claimant’s sales in Canadian 
territory.
581
 
    In SD. Myers v. Canada,
582
 the claimant, a US company, sought to export toxic 
substances known as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from Canada to the US, where 
it had a facility engaged in the business of disposing of PCBs. Canada imposed a ban 
on the export of PCBs in order to preserve the business of PCB disposal for Canadian 
companies. The claimant argued that this prohibition, in substance, amounted to a 
violation of the NAFTA’s prohibition on performance requirements583  to utilize 
domestic content or purchase local goods or services. The tribunal held, however, that 
an export ban clearly was neither a domestic content requirement, nor a requirement 
to purchase local goods or services.
584
 
    In ADF Group v. US.,
585
 the US conceded that its law requiring that the steel 
used in federally funded highway construction projects be of US origin was a 
domestic content performance requirement under the NAFTA. Nevertheless, the 
tribunal found, as the US argued, that the requirement did not violate the performance 
requirement provision of the NAFTA because the NAFTA contains an exception to 
the performance requirements prohibition for measures relating to government 
procurement. 
4.5 Exception Clauses 
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The exceptions to the application of the national treatment and MFN standards also 
affect the scope of the relevant non-discrimination obligations. Many specific 
exceptions are potentially applicable to both standards, but further specific exceptions 
are required to limit MFN treatment, with its possibility to create ‘free rider’ 
situations. Systematic exceptions include, usually, the Regional Economic Integration 
Organization exception, and exceptions with respect to taxation, which are designed 
precisely to avoid such free-riding. There may also be country-specific exceptions 
which may restrict access to specific sectors of the economy or grandfather 
non-conforming measures, though these exceptions can very much depend on whether 
the relevant standards are also supposed to cover the pre-establishment stage of the 
investment. 
General exceptions may exclude certain measures from the scope of application 
of the non-discrimination standard, and other standards of treatment, along the lines 
of general exceptions in the GATT and the GATS. However, the inclusion of such 
general exceptions is relatively rare. 
4.5.1 Essential Security Interests Exception 
Some BITs include an exception for measures necessary to preserve a party’s 
essential security interests.
586
 Such provisions may contain limitations that state, for 
instance, that any measures should be reasonable and non-discriminatory,
587
 or that 
the exception shall not apply to expropriation or to war and civil disturbance 
provisions.
588
 An essential security exception appeared in the GATT.
589
 
The essential security interests exception is a limitation on the scope of the 
obligations in the BIT.
590
 This means host state conduct that falls within the essential 
security interests exception does not violate the BIT. Such conduct is not wrongful 
and does not result in liability for compensation.
591
 The essential security interests 
                                                        
586 e.g., Australia-India BIT, Art. 15; United States-Argentina BIT, Art. XI; Finland-Armenia BIT, Art. 14(1). 
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589 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XX(b). 
590 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, and Interpretation, Oxford University 
Press, 2010, p. 181. 
591 Id. 
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exception has been invoked by Argentina in a number of cases involving measures 
taken by Argentina to address an economic crisis that occurred in 2001 and 2002.
592
 
One issue that has arisen is the relationship between the essential security interests 
exception and the ‘necessity rule’, codified in Article 25 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 
The rule of necessity in Article 25 of the ILC Articles, can be relevant to the subject 
matter of an investment treaty: 
 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of 
an act not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: (a) is 
the only means for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent 
peril; and (b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards 
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole. 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding 
wrongfulness if: (a) the international obligation in question excludes the possibility of 
invoking necessity, or (b) the State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
 
In CMS v Argentina,
593
 the respondent pleaded the defence of necessity, but the 
tribunal found that the conditions for its applications were not met: 
 
[T]he Tribunal is persuaded that the situation was difficult enough to justify the government 
taking action to prevent a worsening of the situation and the danger of total economic 
collapse.
594
 […] A different issue, however, is whether the measures adopted were ‘the only 
way’ for the State to safeguard the interests. This is indeed debateable. […] The 
International Law Commission’s comment to the effect that the plea of necessity is 
‘excluded if there are other (otherwise lawful) means available, even if they may be more 
costly or less convenient,’ is persuasive in assisting this Tribunal in concluding that the 
measures adopted were not the only steps available.
595
 […] The second limit is the 
requirement for the State not to have contributed to the situation of necessity. […] The 
Tribunal observes that government policies and their shortcomings significantly contributed 
to the crisis and the emergency and while exogenous factors did fuel additional difficulties 
they do not exempt the Respondent from its responsibility in the matter.
596
 
 
Therefore, the tribunal considered that an economic crisis might give rise to a plea of 
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necessity in principle. But it found that two requirements for a finding of necessity 
were not met in the particular case: the measures taken by Argentina were not the 
only way to cope with the situation, and Argentina itself had contributed to the 
situation. 
4.5.2 Taxation Exception 
Many BITs include an exception to the MFN and national treatment provisions for tax 
matters. Some BITs exempt taxation measures from certain BIT’s provisions. The US 
2012 Model BIT has applied only selected provisions to measures of taxation, (e.g., 
expropriation, performance requirements, and disputes provisions applied to matters 
of taxation).
597
 Also, the Canadian 2003 model BIT authorizes Investor-State 
Arbitration of claims with respect to taxation measures, only if the claim is either that 
the measure breaches an agreement between the investor and the host state or that the 
measure constitutes an expropriation.
598
 
A few BITs grant to the taxation authorities of the two parties, the power to 
decide whether certain measures violate the BIT. For example, the Canada-Uruguay 
BIT provides that a tax measure shall not be considered to contravene an agreement 
between the investor and the host state or to constitute an expropriation if the taxation 
authorities jointly so determine.
599
 Many US BITs provide that a tax measure shall 
not be considered an expropriation if the taxation authorities of the two parties jointly 
so decide. 
                                                        
597 US Model BIT 2012, Article 21 [Taxation] 
1. Except as provided in this Article, nothing in Section A shall impose obligations with respect to taxation 
measures. 
2. Article 6 [Expropriation] shall apply to all taxation measures, except that a claimant that asserts that a taxation 
measure involves an expropriation may submit a claim to arbitration under Section B only if: 
the claimant has first referred to the competent tax authorities of both Parties in writing the issue of whether that 
taxation measures involves an expropriation; and 
within 180 days after the date of such referral, the competent tax authorities of both Parties fail to agree that the 
taxation measure is not an expropriation. 
3. Subject to paragraph 4, Article 8 [Performance Requirements] (2) through (4) shall apply to all taxation 
measures. 
4. Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the rights and obligations of either Party under any tax convention. In the 
event of any inconsistency between this Treaty and any such convention, that convention shall prevail to the extent 
of the inconsistency. In the case of a tax convention between the Parties, the competent authorities under that 
convention shall have sole responsibility for determining whether any inconsistency exists between this Treaty and 
that convention. 
598 2003 Canadian Model BIT, Art. 16. 
599 Canada-Uruguay BIT, Art. XVI(3)-(4). 
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The NT and MFN obligations exclude the application of tax advantages or 
privileges granted to investors of a third state pursuant to a tax treaty or economic 
integration agreement. Also, the non-conforming provision seeks to preserve any 
existing tax laws and regulations, and measures that are otherwise inconsistent with 
the treaty. 
    Recent arbitral jurisprudence reflects that a taxation measure may constitute an 
expropriation. The tax filter is a mechanism through which parties are to submit the 
dispute to the taxation authorities. A very distinctive feature of the regulation of tax 
measures in an investment treaty is the ‘joint tax consultation’ (sometimes amounting 
to a ‘joint tax veto’ by the two tax authorities).600 
In EnCana v. Ecuador, the tribunal required: for indirect expropriation, that a tax 
law had been ‘extraordinary, punitive in amount, or arbitrary in its incidence.’601 
In Occidental v. Ecuador, the tribunal was much more reticent than the EnCana 
tribunal, with respect to the quality of the ‘tax refund right’ to constitute an 
‘investment’ protected against expropriation. It did not separate the tax refund from 
the overall investment, consisting of a bundle of property rights, but rather looked at 
the economic effect, which indicated that the overall investment was doing well; thus 
no ‘substantial economic deprivation’ took place.602 
    The tribunal’s restrictive approach towards indirect expropriation was perhaps 
facilitated by the fact that it was not precluded from accepting the claim for a breach 
of national treatment commitment.  
In Chinese BITs, the MFN provision excludes international agreements and 
domestic laws on taxation. For example, some BITs especially refer to ‘international 
treaties for the avoidance of double taxation’,603 whereas others refer only to ‘any 
international agreement or arrangement relating to taxation’. 604  The updated 
China-Germany BIT (2013) refers only to international taxation agreements and 
                                                        
600 Art. 21(2), US 2012 Model BIT. 
601 EnCana Corporation v. the Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN 3481, February 2006, para. 177. 
602 Occidental v. Ecuador, administration case no. UN3467 decision of 1 July 2004,  
http://ita.uvic.ca/documents/Oxy-EcuadorFinalAward_001.phf, paras 86-9. 
603 See e.g. China-Indonesia BIT, Art 2(3). 
604 See e.g. China-Korea BIT 1992, Art. 3(4). 
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arrangements in the treaty text. However, the protocol adds a further exemption 
confirming that a state does not have to extend to foreign investors any ‘tax privileges, 
tax exemptions and tax reductions which according to its tax laws are granted only to 
investors resident in its territory’.605 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
605 China-Germany BIT (2003), Ad Art. 3(b). Other recent BITs also contain this exclusion for investor residents. 
See China-Portugal BIT and China-Spain BIT Protocols (both 2005). 
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5 A Comparative Study on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms 
in Trade and Investment Agreements 
 
 
Investment arbitration has been created from the decisions of states to get out of the 
constraints of diplomatic protection.
606
 Investment treaties help to switch investment 
disputes from inter-state settlement to a credible depoliticized dispute settlement 
mechanism. This mechanism also interacts with other concepts, (e.g., trade and 
human rights laws), when dealing with the Investor-State Arbitration (ISA) to balance 
the rights of the host state and the rights of the citizens of this host country. 
Investment arbitration also corresponded with an economic imperative; to 
facilitate the flow of world trade and investment by settling the disputes which would 
arise along the way.
607
 However, the ISA process provokes some questions. For 
example, tribunals may lack of consideration of the public policy of the host state, 
such as the legitimate imposition of taxation. Or, the arbitration simply may not give 
full remedy to a suffered investor.  
Most investment treaties provide for two distinct dispute settlement mechanisms: 
one for disputes between the two contracting states, and another for disputes between 
a host country and an aggrieved foreign investor. As to the former, investment treaties 
usually stipulate that in the event of a dispute over the interpretation or application of 
the treaty, the states concerned will first seek to resolve their difference through 
negotiation and then, if that fails, through ad hoc arbitration.
608
 
As to the ISA, the trend among more recent investment treaties is to provide a 
separate international arbitration procedure, often under the auspices of the ICSID, 
which is for disputes between an aggrieved foreign investor and an offending host 
                                                        
606 Jacques Werner, Limits of Commercial Investor-State Arbitration: The Need for Appellate Review, in 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, ed., Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 115. 
607 Ibid., p. 116. 
608 See e.g., China-UK BIT (1986) Art. 8(1)(2); China-Korea BIT (1992) Art. 10(1)(2); China-Netherlands BIT 
(2001) Art. 9(1)(2). 
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country government. By agreeing to an investment treaty, a state often simultaneously 
gives their consent to submit any future investor-state dispute to the ICSID or another 
arbitration forum.
609
 Although the investor may have to first try to resolve the 
conflict through negotiation and may also have to exhaust local remedies, the investor 
can ultimately invoke a compulsory arbitration in order to secure a binding award. 
The WTO does not give a remedy to private persons injured by trade law violations. 
In the case that a state fails to pay the compensation (under an award), the ICSID 
Convention requires each ICSID member state to recognize such ‘…award… as 
binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its 
territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.’610 Non-ICSID awards 
rendered under investment treaties are enforceable under the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (‘New York 
Convention’).611 This chapter will explore investment arbitration proceedings by 
looking at the WTO. 
5.1 WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
The WTO’s dispute settlement system is unique in international law and institutions, 
both at present and historically.
612
 It embraces mandatory exclusive jurisdiction and 
virtually automatic adoption of dispute settlement reports, which is extraordinary for 
an institution with such broad-ranging competence and responsibilities as the WTO. 
In US—Section 301, the EC claimed that Section 304 of the US Trade Act 
mandated the UETR to make a unilateral decision regarding whether another member 
was acting inconsistently with the WTO Agreement. The EC further argued that a 
USTR determination under Section 304, in the situation where a panel or Appellate 
                                                        
609 One of the most predicts for investment treaty arbitrations involves the need to establish party consent in the 
treaty, foreign investment law, and contracts. See Y. Shany, ‘Consolidation and Tests for Application: Is 
International Law Relevant?’, 21 ICSID Review (2006) 135.  
610 The ICSID Convention, Art. 54(1). 
611 The New York Convention, 330 UNTS 3, UNCITRAL, ‘Status.’ 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral_Texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html.  
612 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, p. 134. 
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Body report had not yet been adopted by the DSB violated DSU Article 23.2(a).
613
 
    The Panel noted that, under the statute, the USTR maintained the discretion to 
determine that US rights under the WTO were not being denied. However, in addition, 
it recognized that, under Section 304, the USTR also had the discretion to find that 
another member’s actions were in fact inconsistent with the WTO Agreement.614 
The Panel then examined and reached certain general observations regarding 
Article 23 of the DSU. First, the Panel noted that the purpose of Article 23, as 
indicated by its title, is the ‘strengthening of the multilateral system’ and further 
considered that this provision was designed to prevent members from unilaterally 
resolving WTO disputes.
615
  
The Panel then examined Articles 23.1 and Article 23.2 and found they contained 
three requirements that members must respect in resolving disputes.
616
 On this basis, 
the Panel found that it was for the WTO through the DSU process, and not an 
individual WTO member, to determine whether a measure is inconsistent with WTO 
obligations.
617
 
Finally, the Panel recognized that striking down a domestic law under WTO rules, 
based solely upon the risk of inconsistent action, ‘should not be done lightly’…‘[i]t 
depends on the specific WTO obligation at issue, the measure under consideration and 
the specific circumstances of each case.’618 Nonetheless, in the instant case, the Panel 
found support for its decision ‘in the context of Article 23 and the DSU in the overall 
WTO system.’619 
The Panel’s preliminary conclusion was that Section 304 constituted a prima 
facie violation of Article 23.2(a), ‘by mandating a determination before the adoption 
                                                        
613 Panel Report, United States—Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R(27th January, 2000) para. 
7.29.  
614 Ibid. para. 7.31. 
615 Ibid. para. 7.35. 
616 It includes the requirement that members are not to make a determination that a violation had occurred ‘except 
through recourse to dispute settlement.’ As Art. 23.2(a) in DSU reads: “…2. In such cases, Members shall: (a) not 
make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or 
that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to 
dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such 
determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or 
an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;...” 
617 Ibid. paras. 7.37-7.40. 
618 Ibid. para. 7.93. 
619 Ibid. 
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of DSB findings and statutorily reserving the right for this determination to be one of 
inconsistency.’620  
Before reaching a final decision on this matter, however, the panel recognized 
that it must also consider other institutional and administrative features of Section 304 
that affected the implementation of the statute. The Panel concluded that the US had, 
in fact, already lawfully removed the prima facie violation of Section 304.
621
 The 
Panel then concluded that Section 304 was ‘not inconsistent’ with US obligations 
under DSU Article 23.2(a).
622
 
This case reflects the extent to which DSU Article 23 precludes unilateral action 
by WTO members. Each side claimed victory—the US because it technically won; the 
EU because the US had firmly committed to always use WTO procedures before 
retaliation—and neither appealed.623 
The WTO has a remarkable system for settling disputes between WTO members 
concerning their rights and obligations under the WTO agreements.
624
 The WTO 
dispute settlement system, which has been in operation since 1 January 1995, is not an 
entirely novel system. On the contrary, this system is based on and has taken on board, 
almost fifty years of experience in the resolution of trade disputes in the context of the 
GATT 1947.
625
 The GATT 1947 contained only two brief provisions on dispute 
settlement,
626
 which neither explicitly referred to ‘dispute settlement’ nor provided 
for detailed procedures to handle disputes. 
    The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which is Annex 2 to the 
WTO Agreement, provides the core treaty text, of about twenty-five pages, which 
governs the WTO DS process. This process consists primarily of four major stages, 
and the Dispute Settlement Body has the overall responsibility for supervising the 
                                                        
620 Ibid. paras. 7.96-7.97. 
621 Ibid. para. 7.131. 
622 Ibid. para. 7.135. 
623 See William J. Davey, ‘The WTO Dispute Settlement System: the first Ten Years’, 8 JIEL 17 (2005), in John H. 
Jackson, William J. Davey, and Alan O. Sykes Jr., ed., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Cases, 
Materials and Text, West Press, 2013, pp. 321-324. 
624 Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, third edition, 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 157. 
625 ‘Members affirm theri adherence to the principles for the manegement of disputes heretofore applied under 
Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947 and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified herein.’ 
Article 3.1, DSU. 
626 Art. XXII and Art. XXIII, GATT1947. 
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process. First, the parties must attempt to resolve their differences through 
consultations. The WTO member should exercise restraint. Second, if that fails, the 
complaining party may demand that a panel of independent experts be established to 
rule on the dispute. Third, and new under the DSU, is the possibility of an appeal by 
any party to the dispute to the Appellate Body. Finally, if the complaining party 
succeeds, the DSB is charged with monitoring the implementation of its 
recommendations. If the recommendations are not implemented, the possibility of 
negotiated compensation or authorization to withdraw concessions arises. The DSU 
also provides for voluntary mediation
627
 at any time (an option which never is used), 
and for an alternative procedure of arbitration,
628
 which is used only once. The DSU 
provides for compulsory referral of all disputes regarding the ‘covered agreements’ 
(WTO-related, as listed or implied in the DSU text) to the procedures set forth.
629
 
This is obviously a very powerful measure of “compulsory jurisdiction,” which, when 
combined with the virtually automatic adoption of a DS report (panel or appellate) is 
even more powerful.
630
 
5.1.1 Scope of the Jurisdiction 
The WTO dispute settlement system thus has jurisdiction ratione materiae over 
disputes between WTO members arising under the ‘covered agreements’.631 The 
covered agreements, referred to in Appendix 1 to the DSU, include the WTO 
Agreement, the GATT 1994 and all other multilateral agreements on trade in goods; 
the GATS; the TRIPS Agreement; the DSU; and the plurilateral Agreement on 
Government Procurement. It is clear that the scope of jurisdiction of the WTO dispute 
settlement system is very broad. It ranges from disputes over measures regarding 
customs duties, disputes regarding sanitary measures, disputes regarding subsidies, 
                                                        
627 Art. 5, DSU 
628 Art. 25, DSU 
629 Arts 1 and 23, DSU. 
630 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2006, p. 152. 
631 With regard to dispute which subject to WTO dispute settlement, Article 1.1 of the DSU states, in relevant part: 
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and 
dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this 
Understanding as the ‘covered agreements’). 
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disputes regarding measures affecting market access for services, to disputes 
regarding intellectual property rights enforcement measures.
632
 
5.1.2 Different Methods of Dispute Settlement 
The WTO dispute settlement system provides for several dispute settlement methods.  
In Article 4 of the DSU, it provides for consultations (i.e., negotiations) between the 
parties. Articles 6 to 20 of the DSU provide for adjudication by a panel and the 
Appellate Body. The WTO dispute settlement system also provides for other dispute 
settlement methods, in particular: arbitration, conciliation, and mediation. Pursuant to 
Article 25 of the DSU, parties to a dispute arising under a covered agreement may 
decide to resort to arbitration as an alternative means of binding dispute settlement, 
rather than have the dispute adjudicated by a panel and the Appellate Body.
633
 When 
parties opt for arbitration, they have to agree on the procedural rules that will apply to 
the arbitration process, and explicitly agree to abide by the arbitration award.
634
 
Arbitration awards need to be consistent with WTO law,
635
 and must be notified to 
the DSB, where any member may raise any point relating to them.
636
 The DSU also 
provides for arbitration in Articles 21.3(c) and 22.6. These arbitration procedures 
concern specific issues that may arise in the context of a dispute, such as the 
determination of the reasonable period of time for implementation
637
 and the 
appropriate level of retaliation.
638
  
5.1.3 Remedy for Breach 
The DSU provides for three types of remedy for breaches of WTO law. One is the 
                                                        
632 Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, (2013), p.163. 
633 Article 25.1 of the DSU, ‘Expeditious arbitration within the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement 
can facilitate the solution of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by both parties.’ 
634 Articles 25.2 and 25.3 of the DSU. 
635 Article 3.5 of the DSU. 
636 See Article 25.3 of the DSU. In 2001, The United States and the European Communities resorted to arbitration 
under Article 25 to resolve a dispute on the appropriate level of compensation due by the United States after it 
failed to comply with the panel report in US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act (2000). Award of the Arbitrators, US – 
Section 110(5) Copyright Act (Article 25) (2001), recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of the DSU, 
WT/DS160/ARB25/1, adopted on 9 November 2001. 
637 Article 21.3(c), DSU. 
638 Article 22.6, DSU. 
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withdrawal (or modification) of the WTO-inconsistent measure.
639
 The other two are 
temporary remedies, including compensation and suspension of concessions or other 
obligations (commonly referred to as ‘retaliation’). The DSU makes clear that 
compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are not 
alternative remedies.
640
 They are remedies which members may want to apply instead 
of withdrawing (or modifying) the WTO-inconsistent measure. 
Compensation as defined by Article 22 of the DSU is voluntary, which means the 
complainant is free to accept or reject compensation. It is also forward-looking. For 
instance, the compensation concerns only the nullification or impairment that will be 
suffered in the future. Moreover, compensation has to be consistent with the covered 
agreements.
641
  
As is explicitly stated in Article 3.7 of the DSU, the suspension of concessions or 
other obligations, commonly referred to as ‘retaliation’, is a measure of ‘last 
resort’.642 When the ‘reasonable period of time for implementation’ has expired and 
the parties have not been able to agree on compensation, the original complaining 
party may request authorization from the DSB, to retaliate against the offending party 
by suspending concessions or other obligations with respect to that offending party. 
    The following sections will focus on dispute settlement mechanisms explored in 
current investment agreements. They have very different features compared with the 
dispute settlement system under the WTO. 
5.2 The State-State Dispute Settlement (SSDS) for Investment Issues  
Most investment treaties provide for two distinct dispute settlement mechanisms: one 
                                                        
639 Article 3.7, fourth sentence, of the DSU states: In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective 
of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are 
found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements. 
640 Article 22.1 of the DSU explicitly states: Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations 
are temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a 
reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations 
is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered 
agreements. 
641 e.g. In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II (1996), the parties agreed on compensation which took the form of 
temporary, additional market access concessions for certain products of export interest to the original 
complainants. 
642 Article 3.7, last sentence, of the DSU. 
172 
for disputes between the two contracting states, and another for disputes between a 
host country and an aggrieved foreign investor. Regarding the former, current 
investment treaties usually stipulate that in the event of a dispute over the 
interpretation or application of a treaty, the states concerned will first seek to resolve 
their differences through negotiation and then, if that fails, through ad hoc arbitration. 
Typically, all BITs contain a State-State Dispute Settlement provision for binding 
arbitration of disputes between parties, with only minor variations among them. These 
provisions apply to any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
BIT.643 As in the Chinese Model BIT, the text states that: 
 
“Section IV: State-State Dispute Settlement [Application] 
1. This Section applies to the settlement of disputes between the Contracting Parties 
arising from the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Agreement.”
644
 
 
In practice, states rarely recourse to the SSDS procedure to solve their disputes. 
But, foreign investors frequently provoke Investor-State Arbitration according to the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement provision, which applies to any dispute concerning 
an investment.  
5.2.1 The SSDS according to BITs  
a) General Texts 
 
From a historical perspective, the SSDS clause appeared in the first BIT 
(Germany-Pakistan, 1959), and has changed relatively little in the fifty years since. 
This BIT provided that, in the event of a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the treaty, the parties shall enter into consultations for the purpose of 
finding a solution.645 If no such solution is reached, the dispute shall be submitted to 
arbitration or, if both parties agree, to the International Court of Justice.
646
 
                                                        
643 i.e., Australia-India BIT, Art. 13(1); Netherlands-Ethiopia BIT, Art. 12.  
644 See Shan and Gallagher, Chinese Investment Treaties, 2009. p. 408. 
645 Germany-Pakistan BIT, Art. 11(1). 
646 Id. 
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    The approach adopted in the Germany-Pakistan BIT was followed closely by 
other BITs with some variations, typically in the form of additional clauses. In one 
respect, most other early BITs were less detailed than the Germany-Pakistan BIT, 
since they did not refer to ICJ adjudication as an alternative. 
The SSDS provision commonly begins with a statement that any disputes within 
the scope of the provision should be settled through negotiation if possible. 
Sometimes it also specifies a certain period of time (i.e., six months) that must have 
passed before the dispute may be submitted to binding arbitration.647  
    Some BITs include an entirely separate provision requiring each party, at the 
request of the other, to consult on matters concerned in the treaty.
648
 This ‘provision 
in kind’ may be used to resolve disputes. But its presence in a treaty is a way of 
indicating the importance that the parties place on the amicable resolution of disputes. 
This provision may therefore be used as a means of facilitating the implementation of 
the treaty. 
If the dispute can’t be settled through negotiations, the SSDS provision provides 
for arbitration before an ad hoc tribunal of three arbitrators.
649
 Typically, the 
prescribed procedure in a treaty for the formation of the tribunal is that each party 
appoints one arbitrator, after which the two party-appointed arbitrators choose a third 
arbitrator who serves as the chair of the tribunal.
650
 
BITs often state that the tribunal shall determine its own procedure.
651
 For 
example, the Australia-India BIT specifies that a particular set of rules be used, either 
the International Law Commission’s model rules of arbitral procedure or the 
UNCITRAL rules.
652
 Other BITs do not include a choice of law clause, but 
commonly require that international law is applied.
653
 The SSDS often provides that 
any award shall be final and binding. It may be noticed that similar language also 
                                                        
647 See e.g., Australia-India BIT, Art. 13(2). 
648 See, e.g. Netherlands-Ethiopia BIT, Art. 11. 
649 i.e., Australia-India BIT, Art. 13(2); Netherlands-Ethiopia BIT, Art. 12(1). 
650 BITs also conditon the appointment of the chair on the approcal of the two disputing parties, and generally 
requrie that the chair be a national of a third state. See Australia-India BIT, Art. 13(2). 
651 Australia-India BIT, Art. 13(8). 
652 One common clause specifies that decisions of the tribunal shall be by a majority vote. See Australia-India BIT, 
Art. 13(6). 
653 i.e., Netherlands-Ethiopia BIT, Art. 12(5). 
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often appears in investor-state disputes provisions. 
    The last issue addressed in most state-state disputes provisions is the payment of 
the costs of arbitration. One common approach is to provide that each party shall bear 
the costs of its own representation and of the arbitrator that it appoints, but that the 
remaining costs shall be shared by the two parties.
654
 An alternative is to provide that 
each party shall bear the costs of its own representation, but that all costs of the 
tribunal shall be paid equally by the parties.
655
 Still other BITs allow the tribunal, at 
its discretion, to impose a greater share of the costs on one party than the other.
656
 
     
b) The Relationship between SSDS and ISDS 
 
BITs often provide that Investor-State Arbitration may not be submitted to state-state 
arbitration unless the tribunal declined jurisdiction or the host state failed to comply 
with the award. The Chinese BIT model includes a similar clause, as the text states 
that:  
 
“Section IV: State-State Dispute Settlement [Application] 
… 
2. A Contracting Party may not initiate proceedings in accordance with this Section with 
regard to a dispute concerning the violation of the rights of an investor, unless the other 
Contracting Party fails to abide by or comply with a final award rendered in a dispute that 
such investor may have submitted pursuant to Section III [Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement]. In this case, an Arbitral Tribunal established in conformity with this Section 
may render, upon request of the Contracting Party whose investor was a party in the 
dispute: 
(a) a statement that the failure to abide by or comply with the final award is inconsistent 
with the obligations set forth in this Agreements; and 
(b) a recommendation that the other Contracting Party abide by or comply with the final 
award.”
657
 
 
This rule in BITs can trace its origins to the ICSID Convention. According to Article 
27 of the ICSID Convention, 
                                                        
654 i.e., Australia-India BIT, Art. 13(7). 
655 i.e., Mexico-Iceland BIT, Art. 22. 
656 i.e., India-Indonesia BIT, Art. 10(5). 
657 Chinese Model BIT, Section IV. 
175 
 
“(1) No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international 
claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State 
shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this 
Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply 
with the award rendered in such dispute. 
(2) Diplomatic protection, for the purpose of paragraph (1), shall not include informal 
diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a settlement of the dispute.”
658
 
 
The reference to an international claim is represented by the word ‘or’ from the phrase 
dealing with diplomatic protection. It indicates that an international claim in this 
context is different from diplomatic protection. This opens the possibility of two 
different arbitration procedures arising from the same claim: one under ICSID 
between the investor and the host state, the other between the two States based on the 
alleged violation of the investment treaty.
659
 This may cause parallel proceedings, 
which involve different parties. To avoid the conflict, some BITs carve out inter-state 
arbitration where ICSID arbitration has been instituted or is available.
660
 In the 
absence of such a provision in a BIT, a tribunal in an inter-state arbitration may 
decline jurisdiction if the claim is in conflict with Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. 
However, the mere existence of a valid consent to ICSID arbitration is not sufficient 
to exclude a claim from inter-state arbitration. In fact, a claim can be brought by the 
investor’s home state on the condition that the state hosting investment has failed to 
abide by the ICSID award.
661
 
Article 64 of the ICSID Convention provides that disputes between Contracting 
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention are to be 
referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
662
 However, in order to prevent 
conflicts with the activities of ICSID tribunals, the Report of the Executive Directors 
                                                        
658 ICSID Convention, Art.27. Emphasis added. 
659 See Broches, A., The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 376 et seq. (1972-II), in Christoph H. Schreuer with Loretta Mlintoppi, 
August Reinisch, and Anthony Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, second edition, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, pp. 420-421. 
660 See i.e., US-Turkey BIT (1985), Art. VII(7). Also See Dolzer and Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 
249. 
661 ICSID Convention, Art.27. 
662 ICSID Convention, Art.64. 
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(in the course of drafting the Convention) clearly establishes that Art. 64 must not be 
used to undermine or circumvent consent to ICSID arbitration.
663
  
 
c) Set Up a Joint Committee for Deciding Certain Cases? 
 
In recent years, some states have called for expanding the scope of applying 
State-State Dispute Settlement.
664
 While maintaining the overall structure of ISDS, 
the renovation is to apply SSDS to disputes on certain issues. Like using filters, a BIT 
may provide for a joint committee to decide on these disputes. For example, a 
committee may decide whether a measure is a prudential measure aimed at 
safeguarding the integrity and stability of the financial system; or whether a taxation 
measure constitutes a fiscal expropriation. In this situation, the ISDS proceeding is 
suspended until the state-to-state tribunal renders its decision. The SSDS award will 
be binding on the ISDS tribunal. The China-Canada 2012 BIT has adopted this 
approach.
665
 
    It is supposed that SSDS, in the form of arbitration, may be better suited for 
sensitive issues, such as those relating to the integrity and stability of the financial 
system, tax matters, or public health, etc. The following section will explore 
investment Case-Law, to have a look at the analyses of tribunals in Inter-State 
Arbitration concerning the issues mentioned above. 
5.2.2 Case-Law 
a) Define the ‘Dispute’ 
 
                                                        
663 The Report specifically states that Art. 64 does not ‘… empower a State to institute proceedings before the 
Court in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State have consented to submit or 
have submitted to arbitration, since such proceedings would contravene the provisions of Article 27, unless the 
other Contracting State had failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in that dispute.’ See Christoph 
H. Schreuer with Loretta Mlintoppi, August Reinisch and Anthony Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, second edition, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 422. 
664 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2015, p. 149. 
665 China-Canada 2012 BIT, as Art. 14 [Taxation] states: (4) The provisions of Article 10 [Expropriation] shall 
apply to taxation measures. (5) No claim may be made by an investor pursuant to paragraph 4 unless: (a) the 
investor provides a copy of the notice of claim to the taxation authorities of the Contracting Parties; and (b) six 
months after receiving notification of the claim by the investor, the taxation authorities of the Contracting Parties 
fail to reach a joint determination that the measure in question is not an expropriation. 
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In the Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum v Republic of Ecuador case,
666
 the 
tribunal regarded that Ecuador had breached the US-Ecuador BIT. After receiving the 
award, Ecuador tried to provoke another procedure for state-state arbitration against 
the US. In Ecuador’s view, the existence of the SSDS process is confirmed by “the 
[US]’s refusal to respond to Ecuador’s request regarding the interpretation of the 
provision concerned.”667 Ecuador argued that the “mere denial” of the interstate 
arbitration by a respondent state does not prove its non-existence.
668
  
The US did not respond to Ecuador’s claim, since the US regarded that it had not 
breached any BIT provision (even allegedly) and was not a party to the disagreement 
about interpretation.  
The majority of the tribunal considered whether there was a dispute at all, 
regarding ‘positive opposition’ by the US of Ecuador’s claims.669 They took the view 
that the US’s silence on its preferred interpretation of the treaty could not be taken to 
mean that it rejected Ecuador’s stated view.670 However, the US had given another 
reasonable explanation for its silence, namely that— it wished to avoid interfering 
with a prior tribunal’s decision.671 
Another arbitral proceeding was initiated by Peru against Chile in 2003. Peru 
provoked the SSDS claim in response to an earlier-initiated investor-state claim 
brought by the Chilean investor.
672
 The interstate arbitration provision was designed 
to resolve a disagreement between the two parties as to the proper interpretation of the 
Peru-Chile BIT. However, this state-state arbitration was abandoned, because the 
tribunal in the separate investor-state arbitration declined to suspend their own 
proceedings so that the state-to-state procedure could be pursued. 
 
b) Relationship between Diplomatic Protection and SSDS 
                                                        
666 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum v Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, Partial Award on the Merits, March 30, 2010. 
667 Ecuador’s Counter-Memorial on Jurisdiction, para. 64. 
668 Ibid., para.65 
669 Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric Peterson, US-Ecuador Inter-State Investment Treaty Award Released to Parties; 
IA Reporter, (Oct 30, 2012). 
670 Id. 
671 Id. 
672 Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, SA v Peru (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4), Award, February 7, 
2005. 
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A different type of state-state arbitration was initiated pursuant to a BIT in 2003 when 
Italy espoused various claims in a dispute with Cuba. The dispute originated in 
injuries that a group of Italian companies, operating in a range of industry sectors, 
claimed to have suffered as a consequence of a series of acts attributable to Cuba.
673
 
In order to exercise diplomatic protection of these companies, Italy invoked Article 10 
of the Italy-Cuba BIT, which provides for ad hoc arbitration for the settlement of 
“disputes between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation and 
application of the treaty.”674 
    Cuba’s first objection was with Italy’s right to pursue its diplomatic protection 
claim. Cuba did not contest that Italy could make claims concerning the interpretation 
and application of the BIT. However, it did object to Italy’s resort to the interstate 
dispute settlement clause for the purpose of the diplomatic protection claim.
675
 In the 
tribunal’s view, as long as the investor had not consented to international arbitration 
with the host state or submitted the dispute for arbitration, it could request diplomatic 
protection from its home state.
676
 However, if the investor had already brought a 
claim before an investor-state tribunal or given its advance consent to such dispute 
settlement, the home state would be prevented from espousing the claim.
677
 
    The way in which the two dispute settlement remedies were coordinated 
demonstrated the method provided in Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. This 
method prohibits diplomatic protection once the investor has submitted or consented 
to submit the dispute to ICSID arbitration. Thus, in the tribunal’s view, the absence of 
a similar provision in the Italy-Cuba BIT could not prevent the application “by 
analogy” of the principle in Article 27.678 Therefore, Italy had the right to resort to 
diplomatic protection within the BIT’s interstate arbitration framework, provided that 
                                                        
673 See Michele Potestà, Republic of Italy v. Cuba, the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 106, No. 2 
(April 2012), pp. 341-347. 
674 Italian Republic v. Republic of Cuba, Ad hoc state-state arbitration, Interim Award, March 15, 2005. 
675 Ibid., para. 47. 
676 Ibid., para. 65. 
677 Id. 
678 Interim Award, para. 65 
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the other jurisdictional requirements set forth in the treaty were met.
679
 
 
c) SSDS Tribunal’s Decisions on Market Access 
 
In the Cross-Border Trucking Services case, Mexico claimed that the US had denied 
its new application for trucking services. The US had previously permitted the gradual 
allowance its services in exchange for the US’s own services in Mexico.680 In 
contrast, the US defence primarily rested on the argument that the delay was both 
prudent and consistent with US obligations under the NAFTA, because of Mexico’s 
inadequate safety regulatory system.
681
 
    Responding to the obligations of national and MFN treatment under the NAFTA, 
the US stressed the importance of the “regulatory environment” in the US and Canada 
compared to that in Mexico.
682
 As a result of these differences, the US argued that 
“the ‘circumstances’ relevant to the treatment of Mexican-based trucking firms for 
safety purposes are not ‘like’ those applicable to the treatment of Canadian and US 
carriers.”683  
    As to the issue of investment, the Panel considered the relevant inquiry as 
“whether the failure by the US government to take appropriate regulatory actions to 
eliminate the moratorium on Mexican investments constitutes a breach of Articles 
1102, 1103, and 1104 of NAFTA.”684 Applying the required allocation of burden of 
proof,
685
 the Panel found that Mexico satisfied its prima facie burden.
686
 Finally it 
                                                        
679 Id., paras 65-67. 
680 In the matter of Cross-Border Trucking Service, Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-2008-01, Final Report, 
para. 21, at 6 (Feb. 6, 2001), available at 
 http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/trucking.pdf [hereinafter Cross-Border Trucking Service Final Report], 
para.146, at 31.  
681 Id., para.153, at 33. 
682 Id. paras. 169-73, at 37-38. 
683 Id. para. 174, at 38-39 (quoting the US Counter-Submission at 49). 
684 Id. para 279, at 75. 
685 For the burden of proof: Mexico must establish that the actions (and inaction) of the US are inconsistent with 
the schedule for implementation of NAFTA, whileas the US bears the burden of proving that its actions and 
inactions in connection with Chater Eleven are authorized by an exception to NAFTA. (para. 285. at 77-78.) 
686 See id. paras 286, 291, at 78, 80. Even though Mexico did not produce a specific investor, the Panel found that 
an application would be pointless in light of the US policy. (para. 286, at 78.) 
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regarded that the US had not defended on the point of investment.
687
 
    The Cross-Border Trucking Services case was settled by an inter-state arbitration 
between two states. The dispute concerned market access obligations under the 
NAFTA. The tribunal allowed for a case-by-case review, in place of a blanket 
restriction (on market entry), thereby allowing the US to impose its safety standards 
on Mexican operations ‘as long as they are made in good faith with respect to 
legitimate safety concerns and conform to all relevant NAFTA provisions.’688 
5.3 Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Provisions in 
Investment Treaties 
The trend among more recent investment treaties is to provide a separate international 
arbitration procedure, e.g., under the ICSID, for disputes between a foreign investor 
and a host country government. By concluding an investment treaty, a state sometimes 
simultaneously gives the consent required to establish an ICSID or other arbitral 
tribunal for any future dispute between one contracting state and a national of another 
contracting state. 
  Although sometimes the investor must first try to try to resolve the dispute 
through negotiation, and may also have to exhaust local remedies, the investor can 
ultimately invoke compulsory international arbitration in order to secure a binding 
award. For example, with the exception of the Australia-US PTA, all of the US 
investment agreements contain an investor-state dispute resolution provision that 
permits investors to take foreign governments to dispute resolution, for violation of 
the treaty’s national treatment, non-discrimination, or expropriation provisions, 
among others.
689
 
                                                        
687 ‘In essence, the United States has effectively conceded that the safety concerns, which are the claimed basis of 
the US refusal to implement its cross-border service obligations, are not applicable to investment.’ See id., para. 
289, at 79. 
688 See Stephen T. Weusweaver, ‘International Trade: Partners, Politics, and Promises: An Analysis of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement’s Arbitral Panel Decision Concerning the United-Mexico Trucking Dispute’, 32 
New Mexico Law Review, 482 (2002). 
689 See Bernard Hoekman and Richard Newfarmer, ‘Preferential Trade Agreements, Investment Disciplines and 
Investment Flows,’ Journal of World Trade 39(5): 949-937, 2005. 
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5.3.1 Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) according to Chinese Investment 
Treaties 
The first BIT entered into by China, in 1982 with Sweden, did not include a provision 
for investor-state dispute resolution. The China-Sweden BIT, Article 6, provides that 
disputes between the contracting parties on the interpretation and application of the 
treaty shall be referred to a three-member ad hoc tribunal.
690
 The China-Thailand BIT 
(1985) also has no investor-state provisions. 
    States giving consent to arbitration in any future disputes will fall under the 
jurisdiction of treaties. The Chinese BITs have also evolved in this respect and have 
moved from a limited right to arbitrate (quantum only) to an unqualified right to 
arbitrate. This right of an investor to arbitrate all disputes is subject only to the 
obligation that they resort to the domestic administrative review process. The investor 
now has the right of direct recourse for an international arbitration for which the state 
must respond. Resort to the national court is no longer the only option. 
    All of China’s BITs include provisions on state-state dispute resolution. They are 
substantially similar, and provide that disputes on the interpretation or application of 
the BIT can be referred to ad hoc arbitration with a tribunal. 
    The following part will review the different types of dispute resolutions in the 
Chinese BITs. It will first look at the choice of arbitrations made in China’s treaties, 
ICSID, ad hoc, or other arbitration rules. It will then continue by reviewing the two 
main types of investor-state dispute resolution clauses in China’s BITs. These clauses 
are either restrictive—where by the BIT permits international arbitration of disputes 
on the amount of compensation for expropriation only—or more liberal or 
expansive—which allows access to international arbitration for all disputes between 
the investor and host state. It will then consider a topic of particular interest right now 
for investors and potential investors in China; the application of the MFN clause to 
dispute resolution. Finally, it will look at the applicable law for dispute settlement and 
the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. 
                                                        
690 The original Sweden BIT 1982 was subsequently amended by a Protocol on 27 September 2004. 
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a) Arbitration Options 
 
The majority of BITs signed by China provide for ad hoc arbitration, usually in 
accordance with the UNCTRAL Arbitration Rules. Overwhelmingly, Chinese BITs 
have consented to arbitrate under the auspices of ICSID. The incorporation of ICSID 
arbitration is not exclusive to China’s new BITs. Several of the older BITs that are 
restrictive in nature provide for disputes to be referred to ICSID. For example the 
China-Chile BIT
691
 and the China-Iceland BIT
692
, both signed in 1994 (the year after 
China ratified the ICSID Convention) refer quantum disputes to ICSID or ad hoc 
arbitration.
693
 These clauses also allow the parties, by ‘mutual agreement’, to refer 
any dispute concerning other matters to ad hoc arbitration. 
    Other BITs make reference to the ICSID for ancillary matters. In the 
China-Cambodia BIT, for example, disputes on quantum are to be referred to ad hoc 
arbitration. In the event of default in the appointment process, ‘either party to the 
dispute may invite the Secretary General of [ICSID] to make the necessary 
appointment.’694 This clause continues to deal with arbitral procedure, which will be 
determined by the tribunal. However, the tribunal may take as guidance the ICSID 
arbitration rules.
695
 Though the China-New Zealand BIT has a slight variation, 
whereby the appointing authority is the president of the World Bank, and the arbitral 
procedure can still be determined by the tribunal with reference to the ICSID 
Convention.
696
 The China-Singapore BIT is slightly different, in that the arbitral 
procedure can be decided by reference to the ICSID Convention, but the appointing 
authority is the Chairman of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
697
 
    The more recent treaties give the parties a choice of international arbitration in 
                                                        
691 China-Chile BIT, Art. 9(3). 
692 China-Iceland BIT, Art. 8(3). 
693 According to Article 9(3) of the China-Korea 1992 BIT, the treaty refers quantum disputes to a conciliation 
board or an arbitration board, to be established with reference to the ICSID Convention. 
694 See Chinese BITs with Cambodia, Qatar, and Iran. 
695 See also Chinese BITs with Algeria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Ecuador, Georgia, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lao, Oman, 
Mongolia, Uruguay, Vietnam. 
696 China-New Zealand BIT Art.13(5). 
697 China-Singapore BIT, Art 13(5). 
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what has been called a ‘cherry-picking’ approach. This approach is not limited to the 
BITs that permit arbitration of all disputes. For example, the China-Ethiopia BIT 
(1998) which is restrictive in scope provides that, ‘if a dispute involving the amount 
of compensation for expropriation cannot be settled within six months after resort to 
negotiations…it may be submitted at the request of either party to an ad hoc arbitral 
or arbitration under the auspices of …ICSID.’698 Some of China’s BITs provide for 
ICSID arbitration as an alternative to a competent local court.
699
 
 
b) Restrictive and Expansive Dispute Resolution Clause 
 
Some older Chinese BITs permitted international arbitration only for the ‘amount of 
compensation’. All other disputes had to be settled in the appropriate national courts 
of the host state.
700
  
    The first BIT to grant open access to international arbitration of any dispute was 
the Barbados BIT, (1998). It allows ‘any investment dispute’ to be referred to ICSID 
or ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
701
 
    This clause is broad in nature as it covers ‘any dispute’ between an investor and 
host state. There are no longer any restrictions ratione materiae. Some of the liberal 
BITs mention an ‘investment dispute’ being referred to arbitration,702 while others 
refer to ‘legal disputes’,703 reflecting the language in Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.  
 
c) Application of MFN Clause on Jurisdiction 
 
Some MFN provisions cover both pre-establishment and post-establishment phases of 
                                                        
698 China-Ethiopia BIT, Art 9(3). 
699 See for example, the China-Uganda BIT which provides at Article 8(2) that, ‘if the dispute cannot be settled 
through negotiations within six months from the date it has been raised by either party to the dispute, it shall be 
submitted by the choice of the investor: (a) to the competent court of the Contracting Party that is a party to the 
dispute; (b) to International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID). 
700 See e.g., China-Albania 1993 BIT, China-Iceland1994 BIT. 
701  See e.g., China-Finland BIT, China-Germany BIT, China-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT, and China-the 
Netherlands BIT. 
702 China-Guyana BIT. 
703 China-Jordan BIT. 
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investment, although this is quite a recent development. The China-New Zealand FTA 
has a reference to ‘admission’ in the MFN clause. BITs were primarily conceived as 
investment protection agreements that applied once an investment was made and not 
to deal with the pre-investment phase. The China-Finland BIT is an exception, which 
covers ‘establishment’ in its MFN provision.704 
    The China-Ethiopia BIT links the MFN provision to fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security protections.
705
 It does not cover any other provision 
of the BIT; since in some treaties, the MFN clause applies only to certain aspects of 
the treaty, while others have a wider application to all of the treaty protections. There 
are specific exclusions from the MFN treatment, for example, double taxation treaties, 
or customs unions. 
    There is uncertainty on whether the MFN treatment should extend to dispute 
resolution. It would not be possible to rely on an MFN clause to provide more 
favourable investor-state dispute provisions, if the agreement itself specifically 
excludes it. The China-New Zealand FTA (2008) confirms that the MFN obligation 
does ‘not encompass a requirement to extend to investors of the other Party dispute 
resolution procedures other than those set out in this Chapter.’706 
 
d) Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
 
The Chinese BITs require an investor seeking arbitration to have already gone through 
the appropriate domestic administrative review process in the national courts. Nearly 
all Chinese BITs that permit arbitration of all disputes include this local remedy 
proviso.
707
 
    China insists on an obligation to exhaust local remedies. In the Protocol of the 
China-Russia BIT, Ad Article 9 confirms that before submitting a dispute to 
                                                        
704 Art. 3(3) of the China-Finland BIT. 
705 Art. 3(2) of the China-Ethiopia BIT provides that, ‘the treatment and protection referred to in Paragraph 1 [fair 
and equitable treatment] of this Article shall not be less favourable than that accorded to investments and activities 
associated with such investments of investors of any third state.’  
706 Art. 139(2) of the China-New Zealand FTA (2008). 
707 See, e.g., Chinese BITs with Jordan, Guyana, Djibouti, Cote d’Ivoire, Brunei, Botswana. 
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arbitration ‘the Contracting Party involved in the dispute may require the investor 
concerned to go through domestic administrative review procedures specified by the 
laws and regulations of that Contracting Party’. Ad Article 9(2) confirms that such 
review procedures shall not take more than ninety days. The time limit of three 
months appears in the majority of these BITs.
708
 However, the China-Iran BIT does 
not include any reference to domestic review procedures as a precondition to 
arbitration. 
5.3.2 Case-Law: a Chinese Perspective 
Several claims have been arbitrated (or threatened) pursuant to Chinese investment 
treaties. Such claims include a pending claim by a Chinese investor against Peru, a 
potential claim by a major Chinese financial services company against Belgium, and a 
claim by Chinese mining investors against Mongolia. 
 
a) Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) 
Company of China v. Belgium
709
 
 
In 2012, the Chinese financial services company Ping An filed an international 
arbitration dispute against Belgium under the China-Belgium BIT. This case was the 
first known treaty claim by a mainland Chinese investor.
710
 The case also marked the 
first where Belgium has been sued pursuant to a BIT. The underlying dispute arose 
out of the alleged destruction of Ping An’s investment in the Belgian-Dutch bank, 
Fortis. Ping An complained it had sustained losses of US＄2.3 billion of its 
investment in Fortis, in the early days of the 2008 crisis when it was dismantled and 
nationalized.
711
 
 
                                                        
708 Similarly, e.g., Chinese BITs with Belgium and Luxembourg, Finland, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. 
709 Ping An v. the Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29. 
710 Ping An made a decision to file a formal arbitration claim against Belgium. This is the first mainland Chinese 
company to do so. Previously a Hong Kong investor brought a claim against Peru to the World Bank’s arbitration 
centre. 
711 See IA Reporter, (Sep. 2012). 
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Disputes: Previously Ping An Co. had a major stake in Fortis financial service 
company. It was the largest shareholder in Fortis, a massive Belgian-Dutch financial 
institution when Fortis nearly collapsed in 2008. Following a government bailout of 
Fortis, authorities engineered the sell-off of various assets of the company despite the 
strenuous objections of Ping An and a minority of other smaller shareholders.
712
  
The details of its arbitration request have not yet been made public. In 2009 the 
Belgian government decided to sell control of Fortis’ Belgian banking operations to 
the French company BNP Paribas.
713
 Ping An, which held almost 5 percent of Fortis, 
voted against the sale. Fortis shareholders lost up to 90 percent of their investments 
after the bank was expropriated by the Belgian and Dutch governments. 
 
Application of the BIT: Given that the case was filed at the ICSID—a forum not 
offered in the 1984 China-Belgium investment treaty—it would appear that the claim 
was made under an updated China-Belgium treaty that was signed in 2005 but only 
came into force in December 2009. The 1984 treaty that was in force during the 
bail-out and break-up of Fortis in 2008 and 2009, was a much less investor-friendly 
agreement. It limited investors to pursue ad hoc arbitration only in relation to a single 
cause of action; disputes over the amount of compensation owed in cases of 
expropriation or nationalization.
714
 
    By contrast, the 2005 treaty, which is now in force, offers ICSID arbitration in 
case of a wide range of potential claims, including when an investor has been denied 
“fair and equitable treatment” by its host country, or suffered discriminatory treatment 
at the hands of authorities. The 2005 China-Belgium treaty also provides for the right 
to compensation in cases of nationalization or expropriation. Finally, the tribunal 
                                                        
712 It was widely reported in the international press at that time, that Ping An had engaged the assistance of the 
Chinese Government to help lobby Belgium for compensation as a result of the alleged mishandling of the Fortis 
crisis by Belgian authorities. 
713 Fortis’ s problem began in April 2007 when the Belgium financial group was forced to raise cash to pay for the 
24billion Euro takeover of ABN Amro, the Dutch bank. The acquisition of ABN stretched Fortis’s balance sheet at 
a time when global liquidity retreated because of the subprime crisis. The Belgium and Dutch governments were 
later forced to nationalize the group’s banking operations in October 2008 to avoid the collapse of their respective 
banking sectors, a move that was firmly opposed by shareholders. See FT news, 24 September, 2012. 
714 If any move to arbitrate dispute had been taken at the time of the crisis, the old treaty might have applied. 
According to Article 10.2 of the China-Belgium 2005 BIT, any formal effort to judicialize or arbitrate a dispute 
while the older treaty was in place could have led to the dispute being relegated to resolution under the old treaty, 
rather than permitting it to be taken up under the new treaty once it was in force. 
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rejected Chinese investor’s claim on the jurisdiction.715 
 
b) China Heilongjiang International Economic & Technical Cooperative Corp. and 
others v. the Republic of Mongolia 
 
This case brought by a trio of Chinese investors against Mongolia has been withdrawn 
prior to the final hearings scheduled for February 2013. Following the cancellation of 
a license in 2009, three Chinese investors in the Tumurtei iron ore mine provoked the 
arbitration. The claimants contend that Mongolian authorities have breached 
protections contained in the 1991 China-Mongolia investment treaty, as well as the 
terms of a Mongolian investment protection statute. The arbitration is a purely ad-hoc 
proceeding (rather than a claim brought under institutional arbitration rules, such as 
those of the ICSID or the SCC). 
 
c) Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China716 
 
A financially-embattled Malaysian construction and development company has 
brought an arbitration claim against China at the ICSID. This is the first time that 
China has been sued in an ICSID arbitration. The Malaysian investor, Ekran, is 
claiming the rights to 900 hectares of land for reconstruction in China. 
 
Dispute: The arbitration by Ekran is the first claim logged against China at the 
ICSID.
717
 However, scrutiny of the company’s financial statements indicates that a 
Chinese subsidiary of the company, Sino-Malaysia Culture & Art Co. Ltd., held an 
ownership stake in lease-holdings for three parcels of land totalling 900 hectares in 
                                                        
715 The claimants file a counter-memorial on jurisdiction on12 May, 2014. 
716 ICSID case No. ARB/11/15. 
717 According to Malaysian business press reports, the company’s Chairman Tan Sri Ting Pek Khiing enjoyed 
close ties to the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamad, and the company had worked on several 
major projects, including a large hydroelectric dam and the development of hotel resorts in Malaysia and abroad. 
According to the same Malaysian business press reports, the company struggled in more recent years to pay debts. 
Trading of its shares was suspended in October 2008, and the company was de-listed from the Kuala Lumpur stock 
exchange in January 2010. 
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China’s Hainan province. Ekran company records show that the leases were granted 
in the early 1990s and were to run for 70 years. However, in 2004, the company’s 
financial records disclosed that local authorities in Hainan province were moving to 
revoke the leasehold rights due to the company’s failure to move forward with its 
development plans. An important charge was recorded in Ekran’s books in 2004. The 
following year, Ekran’s financial records confirm that the company’s rights to the 
Chinese landholdings were revoked as a result of the failure of a subsidiary “to 
develop the land as stipulated under the local legislation.” 
    In subsequent years, Ekran’s Annual Reports have disclosed that its Chinese 
subsidiary, Sino-Malaysia Culture & Art Co. Ltd has been deconsolidated from the 
company’s financial statements. Notwithstanding the company’s 70% equity stake in 
SMCAC, Ekran no longer exercises control over the company. The company’s 
publicly available records do not clarify the reasons why Ekran lost control over the 
Chinese company through which its Chinese assets were held. Ekran’s publicly 
available financial records do not disclose whether the company took legal action in 
the Chinese courts following the loss of the property leases. However, on 24 May 
2011, the ICSID arbitration facility disclosed that the company had filed the 
arbitration against China. 
 
Procedure: The proceeding has been suspended, pursuant to both parties’ agreement. 
The parties filed a request for the discontinuance of the proceeding pursuant to ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 43(1). In addition, the Secretary-General issued a procedural order 
taking note of the discontinuance of the proceeding pursuant to ICSID Arbitration 
Rule 43(1). 
    To conclude, recently updated Chinese BITs have revised procedural provisions, 
including consent to the jurisdiction of Investor-State Arbitrations (ISA) for all 
disputes, although transparency in dispute settlement proceedings is still in need. It is 
not unusual for a BIT to require investor-state parties to first attempt to resolve their 
differences amicably through negotiations, before resorting to arbitration. In the only 
ISA case that has been taken against China so far, Ekron Berhad v. China, 
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investor-state negotiations did not take place in a transparent fashion. 
5.4 A Comparison between Different Remedial Actions 
International trade theory is based on comparative advantage,
718
 as developed by 
David Ricardo. Since Ricardo formulated this theory, there has been a shift in the 
focus of trade theory from a country-, to industry-, to firm-specific analysis.
719
 
Openness to foreign trade and investment, coupled with complementary reforms, 
typically leads to fast growth. In particular, developing countries that do not have 
access to world markets are far worse off than those that do. Therefore, trade requires 
a broader context to achieve a full community between different countries. 
In this context, the fundamental rights related to globalization include the 
rule-of-law, good governance, institution building, and press freedom, etc. 
Traditionally, WTO members have been free to unilaterally decide their domestic 
policy, but they do not discriminate against imported products.
720
 It is up to the WTO 
members to determine the extent to which they are representing the corporate interests 
that are reflected in WTO dispute settlement. 
5.4.1 Firm’s Lobbying 
Firms can strongly lobby governments. In the China—X-Ray Equipment dispute, two 
firms (one European, the other Chinese) took the lead in pressing for antidumping 
measures in their respective home markets.
721
 The imposition of antidumping duties 
in this manner triggered a reveral of dynamics set forth in Krugman (1984), and the 
home market of the embattled incumbent (EU company) is now closed to the new 
                                                        
718 “Comparative advantage’ is determined by the opportunity cost of producing a good, rather than the amount of 
resources committed to its production”. See Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, Marc J. Melitz, International 
Economic: Theory and policy, Tenth Edition, Pearson, 2015.  
719 See P. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade, Volume 1, GATT, the MIT Press, 2016. p23. 
720 Horn and Mavroidis ed., The Economic and Legal Principle in World Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 
2013. 
721 Many of the US claims were similar to those raised in several previous WTO dispute brought by the US 
against China: China—GOES, and China—X-Ray Equipment, and in China—Broiler Products. (antidumping 
cases) 
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entrant (a Chinese company).
722
 This case implied that the antidumping measures 
may emerge because of firm-led initiatives calling for the government to take action 
to counter and/or support industrial policy.
723
 It is more complicated than the 
traditional government-led model. 
    In this picture of China’s participation in investor-state arbitration (ISA), so far, 
there are few decided cases in which China was the respondent. But there have been 
some cases provoked by Chinese investors. As mentioned above, a Malaysian firm 
previously tried to file a case against China in the ICSID. The Malaysian investors 
complained that the local authority denied them the opportunity to renew the license 
for a real estate project in China’s Hainan Island, but later the case was withdrawn 
according to arbitration’s procedure. The process of an investor filing an ISA claim is 
ordinarily done confidentially.  
  In the ICSID, claims by Chinese investors overseas against foreign governments 
are appearing, including a claim for RMB22.8billion brought by China’s Ping An 
insurance company against Belgium. However, there are few publicized documents 
concerning Chinese investor-state disputes. 
    As well as the transparency challenge, China has been reproached for imposing 
rigid constraints on foreign investors, notably a ‘one-by-one’ method of approving 
applications for FDI.
724
 This practice is sometimes criticized for leading to a selective 
investment entry process, through which Chinese regulatory authorities evaluate each 
FDI project, in apparent order, before approaching them.
725
 But, are these criticisms 
of China’s alleged approach towards foreign investment are overstated? China may 
have adopted a ‘dual-track’ policy. On one hand, it concluded BITs with developed 
states primarily to build its economic ties through both inbound and outbound 
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investment. On the other hand, China signed BITs with developing countries 
primarily to strengthen diplomatic alliances and to gain its resource demands.
726
 
  When China’s early BITs permitted disputes to proceed to arbitration was 
dependent on the amount of compensation for expropriation and not on whether China 
had been involved in expropriation.
727
 The underlying assumption was that China’s 
regulation of foreign investment was not subject to legal challenge. 
    China could use de facto retaliation measures against those that resist claims if 
China considers that the treatment of its outbound state enterprises is unduly harsh.
728
 
A further question will ask whether, and to what degree, China is likely to intervene, 
diplomatically or otherwise, on behalf of private outbound investors.
729
 In the 
Chinese Ping An v. Belgium case,
730
 the alleged economic loss of investment interest 
has exceeded US $22billion. In choosing whether to intervene diplomatically, the 
Chinese government could adopt a “cost-benefit analysis”731 to weigh the benefits of 
defending a prominent outbound investor, against the cost of antagonizing the 
government of a foreign state. 
5.4.2 Prospective and Retroactive Remedies 
The remedies described in the GATT/WTO are strictly prospective. In GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings, the claimant states have regularly requested only 
withdrawal of the illegal act without demanding reestablishment of the status quo ante 
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or of the situation that would have existed in the absence of the illegal act.
732
  
Under the WTO system, any compensation or retaliation can thus only be taken 
to induce future compliance. The reason for this prospective remedy is that 
GATT/WTO rules prescribe minimum standards for the non-discriminatory treatment 
of traded goods and, in GATT jurisprudence, are construed to protect ‘expectations on 
the competitive relationship between imported and domestic products’ rather than 
‘expectations on export volumes’. Moreover, it is often impossible to recreate 
retroactively the ‘lost trade opportunities’ or to calculate, and make good for, ‘lost 
trade volumes’. 
Prior to the Australia-Automotive Leather implementation report, it was widely 
accepted by WTO members that the WTO did not provide for retrospective remedies. 
The multilateral trading system was about a balance of rights and obligations with 
WTO remedies to preserve further trading opportunities rather than redress past 
injury.
733
 However, the Automotive Leather implementation panel found that to 
‘withdraw the subsidy’ under Article 4.7 of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement) required retrospective repayment of 
past subsidies. 
The issue of retrospective remedies has been considered in three subsequent 
disputes.
734
 In the Aircraft Subsidies implementation disputes, both Canada and 
Brazil criticized the Automotive Leather findings on ‘withdraw the subsidy’ and 
emphasized they were not seeking a retrospective remedy. They implementation panel 
in Canada-Aircraft Subsidies concluded that: 
[W]e consider that Brazil does not, in fact, want us to make any finding along the lines of 
Australia-Leather Article 21.5. The same is more obviously true of Canada. As noted 
above, we consider that a panel’s findings under Article 21.5 of the DSU should be 
restricted to the scope of the ‘disagreement’ between the parties. In the present case, 
therefore, we do not consider it necessary to make any finding as to whether Article 4.7 
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of the SCM Agreement may encompass repayment of subsidies found to be prohibited.
735
 
 
Similarly, the implementation panel in Brazil-Aircraft Subsidies noted: 
We recall that, under Article 3.7 of the DSU, the aim of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is to secure a positive resolution to a dispute, and that our role under 
Article 21.5 is to render a decision ‘where there is disagreement’ as to the existence 
or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the 
recommendations or rulings of the DSB. Accordingly, we shall address only claims 
that are put before us. Our silence on issues that are not before us should not be taken 
as expressing any view, express or implied, as to whether or not a recommendation to 
‘withdraw’ a prohibited subsidy may encompass repayment of that subsidy.736 
 
The Appellate Body in that dispute stated: ‘In our view, to continue to make payments 
under an export subsidy measure found to be prohibited is not consistent with the 
obligation to “withdraw” prohibited export subsidies, in the sense of “removing” or 
“taking away”.’737 
The cases highlight the marked reluctance of complainants – given the potential 
implications of their own measures in a subsequent dispute—to claim retrospective 
withdrawal.
738
  
    In the United States — Foreign Sales Corporations implementation dispute, the 
EC claimed that the United States’ revised FSC scheme provided subsidies contingent 
upon export performance and accordingly, the United States had failed to comply with 
the recommendations and rulings of the DSB to withdraw the subsidy. The EC did not 
claim that the United States had failed to recall past subsidies provided under the 
original FSC scheme.
739
 
    In contrast, the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism is based on 
the retroactive remedy rule. For example, NAFTA stipulates that arbitral tribunals 
may award only ‘monetary damages and any applicable interest’, ‘restitution of 
property’, and/or ‘costs’. If restitution is awarded, ‘the disputing party may pay 
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monetary damages and any applicable interest instead of restitution’. 740  Such 
retroactive remedies in the ISDS system are indispensable because the primary 
purpose of investment rules is to give an ex post reparation of damages illegally 
inflicted upon a private investor. 
However, retroactive remedies alone are not sufficient. It must be noted that 
many investment rules, including provisions on national treatment and 
most-favoured-nation treatment, also play a role in protecting ‘expectations on the 
competitive relationship’ between investors. Although one particular investor’s 
interest is usually at issue, an arbitral panel’s award is keenly observed by many 
current or potential investors. In this light, prospective remedies announced by an 
arbitral panel can greatly contribute to bringing about both stabilization and 
predictability in shaping future investment decisions. In this sense, the cessation of 
illegal acts and guarantees of non-repetition in addition to any retroactive damage 
awards, may be effectively introduced into the ISDS remedy system. 
 
 
 
                                                        
740 NAFTA Chapter 11. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
New generation IIAs, do not only provide for investment protection, but also gradual 
liberalization. Globalization makes trade and investment more interrelated. Following 
the GATS, an increasing number of FTAs have expanded their scope to market access 
for service sectors and non-service sectors. 
The global picture of investment flows has been changing, with the 
industrializing states of the South (i.e., China, Singapore, South Korea) becoming 
massive exporters of capital. China is expanding its foreign investment, especially in 
the energy sector. This is one reason why China is willing to involve high standards 
for protecting its own investment overseas. Meanwhile, many developed countries are 
changing course to conserve regulatory space. Many NGOs (committed to specific 
sectors, like the environment, human rights, and labour standards) have argued against 
inflexible investment protection on corporations. 
New regional treaties contain wide defences to states’ regulatory space. Tribunals 
often rely on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for the interpretive 
techniques which are used. From a tribunals’ point of view, the agreement is given 
effect on the grounds that foreign investment cannot move unless parties respect the 
obligations to which they promised. 
When interpreting a treaty, the first objective may be the protection of foreign 
investment. Sometimes, tribunals also examine the ‘public interests’ of the state in 
taking measures which are allegedly violating the treaty. 
Chinese investment treaties have undergone some subtle changes since China 
entered into the WTO in 2001. Besides self-standing BITs, China has started to 
negotiate FTAs with investment chapter. The language of investment treaties has 
become longer and more complex. They describe substantive obligations in more 
detail and contain more exceptions. Many BITs borrow the language ‘in like 
circumstances’ from trade agreements as one of the benchmarks in triggering national 
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treatment commitments. 
In order to preserve sufficient regulatory discretion, host states may limit the 
access provisions of the BIT, reserving the right to screen investors, or to place 
conditions on the entry of investment. This is the approach adopted by most early 
BITs.  
    A changed approach allows the host state to keep a broad definition of 
investment, (i.e., permitting the treaty to apply to new forms of investment), while 
limiting the actual scope of the treaty’s application. That is, host states limit the scope 
of market access, but make deeper commitments to nondiscrimination, transparency 
and rule-of-law principles. These principles under trade law have a significant 
influence on the formation of new BITs/PTAs. 
    Investment treaties encourage host states to admit more foreign investment, 
while simultaneously retaining a greater right to regulate the investment once 
established. This approach allows the state to grant a broad right of access to foreign 
investment, but to also adopt more carefully calibrated substantive provisions. 
Therefore, if the state is concerned with the volatility of portfolio investment, rather 
than excluding portfolio investment from the definition of investment or imposing 
limitations on the admission of portfolio investment, it can draft the currency transfers 
provision with exceptions for exigent economic circumstances. Similarly, if the host 
state is concerned with the ability of local enterprises to compete with foreign 
investment in certain sectors of the economy, the host state may reserve the right to 
derogate from the obligation of national treatment in those sectors, at least for some 
particular period of time. In investment treaties, these principles exist as a subtle way 
to circumvent certain provisions. 
    In recent years, developed OECD countries have already sought to achieve a 
balance between investors’ interests and the regulatory measures of the host state. In 
the future, states will be more careful in sculpting their substantive obligations, 
including the use of more specific language and the provision for more exceptions; 
and will create for their BIT partners a role in predicting the proceedings of 
investment dispute settlements. 
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The new BITs also tend to include more procedure rules. One innovation of the 
BIT movement is the inclusion of provisions in the treaties for investors to bring 
claims against host states to an international arbitration tribunal. Many new 
investment treaties have included advance consent from the state for an aggrieved 
investor to commence Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). Most of China’s 
recent FTAs provide for Investor-State Arbitration as well. 
The balance is also gradually shifting from bilateral to regional treaty making. 
Trade liberalization, accompanied by investment policy, has had a significant impact 
on economic development. Only after China joined the WTO, did it start to conclude 
PTAs. Most BITs do not deal with market access restrictions per se, (i.e., sectoral 
entry prohibition), although some impose discipline on performance requirements 
(and similar TRIMs). 
BITs also guarantee MFN and national treatment. Chinese PTAs and recent BITs 
are influenced by a new investment policy that seeks a better balance of the protection 
of foreign investors and host countries’ regulatory rights. Although China may have 
been defensive with regard to commitments that go beyond the level of investment 
liberalization found in Chinese BITs, China is willing to grant MFN treatment in the 
pre-establishment phase. 
China joined the trend to incorporate the investment discipline into FTAs. PTAs 
go beyond the level of investment protection and liberalization usually found in old 
BITs. China’s overall PTA policy is driven by economic as well as political reasons. A 
few PTAs have added provisions safeguarding the right to regulate for sustainable 
development. They contain exceptions to transfer-of-funds obligations or prudential 
carve-outs; and cautiously regulate Investor-State Dispute Settlement by limiting 
treaty provisions that are subject to Investor-State Arbitration. 
Lastly, the case-law reflects that although parties to investment disputes have 
invoked WTO jurisprudence and tribunals have given it consideration, it is hard to 
detect the actual influence of the trade regime’s jurisprudence on national treatment. 
Consequently, the investment tribunals apply a national treatment test that is 
significantly different from that applied by the trade regime. China is learning how to 
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improve transparency, for example through increasing access to hearings by 
non-parties. 
It is particularly important for China to highlight its compliance with investment 
treaties’ commitments, including the implementation of the rules. China should 
implement its commitment to the WTO, otherwise, it will face countermeasures. 
China should also implement competition rules in its own markets to improve firms’ 
efficiency. 
Through its ‘silk road’, China can help improve the economic development of 
countries along the way. The development of the Chinese ‘Belt and Road’ strategy, 
into an actual two-way street with traffic regulation is through the rule-of-law. 
Current rising tensions and long term existential vulnerabilities – particularly in China 
– may thus be overcome without resort to the threat of violence. 
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